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The Political Economy of Transnational Drug Trafficking:  
Criminal Rackets and State-Making in Modern Mexico 
Alejandro Lerch Huacuja 
Abstract 
Far from embodying distinct social actors, the line separating the ‘police’ from the ‘criminal’ 
is historically fluid and at times very thin. Generated by the capitalisation of economic rela-
tions, waves of bandits and criminals have often been instrumental to advance the interests 
of their enabling economic and political elites by forming the security apparatuses (reliant on 
preying, delinquency and extortion) supporting the elites' hegemony. Mexicans, at multiple 
stages in the country's national history, have become well-acquainted with the blend of le-
gality and illegality characterising the country’s security sector. Building from historical so-
ciology, comparative studies and critical approaches to policing, this thesis argues that crim-
inal activities (in particular contraband and drug trafficking) were important political econo-
mies supporting the development of the state security apparatus under the PRI regime in 
Mexico (1940s to 1990s). The thesis documents the paradoxical but regular input of criminal 
markets into the political economies of pacification, policing and state repression, taking 
place at crucial junctures in the history of the single-party state, and assisting the production 
of its particular socioeconomic order. This ‘instrumentalisation’ of transnational criminal 
markets connects with and replicates little-studied Cold War security dynamics whereby the 
reach of the U.S. security apparatus (global policing, paramilitarism, counterinsurgency, 
dirty wars, etc.) was expanded by tapping into criminal activity in host nations. Building from 
the Mexican experience, the thesis argues that state rackets in (transnational) crime generated 
political economies that, embedded into local processes, played a notable part in the making 
of capitalist modernity, liberal state making and empire. The thesis documents in particular 
the ancillary role of drug and contraband markets in the operation of the PRI’s central security 
bodies, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad and the Policía Judicial Federal. Drawing from 
multi-archival research and unprecedented testimonies by former law enforcement agents, 
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the thesis provides a new framework to grasp the important role of criminal-police entangle-
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On December 9, 2019, the architect of the War on Drugs in Mexico, Genaro García Luna, 
was taken into custody in Dallas by the FBI on charges of having taken millions in bribes 
from drug cartels since 2001. His arrest was a cognitive shock in Mexico. More than anyone 
else, García Luna embodied the government’s assault on drug trafficking –– an onslaught 
that has come to define the history of 21st century Mexico, nearing today half a million deaths. 
From 2000 to 2012, the power of García Luna over the security apparatus had been para-
mount. It included directing counterinsurgency operations at the country’s national intelli-
gence agency, as well as heading the increasingly militarised ranks of the national police.  
Learning that the top ‘general’ of the war on the cartels was being accused in the U.S. of 
enabling them was very hard to digest, particularly in a country devastated by the policies 
and decisions adopted by a national security elite headed by García Luna and his subordi-
nates. Had the Mexican government been unaware of his connections to drug traffickers all 
this time? –– a tricky question, given that García Luna embodied the federal security appa-
ratus in Mexico to a large extent. What about the U.S.? Why was the U.S. government press-
ing drug trafficking charges against an official who had enjoyed full access to and support 
from U.S. security and law enforcement agencies for decades? The arrest of García Luna 
represented a cognitive puzzle that specialists and scholars in Mexico seemed ill-equipped to 
address. Some noted how the event called for a historical reinterpretation of the ‘War on 
Drugs’ in Mexico: a reconsideration of its internal logic and a reassessment of its fundamen-
tal aims.  
Looking back, the arrest of García Luna should not have been all that surprising. The extent 
to which the federal government in Mexico (its central security institutions and national po-
litical elites) established protection rackets in the transnational drug business throughout the 
20th century was historically constant. Part of the reason why these cases seem so puzzling, 
however, is the limited and tangential attention given by scholars to the historical connections 
between state institutions and the drug business, as well as the political aims and structural 
processes that these entanglements have historically enabled. On the one hand, the scholar-
ship has tended to assume that ‘state’ and ‘criminal’ embody differentiated historical actors. 
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‘Police’ and ‘bandit’ are often cast as naturally opposed categories and the ‘corrupt’ devia-
tions represented by their ‘entanglements’ are thought of as an exception rather than the 
norm. As this thesis will note, recent approaches to the drug business have tended to miss, in 
particular, the paradoxical importance of the ‘criminal’ in the consolidation of ‘security’ in 
20th century Mexico. On the other hand, when describing the historical entanglements be-
tween criminal and state actors, the dominant post-structuralist frameworks in Mexican his-
toriography have tended to overlook the input of these economies in processes and geogra-
phies that transcend local and culturalist boundaries. By casting power relations as notori-
ously heterogeneous and geographically dispersed, dominant approaches to Mexican history 
have downplayed the possibility of a synthetical understanding of the input of drug markets 
in the making of Mexican modernity. Of course, an emphasis on variation and heterogeneity 
has shed light on the messy and complex mosaic of power relations in 20th century Mexico, 
but it has also precluded a more nuanced understanding of the aims and drivers behind the 
extortion of criminal activities by national elites and state institutions. The literature’s char-
acterisation of 20th century Mexico as a ‘weak’ state is particularly surprising when one con-
siders, for example, the capacity of the central state to exert a highly coherent and integrated 
form of control over major criminal activities for decades. As the thesis will note, this capac-
ity to control drug markets became an important sustenance in articulating national govern-
ance, deploying state violence, and paving the way for the capitalist process. The relatively 
low levels of criminal violence characterising the Mexican drug market until very recently 
have been noticed as a positive outcome stemming, especially, from this relatively centralised 
and coherent form of state control.  
Limited interest in making sense of the central gradients in the history of drug markets partly 
explains why we seem puzzled when cases like García Luna turn our frame of reference 
(‘state versus criminals’, ‘entanglements are relevant mostly at local levels’) upside down. 
Looking to contribute towards a more encompassing understanding of the input of the ‘crim-
inal’ in the state-making process in modern Mexico, the thesis will revisit key transitions in 
the history of criminal rackets in the drug and contraband economies, beginning with their 
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modern inception in the 1940s and concluding with their fragmentation in the 1990s. In con-
trast to predominant post-structuralist frameworks in Mexican historiography, which cast 
state power as the crystallisation of the ‘social’ or the synthesis of multiple ‘local’ processes, 
the thesis credits the role of the state and national elites in driving the political process and 
the structural transformations that shaped the country’s modernity. Likewise, it locates the 
Mexican ‘state’ within a transnational and highly unequal geography of power where domes-
tic outcomes are not explicable without accounting for the input of external interventions and 
global economic interests. Rooted in a global perspective1, the thesis emphasises in particular 
how the evolution of the state racket in the drug economy during the second half of the 20th 
century in Mexico replicates experiences and patterns that connect and compare with expe-
riences in the transnational plane.    
The thesis argues that the interest in studying state involvement in drug economies (and in 
criminal activities more generally) transcends the act of ‘corruption’ that it obviously em-
bodies as well as the cultural landscapes where it is normalised into an everyday, acceptable 
routine. From a political perspective, drug rackets (especially in transnational markets) are 
interesting because of their association with security processes that, during the Cold War, in 
particular, allowed relevant states to generate a certain social order, repress class antagonisms 
and political dissent, police alienated populations, neutralise the manifestations of ‘internal 
enemies’, empower authoritarian politics and channel external interventions with dramatic 
implications for the ‘subaltern’. In other words, state rackets are also interesting because of 
their input in limiting the realm of the historically possible. The instrumentalisation of these 
markets in Mexico during the Cold War replicated to an important extent the logic and con-
nected with the global history, of geographies in Indochina, Burma, Turkey, Lebanon, Co-
lombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Central America. In these heterogeneous and varied geographies, 
the need to police antagonised societies drove their underfunded, corrupt, and inefficient 
governments to tap into these economies to generate paramilitarised security to shape the 
 
1 See: Drayton, Richard, and David Motadel. "Discussion: the futures of global history." Journal of Global History, vol. 
13, no. 1, 2018, pp. 1-21; O’Brien, Patrick. "Historical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global his-
tory." Journal of Global History, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 3-39; Conrad, Sebastian. What is Global History? Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2016.  
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social order. In all of these geographies, state intervention in drug economies enhanced pro-
active and reactive capabilities to deal with peasant insurrections, militant labour unions, 
social leaders, nationalist movements, socialist and communist actors, thus paving the way 
for an agenda centred on the forceful deployment of (U.S.-led) capitalism. A point to under-
line here is that the instrumentalisation of criminal markets during this period served an 
agenda aimed not only at advancing U.S. foreign policy in Cold War theatres but aimed more 
precisely at pacifying the social antagonisms generated by it2. The beginning of the Cold War 
in Mexico went hand in hand with the consolidation of the political system that would rule 
the country for the remainder of the 20th century: the single-party regime of the Partido Revo-
lucionario Institucional (PRI). This historical junction saw the establishment of a new na-
tional security agency tasked with extinguishing the remaining energies of the Mexican Rev-
olution and paving the way for the intense form of capitalist relations that followed. Put dif-
ferently, a new ‘long’ historical cycle, predicated on a much more embedded relationship 
between state and capital had to develop the coercive capacity to address the social antago-
nisms that capitalist accumulation was likely to entail. This national agency was the Direc-
ción Federal de Seguridad (DFS), which from the beginning was supported by an unofficial 
‘licence’ to generate rents through criminal activities. In other words, to compensate for the 
government’s fiscal incapacity to support its security necessities (an incapacity generated, 
amongst other things, by its close relationship with capital), the state turned to criminal econ-
omies to generate these rents. The extent to which criminal economies undergirded the secu-
rity processes and bureaucracies supporting the regime in power hints at why these practices 
were fully tolerated and encouraged by the political elite. The instrumentalisation of criminal 
economies to ‘generate’ a new social order in Mexico enjoyed the support of, and replicated 
strategies deployed elsewhere by the U.S. government. 
The instrumentalisation of criminals to service territorial expansion, political consolidation, 
and capitalist agendas, of course, represents a primal and well-established practice in global 
 
2 For a discussion of the concept of ‘pacification’, especially with regards to ‘pacifying’ the antagonisms generated by 
capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, see: Schrader, Stuart. Badges without borders: how global counterinsurgency 
transformed American policing. University of California Press, 2019; as well as Neocleous, Mark. "A brighter and nicer 
new life: Security as pacification." Social & Legal Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 2011, pp. 191-208. 
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history. The use of ‘criminals’, ‘predators’, or ‘bandits’ has been a key but often understudied 
vehicle employed by emerging dominant classes to ‘secure’ new forms of economic relations 
and consolidate broader geographies of power. The emergence of liberal states in the 18th 
and 19th centuries involved almost universally the incorporation and enablement of criminal 
gangs to contain the social antagonisms and state collapse generated by the liberalisation of 
feudal polities. The success of bandit gangs became predicated on their relationship with new 
elites, and the security of these new elites became contingent, in turn, on services provided 
by ‘licensed’ criminals and bandits. In Mexico, for example, the first national police (created 
by the early liberal state in the mid-1800s) incorporated bandit gangs (who continued prey-
ing, if more selectively) to impose new property and labour conditions on the liberalised 
peasantry. The intense social grievances implicated by structural liberalisation would spin 
out of control and trigger, a few decades later, the Mexican Revolution. An argument ad-
vanced here is that the global use of banditry to contain social antagonisms and consolidate 
emerging nation-states in the 18th and 19th centuries anticipates the aims and logic that are 
served, under different historical circumstances, by Cold War security apparatuses and their 
relationship to organised crime. Of course, the relationship between state actors and criminals 
in both periods is very different, and the arguments advanced here do not seek to gloss over 
the enormous qualitative disparities that separate these examples. However, in spite of these 
great differences, there are also notable regularities worth noting in order to grasp and syn-
thesise little-studied dynamics in modern state formation and, in particular, the overlooked, 
regular and decisive input of criminals in political modernity.  
In other words, the idea here is to make better sense of what has brought (and is likely to 
continue to bring) these two seemingly antagonistic actors ––states and bandits, police and 
criminals–– to collaborate so regularly. The first chapter lays down the theoretical frame-
work. It adopts a Tillyan perspective on state-making whereby state-making involves, by 
definition, predatory extortion, and criminal activities. The chapter argues that the common 
identity of ‘criminals’ and ‘rulers’ stems from the fact that both depend on the same mecha-
nism to generate income: the means of violence. Building on the theoretical affinity of extor-
tion and state-making, the chapter then discusses the historical importance of extorters and 
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criminals in securing the chaotic transition from premodern to capitalist societies, a transition 
framed by state collapse, the suppression of political barriers to capital accumulation, and the 
emergence of bourgeoisie hegemony.  An argument advanced here is that structural capital-
isation/liberalisation tends to generate the very banditry that, subsequently, emerging classes 
have little option but to co-opt. Echoing these dynamics in the consolidation of early moder-
nity, the instrumentalisation of transnational drug markets in the 20th century played a similar 
role in containing the social tensions generated by economic dislocation brought about by 
U.S.-led capitalism during the Cold War. By noting the relationship between liberalisation 
and the instrumentalisation of banditry in early capitalist Mexico, the chapter anticipates the 
analogous relationship between neoliberal reform, expanded banditry (the drug wars), and 
the co-optation of some of this banditry by neoliberal elites (through the likes of García Luna) 
to police and repress the social antagonisms generated by the liberalisation process.   
The second chapter introduces the reader to the PRI regime, as well as to the role that criminal 
economies played in its early political consolidation. It introduces the regime by discussing 
the evolution of Mexican historiography on PRI development and noting, in particular, how 
predominant academic discourses that privilege subnational and localist frameworks have 
tended to underestimate or draw attention away from national and global actors of key im-
portance in the making of PRI modernity. After this brief literature review, the chapter begins 
to problematise the relationship between the state and the bandit in the early PRI period. 
What explains the strong involvement of the Mexican state in criminal activity? What did the 
Mexican state gain from this involvement, other than economic benefits? Why were these 
‘entanglements’ so blatantly encouraged by party elites? How do these processes reflect on 
other cases in global history? 
The third chapter discusses the nexus between the DFS and transnational drug markets in the 
1970s and early 1980s. The chapter not only notes the extent to which protection rackets in 
criminal economies became entangled with ‘pacification’ and counterinsurgency campaigns 
during this repressive period but the extent to which these campaigns led to a tighter form of 
state control of drug markets. The chapter documents novel aspects of the landmark 1977 
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drug enforcement Condor operation. This landmark, U.S.-led militarised eradication and in-
terdiction campaign in northwestern Mexico marked the testing ground and early global de-
ployment of the ‘War on Drugs’. An operation studied mostly as a drug enforcement cam-
paign, Condor involved cloaked transfers of military hardware aimed at expanding the lim-
ited capabilities of the Mexican government to address mounting insurrection in the sierras. 
In this regard, Condor anticipates later drug enforcement campaigns in Latin America (such 
as Plan Colombia) that, rather than dismantling drug economies, built on these economies to 
police, pacify and repress social antagonisms. Condor is important because it lifts the veil on 
the logic that informs U.S. transfers to host countries under the veil of drug enforcement.  
Chapter four documents how, following the dismantlement of the DFS in the mid-1980s 
(which resulted from the public exposure of its involvement in drug markets), the PRI state 
continued to extort transnational drug activity through an expanded national police: the 
Policía Judicial Federal (PJF). Using rare access to former PJF as well as Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) officials, the chapter documents the operations, processes, and hier-
archies that a ‘racket’ of this scale can involve. Like the DFS before it, the very operation of 
the PJF became reliant on the extortion of drug trafficking and contraband activity, underlin-
ing the extent to which the political economy of security under the PRI regime continued to 
be supported by contraband and drugs. A key difference, however, was that the new racket 
under the PJF lost its association with a national security agenda (an agenda rooted in the 
hegemony of the PRI regime and Cold War compromises) and began instead to gravitate 
closer to the agendas of a technocratic faction that changed the socio-economic landscape of 
the country to an extent not seen since the days of the Mexican Revolution.   
Chapter five shifts from the ‘national’ to the ‘local’ by focusing on the recent evolution of 
‘rackets’ in the state of Tamaulipas, a region that not only represents the most important 
criminal corridor in Mexican history but the area where the recent explosion in drug violence 
originated first. The history of criminal rackets in Tamaulipas mirrors the general ‘racketeer-
ing’ trajectory that constructed and deconstructed the Mexican state in the 20th century, going 
from protection rackets supporting local power (1920s to 1930s) to rackets in support of a 
centralization process (1940s to 1980s) to rackets captured by an emergent technocratic and 
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neoliberal elite (1980s and 1990s) to the decentralisation of the drug racket and its embed-
dedness in local politics and centrifugal dynamics. The last chapter of the thesis contributes 
to the discussion of violence in Mexico by documenting more thoroughly the transition from 
a relatively centralised to a relatively de-centralised scheme of political protection of trans-
national criminal activity. The collapse of the PRI racket led to a proliferation of ‘security 
apparatuses’ that, in addition to the drug economy, began to tap into whatever low-barrier 
economy was made available. This led to a swarm of preying, extortion, and violence that 
changed the face of Mexico. This swarm emerged first in Tamaulipas and was called Los 
Zetas.  
After fifty years of relative centralisation under the PRI state, the means of violence in Mex-
ico became disjointed, protracted, disordered. Criminal economies formerly supporting an 
articulate and coherent organisation of the means of violence began at this hour to support, 
instead, a growing pool of non-state security apparatuses. Reflecting in some ways the secu-
rity dynamics involved in the liberalisation process in late 19th century Mexico, the recent 
neo-liberalisation of the country not only led to a proliferation of ‘banditry’ but expanded the 
importance of ‘bandits’ in the security processes of a society undergoing unprecedented 
structural change. Along with an enormous militarised effort aimed at containing the outburst 
of organised crime, the emerging (neo)liberal state had little choice but to co-opt and instru-
mentalise some of the banditry that it had generated to bring some sense of security into this 
new socioeconomic order. The need to generate a security apparatus through the co-option 
of some of this banditry helps make sense of the puzzle that García Luna and many others 
currently embody.  
The challenges associated with addressing the ‘obscure’ question of state involvement in 
organised crime are evident. Looking into the ‘deep’, ‘grey’, ‘parallel’ spaces in which ‘ex-
ceptions’ to ‘legalise the illegal’ are possible is a challenging undertaking. In spite of these 
obstacles, documenting these processes and casting them as an integral part of the history of 
the modern state ought to be an important item in the research agenda not only to present a 
more realistic picture of the history of the capitalist state but because of the need to challenge 
these practices if we aspire to construct democratic, functional and equal societies. The aim 
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of the thesis has not been to single-out particular actors for their involvement in criminal 
economies but to make sense of their actions, the historical context in which their actions 
took place, and the extent to which they can be better explained by looking at their resem-
blance and connections with global experiences. The thesis sits at the intersection of com-
parative studies, historical sociology, and critical approaches to policing. It seeks to contrib-
ute to a growing body of literature that, as will be noted in Chapter One, casts ‘criminals’ and 
the ‘police’ as social actors contingent on the dynamics of structural transformation. It also 
aims at making better sense of how the history of state involvement in drug markets in Mex-
ico reflects on the embeddedness of ‘police’ and ‘criminals’ driving violent conflict in con-
temporary Mexico. The thesis employs historical methods and draws in particular from pri-
mary sources. These sources include, especially, multiple historical archives in Mexico and 
the United States, as well as semi-structured, open-ended confidential interviews with (re-
tired) federal police officers and DEA agents.  
Archival material includes declassified intelligence memos, embassy cables, court records, 
government reports, and working papers produced by government agencies available at the 
National Security Archive (Washington D.C.), the National Archives and Records Admin-
istration (Maryland), the Charles Bowden Collection at the University of Texas (San Marcos) 
and the Archivo General de la Nación (Mexico City). Interviewees include two former high-
ranking members of the PJF (who chose to remain anonymous), a former DEA field agent 
(Salvador Martinez), a former DEA director for National Intelligence (Phil Jordan), and the 
DEA agent tasked with the early investigation of Enrique Camarena’s murder (who chose to 
remain anonymous). The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured style, broadly fol-
lowing customised questionnaires but leaving ample room for the interlocutors to share their 
experiences. Contact with these actors was sometimes made through intermediaries in the 




Chapter 1 - Theoretical discussion: the bandit in historical perspective 
This chapter lays down the theoretical framework and anticipates the key ideas that guide the 
thesis. The aim of the chapter is to underline and make better sense of the often-overlooked 
role of bandits in the making of political modernity. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first section, very briefly, invites the reader to consider ‘state-making’ at a very basic 
level. Employing a Tyllian framework, it argues that political power originates and matures 
as an extortion racket. The key attribute of this process is the generation of security; its plain-
est and crudest embodiment, an extorting criminal. State-making is a process continuously 
coinhabited by an economic actor (generating surplus) and its protector (a security appa-
ratus). Building from this framework, the second section discusses banditry in historical 
praxis, in particular its role in the construction of political modernity. Drawing from the rich 
literature on social banditry introduced by Eric Hobsbawm, but more in particular from the 
revisionist literature advanced by Anton Blok, the section discusses the ancillary role of ban-
ditry in the consolidation of liberal states in the 18th and 19th centuries. The section shows 
how, paradoxically, bandits were often instrumental in the creation of the institution tasked 
with securing political modernity: the police. Finally, the third section shows how the instru-
mentalisation of banditry to advance the interests of states and empires extends to the con-
temporary world. The role of brigands and mercenaries in the 17th and 18th centuries antici-
pates the input of transnational drug markets in the security strategies of Cold War conflicts 
and the articulation of American global hegemony.  
The bandit and the racketeering continuum 
In his landmark essay, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, Charles Tilly 
lays down a very useful and straightforward theory of how political structures develop. State-
making results from the interaction and overlapping interests of two distinct social actors: 
economic actors and security agents. Economic actors need to secure their property. Security 
actors need to extract some surplus in order to make a living. The embeddedness of capital 
and security generates state-making, not as a historical end, but as a process. From ancestral 
gangs to fiefdom chiefs to medieval kings to constitutional governments, rulers extract levies 
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from economic agents, and they do so primarily to enhance their security capabilities. As 
Tilly notes, protection to farmers from predators, protection to shepherds from cattle-rustlers, 
protection to villagers from outside raiders, are examples of the austere dynamics that set the 
state-making process in motion. Successful ‘protection’ opens larger pools of taxable wealth 
that the security apparatus can tap into, hence expand3. Preying, banditry, piracy, gangland, 
policing, war-making are all forms of ‘extortion’ rackets whereby security actors sell or im-
pose ‘security’. All belong to the same historical continuum and represent state-making as a 
fundamental, constantly updating social and historical process. Naturally, in the long term, 
the interests of economic agents must align with the interests of the security apparatus and 
vice-versa in order for the joint venture to be successful. The particulars of this alignment 
are, of course, contingent on many social and historical factors, but the fundamental dynam-
ics of how power is built and rebuilt remain in place.  
Power holders’ pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the 
extraction of resources for war making from the populations 
over which they had control and in the promotion of capital 
accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. 
War making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted 
to shape European state making. […] In the long run, the quest 
inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to cap-
italists who could supply and arrange credit and in imposing 
one form of regular taxation or another on the people and ac-
tivities within their spheres of control4. 
 
3 By security apparatus I refer to the internal and external security capabilities of states. Security is understood here in a 
literal sense, and thus ‘security apparatus’ refers to the bodies who protect rulers from internal and external threats, such 
as armies and the police. The term echoes Althusser´s “Repressive State Apparatus”, which includes the army, the police, 
the judiciary, and the prison system. Coercive capabilities are established on the ability to deploy violence, actual and la-
tent. They are different from soft power, which is the ruling class´ ability to hold on to power by masking the exploited 
condition of the subaltern classes. See: Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an 
investigation)." The anthropology of the state: A reader, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, pp. 86-98. 
4 Tilly, Charles. "War making and state making as organized crime." Bringing the state back in, edited by Evans, Peter B., 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169-191, p. 172. 
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From a similar perspective, Marcur Olson argues that early forms of state-making resulted 
less from mobile bandits (who came, plundered, and left) and more from stationary bandits 
(who rather than plundering and leaving, stayed on to prey). He reflects: “Why should war-
lords, who were stationary bandits continuously stealing from a given group of victims, be 
preferred, by those victims, to roving bandits who soon departed?”5. Olson suggests that, in 
contrast to itinerant and purely predatory theft, stationary bandits were bound to establish a 
more ‘rational’ form of protection racket, temper their predatory instincts, and offer at least 
one service to economic agents: protection from other predators. As Olson notes, “[w]ith the 
rational monopolization of theft - in contrast to uncoordinated competitive theft - the victims 
of the theft can expect to retain whatever capital they accumulate after tax [and] and therefore 
also have an incentive to save and to invest, thereby increasing future income and tax re-
ceipts”6. 
The birth of the economy is thus contingent on the demand for ‘protection’, setting in motion 
the social dynamics that we associate with the category of the state. The transition from 
hunter-gathering to agricultural societies not only generated the first form of capital in need 
of protection but also the first form of surplus capable of supporting a structure of protection. 
Archaeologists have noted that the Neolithic revolution altered the edifice of politics in a 
fundamental sense: it transformed a society organised largely along communal lines and con-
sensual politics into a more hierarchical and stratified social organisation where power began 
to concentrate in a handful few7. The demand and the possibility of protection generated the 
pivotal transition leading from the horizontal politics of bon sauvage to the hierarchical pol-
itics of Leviathan.  
 
5 Olson, Mancur. "Dictatorship, democracy, and development." American political science review, vol. 87, no. 3, 1993, 
pp. 567-576, p. 568. 
6 Idem, p. 568. 
7 Earle, Timothy. Bronze Age Economics: the first political economies. Routledge, 2018; Earle, Timothy, and Kristian 
Kristiansen, eds. Organizing Bronze Age Societies: The Mediterranean, Central Europe, and Scandinavia Compared. 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. See also: Gilman, Antonio, et al. "The development of social stratification in Bronze 
Age Europe [and comments and reply]." Current anthropology, vol. 22, no. 1, 1981, pp. 1-23; Bar‐Yosef, Ofer. "The 
Natufian culture in the Levant, threshold to the origins of agriculture." Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Re-
views, vol. 6, no. 5, 1998, pp. 159-177. 
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Developing and supporting security capabilities became the pressing concern for those in-
vested in providing it. In Europe, chiefs, kings, and emperors until the 18th century invested 
almost their entire income in expanding their capabilities to deploy violence. As Olson notes, 
“[t]hough the pyramids, the palace of Versailles, the Taj Mahal, and even Imelda Marcos' 
three thousand pairs of shoes were expensive, the social costs of autocratic leaders arise 
mostly out of their appetites for military power, international prestige, and larger domains”8. 
Levies collected by emerging polities were invested to a large extent in raising armies, paying 
for mercenaries, and running state armouries. Reflecting the austerity of the feudal economy, 
the low availability of capital until the 18th century made it very difficult for states to support 
professionalised and permanent military structures. Despite investing the lion’s share of state 
revenue in security, permanent security bureaucracies were inexistent in Europe until the 18th 
and 19th centuries9. War-making was mobilised by looting and the promise of rewards, rather 
than the meagre salaries or wages disbursed by rulers. This transient form of security appa-
ratus corresponded with a political structure composed less of a centralised authority concen-
trating revenue powers and more of intermediaries and local power holders collecting levies 
from peasants and ruling fiefdoms as personal turfs. No European state made a serious at-
tempt to institute direct rule until the French Revolution10.  
This began to change, of course, when the underlying economic base began to expand. In 
Europe, this initially took place with the emergence of European burgs around the time of 
the Renaissance, which concentrated (geographically) the taxable wealth that rulers could tap 
into and reduced the transaction costs associated with tax collection11. Larger extractions, 
ultimately spent in security and defence, allowed for the permanency and gradual profession-
alisation of armies. As Tilly points out, “After 1400, the European pursuit of larger, more 
 
8 Olson, Mancur. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3, 1993, 
pp. 567-576, p. 569. 
9 Tilly, Charles. "Cities and states in Europe, 1000–1800." Theory and Society, vol. 18, no. 5, 1989, pp. 563-584; also: 
Tilly, Charles. "Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650." Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in 
Politics and State Formation, edited by Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 
37-81. 
10 Tilly, Charles. Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
11 Levi, Margaret. Of rule and revenue. University of California Press, 1989. 
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permanent, and costlier varieties of military organisation did, in fact, drive spectacular in-
creases in princely budgets, taxes, and staffs. After 1500 or so, princes who managed to create 
the costly varieties of military organisation were, indeed, able to conquer new chunks of 
territory”12. Even more importantly, the availability of taxable capital expanded further with 
the advent of the bourgeoisie and liberalised forms of economic production in the 17th and 
18th centuries, as well as the concomitant establishment of parliamentary institutions increas-
ing the “discount rates” of tax collection13. The availability of larger pools of wealth in a 
number of (northern) European states enabled mounting ambitions of rulers, particularly 
abroad. This translated into technological innovations, permanent armies, navies, foreign 
conquest, and the laying down of commercial empires in partnership with capitalists and 
financiers. From early ‘stationary’ bandits to successful empires, the dynamics supporting 
political structures rested always in protecting and promoting the interests of capital.  
Internally, political modernisation meant not only the gradual removal of feudal intermedi-
aries and the centralisation of government functions (in particular, taxation) but the under-
taking of more ‘managerial’ commitments in population control after the 18th century. Pro-
letarisation in the countryside, then in the cities, tended to respond to state policies, including 
fiscal policy, which sought to rationalise economic production and increase taxable wealth14. 
The making of capitalist societies shifted the orientation of ‘security’ from a predominantly 
‘external’ to a predominantly ‘internal’ bearing, invested now in a colonisation process aimed 
at modelling populations to fit capitalist needs. The institution tasked with generating this 
capitalist order was, first and foremost, the police. As Mark Neocleous points out, early po-
lice bodies were not only concerned with law enforcement but played a pivotal role in the 
administrative regulation of bourgeois society. “While it is true that early police measures 
were designed to prevent disorder, violence, and crime, their primary function would seem 
to be the reformation, by juridical means, of relations of authority and service which had been 
previously ensured by the customary bonds of the serf to his manor and the laborer to his 
 
12 Tilly, Charles. "War making and state making as organized crime." Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and So-
cial Change, edited by Ernesto Castañeda and Cathy Lisa Schneider, Routledge, 2017, pp. 123-139, p. 131.  
13 Levi, Margaret. Of rule and revenue. University of California Press, 1989. 
14 Tilly, Charles. "States, Taxes and Proletarians." CRSO Working Paper no. 213, University of Michigan, 1980. 
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master.”15 The creation of policing bodies was, similarly, aimed at consolidating the broader 
political geographies enshrined by national states. The police oversaw the transition from 
premodern modes of production taking place in decentralised polities to a world of enclo-
sures, wage labour, and generalised alienation where power began to concentrate in a bour-
geois elite. For Tilly, European governments reduced their reliance on indirect rule by means 
of two expensive but effective strategies: (a) extending their officialdom to the local commu-
nity and (b) encouraging the creation of police forces that were subordinate to the government 
rather than to individual patrons16. Cyril D. Robinson and Richard Scaglion argue along sim-
ilar lines and locate the advent of modern policing in the context of an emerging capitalist 
system and the simultaneous rise of liberal states. To them, the origin of a specialised police 
function was a necessary development to create dominant and subordinate classes, to restrict 
class access to basic resources, and to transform ‘policing’ from an activity embedded in 
communities to a dislodged instrument in the hands of an emerging dominant class17. From 
these perspectives, the police generates, through various means, the hierarchical order con-
ducive to capitalist accumulation.  
The genesis and evolution of the police is thus closely associated with the creation of a liberal 
world defined by the paramountcy and universality of the law18. And yet, rather than the 
embodiment of the ‘rule of law’, the genesis and evolution of the security apparatus tasked 
with consolidating the capitalist order rested on the shoulders, paradoxically, of incorporated 
bandits and criminals. As noted in the following section, generating a police force involved 
(and continues to involve in many cases) a constant violation of the legal order and the se-
lective enablement of ‘crime’ to generate the very economies that support ‘policing’. Reflex-
ively thought of as the antagonist of criminality, the genesis and evolution of the police relied, 
 
15 Neocleous, Mark. The fabrication of social order: A critical theory of police power. Pluto Press, 2000. 
16 Tilly, Charles. "War making and state making as organized crime." Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and So-
cial Change, edited by Ernesto Castañeda and Cathy Lisa Schneider, Routledge, 2017, pp. 123-139. 
17 Robinson, Cyril D., and Richard Scaglion. "The origin and evolution of the police function in society: Notes toward a 
theory." Law and Society Review, vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, pp. 109-153. 
18 Locke, John. Second Treatise of Civil Government. Ch. IV, sec. 22, 1690. 
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instead, on a more updated form of Tilly’s ‘racketeering’ continuum: a police racket. As 
noted by Kristian Williams, the history of American policing 
…gives concrete expression to Tilly‘s theoretical claim. […] 
[G]overnment agencies and organized criminal enterprises were 
not only moral equivalents, they often comprised the same peo-
ple. Nineteenth-century policing did not just resemble racketeer-
ing, it was unmistakable gangsterism. The police were a central 
component of this system. Both the protection schemes that en-
sured the cooperation of the underworld and the brawling gangs 
that controlled the polls on election day relied on—at the very 
least—the acquiescence of the police. In many respects the devel-
opment of the political machines depended upon the simultaneous 
development of the modern police19.  
What defines the police is not its attachment to the rule of law but its ability to operate above 
it in order to accomplish its true raison d’être: to police, through preventive and proactive 
mechanisms, the populations alienated by economic modernity. The extortion mechanisms 
that enabled the birth and evolution of policing belong to a racketeering continuum going 
back to the common agenda of early protectors and primordial forms of capital. Extortion, 
now and then, translates into a particular form of security and order. Echoing the ancillary 
importance of preying and looting in the construction of early and externally oriented security 
apparatuses in precapitalist societies, bandits and criminals were also ancillary in the creation 
and historical evolution of the policing bodies tasked with shaping society in accordance with 
capitalist needs.  
  
 
19 Williams, Kristian. Our enemies in blue: Police and power in America. AK Press, 2015, p. 63 (E-book). 
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Banditry, policing, and liberal states 
What king or country has not had sense enough to attempt to 
turn bandits into policemen? To let the lawless, enforce the 
law? […] Bourbon kings […] pardoned bandits and inducted 
them into royal service. Russian tsars and lords gave the Cos-
sacks land and privileges for police protection. The Khonds of 
India´s Bengal area, displaced by British capitalism, plundered 
openly and in good conscience until many turned to law en-
forcement for the imperialists. […] Former outlaws figured 
among the best lawmen who brought order to the American 
west.20 
The paradoxical input of banditry into the early policing apparatuses of emerging capitalist 
states is a recurrent theme in ‘bandit’ historiography. This was a period in global history 
where the direction of ‘security’ shifted its predominantly ‘external’ orientation towards a 
predominantly ‘internal’ adversary (the proletarian class). Any attempt by the emerging dom-
inant classes to secure a capitalist order had to reckon with ‘pacifying’ two unwanted by-
products of the social alienation generated by it: angry social protest and the generalisation 
of delinquency. Liberal elites had little choice but to instrumentalise some of this delinquency 
in order to establish a security apparatus in support of their ascendancy. From this perspec-
tive, bandits co-opted by the new ruling classes can be regarded as the seminal reactionary 
body deployed to push back on the social antagonisms generated by capitalist alienation. 
Formally or informally incorporated into the security apparatuses of emerging capitalist 
states, the bandit was often its seminal policing apparatus. 
Emergent ‘liberal’ states can be said to have embodied historical processes whereby bour-
geois interests began to exhibit growing capabilities to shape social and economic relations 
 




in expansive (national) geographies and in accordance with capitalist requirements. The tran-
sition from ‘traditional’ (manorial, feudal, patrimonial) to capitalist economies involved mul-
tiple and incomplete routes contingent on local conditions and timetables21, but a more 
‘global’ expansion of liberal and national statehood took root in particular in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. This was a time when emergent liberal elites became invested in ‘national’ projects 
of internal colonisation. Like the emergence of capitalism more generally, the empowerment 
of these new elites was supported by a process of ‘primitive accumulation’ enabled, in par-
ticular, by the capitalisation of rural landscapes22. Marking the end of the ‘moral’ economies 
of manorial and feudal periods23, primitive accumulation involved often (but not exclusively) 
the creation of free labourers and the enclosure of communal lands24. According to 
Hobsbawm, the political elites emerging from the capitalisation of agriculture constituted 
“no more than the forces of profit-pursuing private enterprise” seeking “to turn land into a 
commodity” and “to pass this land into the ownership of a class of men impelled by reason”25. 
Large‐scale land dispossession preceded capitalism, but new elements in the late 17th, 18th, 
and early 19th centuries (first in Northern Europe, then in Southern Europe, Latin America, 
India, and Asia) were making it possible to shape the rural economy in accordance with ra-
tional-legal principles. These capabilities included, according to Marx, a more methodical 
reliance on legal frameworks that ‘legitimised’ dispossession, as well as a systematic deploy-
ment of new techniques of survey, representation, and land apportionment26. Turning the 
 
21 A good overview on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, involving in particular Marxist approaches, is Black-
ledge, Paul. Reflections on the Marxist theory of history. Manchester University Press, 2013.  See also: Katz, Claudio J. 
"Karl Marx on the transition from feudalism to capitalism." Theory and Society, vol. 22, no. 3, 1993, pp. 363-389. 
22 See, for example: Blok, Anton. "The peasant and the brigand: social banditry reconsidered." Comparative studies in 
Society and History, vol. 14, no. 4, 1972, pp. 494-503; Vanderwood, Paul J. Disorder and progress: Bandits, police, and 
Mexican development. Rowman & Littlefield, 1992; Gallant, Thomas W. "Brigandage, piracy, capitalism, and state-for-
mation: transnational crime from a historical world-systems perspective." States and illegal practices, edited by Josiah 
McC. Heyman, Hart Publishing, 1999, pp. 25-62. 
23 Scott, James C. The moral economy of the peasant: Rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia. Yale University Press, 
1977. 
24 Looking at the acceleration of capitalist relations under (neo)liberalism, recent critical interpretations recast the concept 
of ‘primitive accumulation’ as a continuous phenomenon contingent to the reproduction of capital rather than an ‘original’ 
historical moment. See, for example: Glassman, Jim. "Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumula-
tion by ‘extra-economic’ means." Progress in human geography, vol. 30, no. 5, 2006, pp. 608-625. Also: Hall, Derek. 
"Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession and the global land grab." Third World Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 9, 
2013, pp. 1582-1604.  
25 Hobsbawn, Eric. 1962. The age of revolution. Europe 1789–1848. London: Abacus, p. 184. 
26 Cited in: Alden Wily, Liz. "Looking back to see forward: the legal niceties of land theft in land rushes." The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, vol. 39, no. 3-4, 2012, pp. 751-775.  
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manorial serf into a wage labourer shifted economic production from direct use to the market 
economy. Similarly, the creation of ‘exchange value’ began to transform the attitudes of pro-
ducers27. Towns re-emerged and acted as magnets for the peasant’s ‘flight’ from the land28, 
a process that further encouraged the fiscal and political centralisation ancillary to the emer-
gence of modern, national states29. 
Nurtured by these structural processes, the emergence of ‘liberal’ or ‘capitalist’ states is thus 
understood as a complex, highly contingent but relatively universal process in which political 
agency, inspired by bourgeois doctrine, became concerned with breaking the ‘irrational’ fet-
ters to capitalist accumulation, first in the countryside, then in the cities. Structural transfor-
mations in the 18th and 19th centuries weakened the grip of dominant classes whose power 
had been established on the very ‘obstacles’ to economic efficiency targeted by liberal poli-
cies, opening channels for emerging liberal groups to take control of the political process and 
shape the sociolegal order in accordance with bourgeois interests. Departing from the noto-
rious ‘parcellated’ form of sovereignty characterising manorial and other pre-modern politi-
cal economies (where surplus was not extracted by the state but by landowners), the progres-
sive capitalisation of economic relations allowed for the consolidation of the increasingly 
extended geographies of power (and taxation) associated with the nation-state. As Elden 
notes, states at this hour “became consolidated as territorial agencies fostering a new rationale 
of abstraction and calculation, contributing to intensified land commodification, and diluting 
[land´s] traditional cultural significance”30. The emergence of ‘modern’ or ‘liberal’ states 
thus involved a process of ‘internal colonisation’ mobilised, in particular, to generate prole-
tarisation31. Ancillary to the rise of the ‘liberal’ state, economic liberalisation is understood 
 
27 Sweezy, Paul M., and Maurice Dobb. "The transition from feudalism to capitalism." Science & Society, vol. 14, no. 2, 
1950, pp. 134-167.  
28 Idem. 
29 Tilly, Charles. "States, Taxes and Proletarians." CRSO Working Paper no. 213, University of Michigan, 1980. 
30 Elden, Stuart. “Governmentality, calculation, territory.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 25, no. 3, 
2007, pp. 562–580, cited in: Sevilla‐Buitrago, Alvaro. "Capitalist formations of enclosure: Space and the extinction of the 
commons." Antipode, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015, pp. 999-1020. 
31 Tilly, Charles. "States, Taxes and Proletarians." CRSO Working Paper no. 213, University of Michigan, 1980. 
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here as a process whereby socio-economic relations are adapted to ‘rational-legal’ frame-
works conducive to more efficient and exploitative schemes to accumulate capital32.  
Importantly, the extent to which ‘liberalisation’, generally speaking, is contingent on mass 
dispossession makes ‘security’ and ‘pacification’ key ingredients in the successful imple-
mentation of this process. Marx argues that ‘security’, not ‘liberty’, is the supreme concept 
of bourgeois society “because of the need to manage the contradictions of a capitalism being 
constantly restructured according to the shifting levels of class confidence expressed by the 
ruling class”33. Deploying “security as liberty”, Mark Neocleous notes, underpins the exer-
cises of liberal power. Liberalism’s various formulations concerning, for example, ‘individ-
ual liberty’, ‘freedom of expression’, ‘free market’, ‘freedom of contract’, and so on, “all 
seem to articulate a vision of society with a large degree of insecurity”34. The security appa-
ratus created to ‘secure the insecurity’ implicated in the consolidation of liberal political 
economies is, as noted above, the police –– an institution whose genesis not only takes place 
amidst the ‘liberalisation’ of economic relations but is often instrumental to deepen and ex-
tend the internal colonisation process that configured national-liberal states. But whereas the 
creation of police forces has been noted as a pivotal mechanism allowing for the emergence 
of liberal orders, the crucial but paradoxical role of bandits in generating this capacity has 
gone, in contrast, mostly ignored. 
Central to discussions about the history of banditry and the liberal state are the following 
questions: To what extent is the bandit an enabler, rather than an antagonist, of the structural 
processes that constituted political modernity? To what extent can the bandit generate a cen-
tripetal, rather than centrifugal pull? To what extent did bandits facilitate the consolidation 
of liberal polities in the 18th and 19th centuries, and in what ways do co-opted bandits continue 
to generate statehood today?  These questions seem relevant if we consider that bandits in 
 
32 Critical approaches have noted the dialectical relationship between 'communing' and 'enclosure' in contemporary 
(neo)liberalism. See, in for example, Alden Wily, Liz. "Looking back to see forward: the legal niceties of land theft in 
land rushes." The Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 39, no. 3-4, 2012, pp. 751-775; Harvey, David. "Neo‐Liberalism as cre-
ative destruction." Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, vol. 88, no. 2, 2006, pp. 145-158; De Angelis, 
Massimo. The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital. London: Pluto Press, 2007.  




the literature were originally cast as ‘social rebels’ pushing back on capitalist transformation 
and national statehood35. Building on the revolutionary work of Anton Blok on Cosa Nostra, 
revisionist studies began to challenge the idea of bandits as champions of the people, noting 
instead that, in the long run, the success of the bandit was predicated on its attachment to 
political power36. Rather than being enemies of the landed elites (as is often romantically 
portrayed) bandits tended more often to operate under their protection.  
In the transformative rural geographies of the 19th century, “banditry was not a deliberate, 
individual choice, a release from boredom or excitement”, but the result “of an existence 
compelled by circumstances”37. As Alan Knight notes, bandits most often had banditry thrust 
upon them38. The abolishment of communal property and the commercialisation of agricul-
ture set redundant rural masses into circulation. Thomas Gallant notes how “[i]n peripheral 
areas, capital accumulation occurred in the form of large landed estates that were usually 
created through the extirpation of small, subsistence-oriented peasant forms of agriculture 
and their replacement by more commercialized agrarian regimes”39. Demobilised peasants 
often had little option but to join brigand gangs to live off theft, kidnapping, and extortion. 
As Gallant points out, “[w]herever this transformation occurred, be it in southern Europe, 
 
35 Hobsbawm, Eric J. Primitive rebels: Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries. Man-
chester University Press, 1971. 
36 Notable examples include: Antony, Robert J. "Peasants, heroes, and brigands: The problems of social banditry in early 
nineteenth-century South China." Modern China, vol. 15, no. 2, 1989, pp. 123-148; Brown, Nathan. "Brigands and state 
building: The invention of banditry in modern Egypt." Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1990, 
pp. 258-281; Gallant, Thomas W. "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a His-
torical World-Systems Perspective.” States and Illegal Practices, edited by Josiah McC. Heyman, Hart Publishing, 1999, 
pp. 25-62; Davis, Diane E., and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. Irregular armed forces and their role in politics and state for-
mation. Cambridge University Press, 2003; Vanderwood, Paul J. Disorder and progress: Bandits, police, and Mexican 
development. Rowman & Littlefield, 1992; Singelmann, Peter. "Political structure and social banditry in Northeast Bra-
zil." Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 1975, pp. 59-83; Barkey, Karen. Bandits and bureaucrats: The Otto-
man route to state centralization. Cornell University Press, 1994; Gingeras, Ryan. Heroin, organized crime, and the mak-
ing of modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, 2014; Blok, Anton. "The peasant and the brigand: social banditry recon-
sidered." Comparative studies in Society and History, vol. 14, no. 4, 1972, pp. 494-503. 
37 Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. Volume 1: Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants, and Volume 2: Counter-revolu-
tion and Reconstruction. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986, p. 123. 
38 Idem.  
39 Gallant, Thomas W. "Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical 
World-Systems Perspective” States and Illegal Practices, edited by Josiah McC. Heyman, Hart Publishing, 1999, pp. 25-
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India, Latin America or Asia, banditry developed”40. Securing property in this chaotic tran-
sition became a private obligation. It was from amongst the “disgruntled and displaced young 
men” that the new landowners and estate managers recruited private armed bands to disci-
pline an alienated labour force and secure capitalist property41. These new guards continued 
to selectively rob, kidnap, and extort as a way of living despite their formal or informal in-
corporation as ‘policing’ bodies. Their ability to do so was firmly established on their attach-
ment to the ruling classes and the liberal state.  
[Banditry] in rural India during the 19th century, for example, 
was closely connected to the advent of agricultural commer-
cialization and the practice by holders of zamindari estates of 
hiring armed guards. In Egypt as well, “notables also tried to 
stay on the good side of bandits in order to avoid being their 
targets”. The pattern holds for other parts of Africa. In the 
Huaibei region of north China (…) large farm owners hired 
gangs of armed men to guard their fields during the harvest, 
and these were the same men who were often bandits. 
(…) From this brief global survey, it appears that there were 
very strong structural and causal linkages between certain key 
aspects of economic peripheralization relating specifically to 
capital accumulation and labour extraction that created con-
straints, pressures, and opportunities for the formation of mil-
itary entrepreneurs42. 
Eric Hobsbawm points to two conditions that encourage the emergence of banditry. First, in 
terms of timing, banditry is epidemic amidst the pauperisation and economic crisis that 
frames the end of a relatively “long” cycle of history43. Thus, banditry is - not surprisingly – 
 
40 Idem, p. 30. 
41 Idem, p. 30. 
42 Idem, p. 31. 
43 Hobsbawm, Eric. Bandits. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010, p. 22.  
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particularly relevant in the key transitions to capitalist economies. Second, in terms of loca-
tion, banditry is much more common in peripheral or ‘backward’ regions where state rule is 
weak44. During these periods, and in these regions, the more organised types of banditry are 
often co-opted by the ruling classes as a mechanism to create a state of security. Bandits 
develop close ties with capital, preying on their own class to enable the power of those pro-
tecting them. As Marx harshly noted:  
The “dangerous class”, [lumpen-proletariat] the social scum, 
that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of 
the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the move-
ment by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, how-
ever, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reac-
tionary intrigue45.  
After Hobsbawm, the topic of banditry attracted a large number of historical studies. These 
studies focused on a historical period orbiting the 18th and 19th centuries framed often by the 
birth of the liberal nation-state. Anton Blok´s landmark studies of the Sicilian mafia tilled the 
field for further demonstrations of the proximity between rulers and bandits. As a strategy of 
rule organised banditry was understood as what can be described as state-supported paramil-
itary or parapolice activity. The distinction of banditry, of course, rests on the methods it 
employs to support itself as an appendant ‘security apparatus’: racketeering, extortion, theft, 
kidnapping, and other ‘outlaw’ economies. What gives the bandit economy its distinctive 
mark is that it ‘creates’ its own economy by drawing from the increasingly pertinent distinc-
tion of legal and illegal in the modern world. The key importance of criminal economies is 
that they represent relatively easy-to-access sources of income that can quickly generate vo-
 
44 Idem. 
45 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The communist manifesto. Penguin, 2002. 
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luminous profits for violent entrepreneurs. Criminal economies constitute what Snyder de-
scribes as low-barrier commodities that ‘rulers’ can control with relative ease in austere con-
texts46.  
Banditry in historical praxis 
States and bandits are often thought of as opposite figures –– perhaps because the liberal 
justification for the state is the war against the ‘beastly’ impulses embodied by the criminal. 
According to unempathetic liberal accounts (Locke), the criminal is an individual who, “by 
renouncing reason [and] succumbing to the impulses of savage beasts […] preys on the civil 
order”47. However, overlooked by Locke and other liberal thinkers, the criminal is a key 
enabler and angular stone of this ‘civil order’. A good example of the role of incorporated 
banditry in the consolidation of liberal polities in the 18th and 19th centuries is, of course, 
Mexico. Banditry thrived in the anarchic conditions that followed the collapse of Spanish 
rule and the progressive capitalisation of Mexican agriculture in the mid-19th century. In 
1810, the revolution of independence resulted, crucially, from the increasingly capitalist ori-
entation of the rural region where mass revolts first erupted: the Bajio48. From the time of 
independence (1821) to the liberal dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1875), Mexico suffered 800 
revolts, focused most particularly on land tenure49. As Berry has noted, the beneficiaries of 
land liberalisation in the second half of the 20th century were mostly liberal elites in a position 
to purchase the disincorporated lands at bargain prices50. These structural transformations 
drove indigenous peoples and alienated peasants to fill up the sad ranks of the haciendas or, 
alternatively, join a bandit gang.  
To contain the generalisation of banditry and the social antagonisms triggered by economic 
liberalisation, the liberal government had little option but to incorporate bandits as its pivotal 
 
46 Snyder, Richard, and Ravi Bhavnani. "Diamonds, blood, and taxes: A revenue-centered framework for explaining polit-
ical order." Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, 2005, pp. 563-597. 
47 Cited in Neocleous, Mark. War Power, Police Power. Edinburgh University Press, 2014, p. 25. 
48 Katz, Friedrich. Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in México. Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 
547. 
49 Idem.  
50 Berry, Charles Redmon. The reform in Oaxaca, 1856-76: a microhistory of the liberal revolution. University of Ne-
braska Press, 1981. 
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security apparatus. First, the federal government encouraged local governments to form re-
gional policing bodies to protect landowner interests. These ‘policing’ bodies were, as Paul 
Vanderwood notes, almost indistinguishable from the bandits they were called to repress51. 
Then, in 1861, brigand groups were incorporated by the liberal government to form the coun-
try’s first national policing body, Los Rurales. This policing body was to become the main 
vehicle to pacify and repress the social antagonisms generated by the emergence of the agro-
industrial and industrial classes. As late as 1872, newspapers continued to report how Los 
Rurales were involved in ‘selective’ banditry, robbing, and abuse52. As Vanderwood notes,  
Pacification required assimilation of the bandits into a police 
force, so brigands like Abraham Plata were amnestied into ser-
vice as corps commanders. Not only did the practice help to 
ensure a semblance of public order, it also removed, or at least 
eroded, a major obstacle to political centralization and national 
integration. […] Well-known brigands, along with any num-
ber of suspect characters, became rural policemen, but many 
of them also kept a hand in banditry, and as a result order and 
disorder developed still another blend53. 
The role of banditry in capitalist transformation and national statehood is also notable in the 
construction of modernity in Brazil, in particular, the input of cangaceiros and capangas 
(bandit gangs)54. Brazil had been organised, since colonial times, in massive estates. Estate 
owners under Portuguese rule formed, by right, security brigades for internal policing, re-
cruiting in particular from fugitive outlaws whose freedom became fully dependent on their 
hiring patron. Conflict between estate-owners was common, and they often made use of these 
capangas and cangaceiros to fight one another. When Brazil became an independent empire 
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52 Idem. 
53 Idem, pp. 51, 54. 
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(1822), the domain of the central government extended to the regions via imperially ap-
pointed regional commanders of the National Guard which served as regional strongmen, or 
coroneis, in what constituted a period known as coronelismo. As Singelmann notes, coroneis 
recruited bandits to police their terrains and harass political opponents: “The cleverest 
cangaceiros managed to fit themselves into this political milieu by simply allying themselves 
strategically and robbing selectively, supported by widespread sympathy and admiration in 
the population for their apparent attacks on the rich and generosity toward the poor”55. Op-
posing the idea of ‘social banditry’, Singelmann shows that becoming a cangaceiro was not 
a reaction against, but an adaptation to the new political structures of late 19th century Brazil. 
He writes: “Once in the cangaço, bandits often managed to switch back to the side of the law 
by finding the right employer, while others were unable to make the change, but continued 
their association with politicians willing to hire them”56. A prominent example of a 
cangaceiro was the legendary Antonio Silvino. Despite his popular image as Brazil’s ‘Robin 
Hood’ of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Silvino operated with the support of the mili-
tary, the police, the church, and the state government. As noted by Lewin, “Silvino's incred-
ibly prolonged survival as a cangaceiro is explained by the fact that his most reliable protec-
tion derived consistently from his connections with the powerful rather than with the humble 
in rural society. And those connections defined him more as a landlords' bandit than a peo-
ple's bandit”57. Singelmann notes how cangaceiros were no ‘romantic bandits’ or represent-
atives of a class struggle: they instead were hired killers for the powerful, “willing to take up 
arms against true revolutionary movements such as the Coluna Prestes”58. The use of 
cangaceiros and capangas throughout the 19th century in Brazil, and its importance in the 
violent politics of coronelismo, underlines the importance that organised banditry often had 
in transitions to more rationalised agricultural economies in contexts with a weak political 
centre.  
 
55 Idem, p. 72. 
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35 
 
A more recent example of the instrumentalisation of banditry to consolidate national govern-
ance is Turkey. The transition from a patrimonial polity (the Ottoman Empire) to a liberal 
state (the Turkish Republic) in the early 20th century developed in a context of generalised 
chaos, centrifugal pull, and widespread lawlessness and banditry. Bandit gangs, or çetes, in-
volved in contraband and extortion, were regularly co-opted as paramilitary bodies to reartic-
ulate national sovereignty amidst Ottoman collapse. The co-optation of çetes served multiple 
purposes aimed, particularly, at developing state capacity and centralising political power. 
For example,   
[t]he newly demarcated territorial boundary between Greece 
and Turkey needed to be guarded. And who better than the lo-
cal bad men? But as before, they preyed on cross-border traf-
fic.  Moreover, since the border guards were drawn from the 
same class of military entrepreneurs, they would venture on 
bandit raids across the border. When they did this, they often 
had the unacknowledged approval of their government59. 
As Ryan Gingeras has noted, çetes were used by the leaders of the young Turkish Republic 
in the early decades of the 20th century to conduct irregular warfare against separatist groups 
of Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians60. The leaders of the republic recruited and utilised 
gangs as effective and brutal instruments in what were often genocidal wars against separatist 
forces threatening the integrity and hegemony of the Turkish state. Importantly, bands of 
çetes employed as proxies during the early years of the Turkish Republic were coordinated 
by the national security agency, the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, or Special Organization. The instru-
mentalisation of çetes by the nascent security services is significant in that it points to the 
institution that, in the 20th century, takes charge of ‘managing’ bandit economies to support 
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parapolitical activity: the national security apparatus. As Gingeras notes, “[t]he Special Or-
ganization served an important purpose in bringing together various parties interested in or 
committed to the empire´s preservation. […] Çetes provided the muscle to do this cabal´s 
dirty work”61. Early collaboration between çetes and the Turkish security services supported 
the surveillance of Armenian propagandists, supporters of the banished Ottoman monarchy, 
individuals charged with treason, communists, revolutionaries, foreigners, and Kurds. The 
Turkish national security service (which grew out of the Special Organization) would in the 
1950s and 1960s become entangled with the new ‘key’ commodity in global illicit markets: 
heroin. The individuals considered the ‘first godfathers’ of the so-called Turkish mafia 
(Dündar Kilic, Abuzer Ugurlu, Bechet Canturk, and Abdullah Catli) would gain equal noto-
riety as clandestine agents and provocateurs allied with the more reactionary circles of the 
Turkish establishment62. These gangsters became in the 1970s “the instrument of a robust 
and paranoid government apparatus committed to the preservation of the state at all costs”63. 
The use of çetes by the Turkish state to consolidate territorial integrity (following Ottoman 
collapse), as well as the proximity that it subsequently developed with the heroin trade, is 
interesting in that it shows the continuing importance and evolution of co-opted banditry in 
a single ‘national’ trajectory. The proximity between drug economies and security services 
in Turkey echoes to some extent the Mexican experience described in subsequent chapters. 
In both cases, the point to be underlined is that bandit and criminal economies serve, often, 
a much larger purpose than themselves and their most immediate operators and enablers.   
The most studied case of banditry and its relationship with the emergence of the liberal re-
gime is Cosa Nostra. From its instrumental role in the liberalisation of agriculture in mez-
zogiorno Sicily to its role in the security dynamics that led to the collapse of the First Italian 
Republic in 1992, Cosa Nostra (like the Turkish case) is an illustrative example of the endur-
ing role that co-opted outlaw economies can play at different historical stages and under 
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changing internal and external political conditions. Akin to other examples of organised ban-
ditry, the emergence of Cosa Nostra took place in a context marked by the collapse of baro-
nial and communal property in the mid-19th century and the concomitant need to secure the 
property consolidated by liberalisation. In a context of growing insecurity and chaos, safe-
guarding new forms of property became a private responsibility. Securing these new estates 
was a service provided by gangs of armed men commanded by a gabellotto, or foreman, in 
charge of managing the new properties of absentee wealthy capitalist landowners based in 
Palermo64. The gabellotto offered his services to multiple landowners, orchard exporters, and 
sulfur mines proprietors65, becoming increasingly specialised in what Gambetta calls ‘the 
business of private protection’66. He also became adept in the provision of services like re-
covering stolen property, mediating feuds between peasants, and gathering votes for Sicilian 
notables. This led to the gradual ‘usurpation’ by the gabellotto of functions associated with 
‘state’: targeting other bandits, administrating justice, settling disputes, dispensing patron-
age67. As Renda has noted, the national politicians of the newly unified Italian state opted to 
govern Sicily through rather than against extortionist groups in part because they proved 
capable of regulating banditry68.  
By the end of the 19th century, these men of violence became increasingly organised in secret 
fraternities in which a common framework for the extra-legal regulation of violence slowly 
developed: this new institution was called the mafia, or Cosa Nostra. The emergent Cosa 
Nostra divided rackets into territorial turfs in which a cosca (family) held a monopoly over 
the regulation of illegal activities (such as extorting the pizzo [extortion fee] from local busi-
ness). Money generated by the ‘families’ was invested, in particular, in expanding their ca-
pabilities to generate violence69. Governing bodies such as the Commission of Palermo, or 
the dominance of a particular faction (for example, the Corleonesi in the 1970s) would at 
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times make of the Cosa Nostra an articulate and relatively vertical organisation, while at 
others, conflict would make it anything but a unitary society. As Paoli has noted, the degree 
of centralisation and cohesiveness in Cosa Nostra was historically fluid70.    
By the end of the 19th century, the services provided by Cosa Nostra to the emerging Sicilian 
elite were not restricted to securing their property but began to exhibit a more proactive form 
of ‘policing’ attached to nascent capitalist interests. As Acemoglu, De Feo, and De Luca have 
documented, the empowerment of Cosa Nostra in Sicily was triggered to a considerable ex-
tent by landowners, estate managers, and local politicians seeking to combat peasant de-
mands originating from the first socialist movement in Italy, the Fasci dei Lavoratori71. The 
authors note how “[t]he first mass socialist movement in Italy, the Peasant Fasci, emerged in 
Sicily [partly] because of the extremely harsh working conditions of the island’s peasants. 
Our results indicate that as much as 37 per cent of the strength of the Mafia in 1900 may be 
related to its involvement in the suppression of the Peasant Fasci”72.  
The evolution of Cosa Nostra also began to involve a mutually beneficial relationship with 
the political establishment in both Palermo and Rome. With the triumph of liberalism came 
electoral politics. In return for protection to conduct their illegal activities with impunity as 
well as to exert control over a considerable share of public spending in Sicily, Cosa Nostra 
provided the votes that the emergent political parties needed to win elections. According to 
Antonino Calderone, “an average mafioso of post-war Sicily could guarantee the loyalty of 
40 to 50 persons. As there were some 1,500 to 2,000 men of honour in the province of Pa-
lermo, that would add up to from 75,000 to 100,000 “friendly” votes in that province alone”73. 
Similarly, Graziano notes that “the obvious advantages derived in such a milieu by anybody 
who could put together one hundred votes (...) meant that in the Mezzogiorno, [electoral] 
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groups were often infiltrated by mafia and camorra”74. With the rise of mass politics after the 
Second World War (WW II), Cosa Nostra became the most notable electoral machine in 
Sicily. Securing votes for the Democrazia Christiana party (the party that almost single-hand-
edly controlled Italian politics for the entire Cold War period) was part of a quid-pro-quo or 
wicked deal paid not only with protection and impunity but by giving Cosa Nostra a centre-
stage in the patronage politics of Southern Italy75. Throughout the Cold War period, Cosa 
Nostra became a para-political actor in the struggle against the Italian Communist Party (the 
largest in Western Europe) and the neutralisation of the socialist movement, particularly in 
the impoverished South. The pro-capitalist orientation of the mafia opened bridges of covert 
collaboration between Cosa Nostra and the Italian security services that, as Schneider and 
Schneider have noted, resembled the collaboration of covert cliques of army coronels and 
espionage specialists staging coups d’état in Latin American countries during the 1960s and 
1970s to counter the alleged threat of communism76. As Blok has also noted, the proximity 
between the Italian state and the Mafia started to become antagonistic only after the threat of 
communism had ended, a fact that underscores the importance of Cosa Nostra as a Cold War 
‘bandit’. Stille points out how, “[u]ntil the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. government 
was also keenly interested in keeping the Christian Democrats in power and the Communists 
out. In the 1940s and 1950s, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] funded the Christian 
Democrats, just like the Russians funded the Italian Communist Party. […] [T]he United 
States’ closest political allies continued to be many of the same politicians suspected of being 
in league with the Mafia”77. The ‘instrumentalisation’ of the Sicilian mafia to regulate vio-
lence and influence political outcomes in Sicily is a notable example of the role that outlaw 
economies can play in longer state trajectories traversing multiple historical periods and 
framed by both national and transnational political contexts.   
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Protection rackets in criminal economies have often generated the ‘security’ of their political 
enablers; the instrumentalisation of banditry is an important part of the story behind the con-
solidation of liberal elites and the formation of a world capitalist system. As the examples 
above suggest, the particular ways in which ‘protected’ bandits contributed to the formation 
of national sovereignties were contingent on the peculiarities of the local and national histo-
ries that generated and co-opted them. The arguments advanced here do not seek to gloss 
over the considerable qualitative differences that gave the banditry spectrum (and its connec-
tions with power) its diverse and assorted character. Rather, the chapter notes important reg-
ularities across space and time that show that, despite these differences, the instrumentalisa-
tion of banditry to generate security structures was a regular and notable process in the con-
solidation of broader geographies of power and the formation of a global capitalist world. 
Criminal gangs may appear to challenge the ‘monopoly’ of violence that the state ideally 
embodies, but often their covert instrumentalisation by supra-local powers strengthens this 
‘monopoly’ by rendering local geographies and populations malleable to state and elite in-
terests. In this respect, a Tyllian approach is particularly well-suited not only to note the 
identification between the criminal and the security process but to note also how the ‘racket-
eering’ of illicit economies has been relevant to the production of security in capitalist states.  
The role of banditry in supporting unequal relations at global levels (for example, in the 
dynamics of empire, or the global division of labour) makes it a noteworthy subject to centre-
periphery perspectives concerned with the logistics generating unequal exchange at the 
global level. Conversely, questions of economic structure are particularly relevant in bandit 
historiography given the extent to which the generalisation of banditry (and its instrumental-
isation by the state) connects with accelerated socio-economic transformation. Put differ-
ently, the instrumentalisation of banditry has been a relevant component in the construction 
of the global hierarchy intrinsical to centre-periphery relations. Global hierarchies can be 
conceived narrowly as relations of legitimate authority between states and more broadly as 
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organised inequality78. As Zarakol notes, “[a]t issue is how different forms of power—coer-
cion, dominance, legitimacy, and so on—give rise to different kinds of hierarchies that have 
different kinds of effects on international politics”79. Zarakol also notes how a world-systems 
perspective enables a type of analysis of hierarchical organisation that interrogates the par-
ticular machinations through which capital establishes and perpetuates global order, the na-
ture of the inequalities entailed by it, and the moral, social and behavioural dynamics that 
follow80. Without disregarding the role that legitimacy undoubtedly plays in structuring hi-
erarchy at any level, a key aim here is to bring to light little-studied but important ‘coercive’ 
mechanisms that articulate the global hierarchy implicated in centre-periphery approaches. 
Whereas a centre-periphery approach is suitable to understand the relationship between a 
supraordinate and a subordinate entity (such as the U.S. and Mexico), a Tillyian perspective 
seems particularly apt to capture and unpack the flow of criminal rents into the security pro-
cesses cementing these unequal relationships. A Tillyian approach allows the thesis to un-
derline the importance of state rackets in driving these security processes, in supporting po-
licing capabilities, and in allowing the ‘centre’ to exert relative control over the ‘periphery’.  
To recapitulate: the political nature of the bandit lies not only in its embodiment of mecha-
nisms tantamount to state-making (i.e. Tilly) but also in its regular and significant input into 
key security processes structuring national and global hierarchies. The ‘instrumentalisation’ 
of organised crime to form internally- and externally oriented security apparatuses has a solid 
record in the history of nation-states and empires. From this perspective, the importance of 
banditry in the 18th and 19th centuries, briefly explored in the examples above, points to pat-
terns and processes in the making of modernity that cut across geographies and time, and that 
constitute an important element in the history of global modernity. As ever, a ‘license’ to 
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prey compensated for fiscal weakness, but now these rents resulted from an increasingly per-
tinent distinction between legality and illegality that the state, instead of enforcing, selec-
tively abused.  
Drug trafficking in social histories  
No other criminal commodity in the second half of the 20th century has had a more profound 
political impact on the state-making process than drug trafficking. In ‘peripheral’ local con-
texts, who controls the points of access to the drug economy can determine who has access 
to key resources invested in purchasing arms, bullets, and enforcers. The role of the drug 
economy in local settings has been studied in ghettos, prison gangs, local cacicazgos and as 
an economy in warlordism. David Skarbek81 shows how a gang’s hegemony in a prison is 
often predicated on its ability to control the drug economy. Controlling the flow of ‘drug 
taxes’ often goes hand-in-hand with developing capacities to monopolise a highly discre-
tional use of violence that, in turn, is able to affect social, political, and cultural life. For 
Graham Denyer Willis, drug profits in urban slums are viewed less as an end in itself but 
rather “as a necessary means to strengthen and expand the organization”82. Monopolising 
control of drug sales creates a political economy enabling a gang to enforce property rights, 
dictate legitimate death warrants, impose codes of conduct, among other ‘state-like’ activi-
ties. Dennis Rodgers explains how gangs in Managua in the 1990s produced “social sover-
eignty” by providing “a sense of predictability and symbolic reference point for everyday 
local life”83. Gangs “constituted the principal anchor for a notion of community in a wider 
context of extreme social fragmentation”84. Rodgers notes how gangs can evolve into preda-
tory institutions, imposing order through terror as a way to protect, especially, drug interests. 
From a different perspective, Snyder suggests that lootable wealth (such as the drug market) 
can lead to social order if rulers (in this case, gangs) are able to impose monopolised extortion 
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rackets over these crucial commodities. In contrast, the breakdown or absence of rackets can 
produce instability in two ways: first, by causing a fiscal crisis that renders authority vulner-
able, and second, by making it easier for rebels to organise85.  
The drug economy can also enable warlords and caciques whose power rests in their ability 
to tax and restrict access to drug production. In his study of the drug economy in western 
Mexico, Pansters, for example, notes how local drug production has at times become “deeply 
embedded in particular local and regional social relations and economies, through which [it] 
play[s] a functional role in governance systems”86. The arbitrary and informal nature of ca-
ciquismo in Mexico, Pansters notes, is well-suited to accommodate and incorporate criminal 
entanglements. For Pansters, the protective mechanisms and the corresponding corruption 
that apply to the complex relations between state (law enforcement) and criminal organisa-
tions and economies can be argued to have evolved more ‘naturally’ from historically and 
socially rooted cultural practices of informal arrangements and personalistic mediation of the 
law (impunity). These informal practices, which Pansters identifies as ‘informal orders’, 
shape processes and transactions in politics, society, and the economy, and as such they have 
been able to absorb or extend into illegal/criminal activities. This interpretation stresses an 
endogenous role of criminal economies in structuring political authority but does not pre-
clude the possibility that exogenous actors instrumentalise these culturally rooted practices 
and criminal economies to channel interests into local and social milieus87. An important 
observation at this point is that these forms of ‘criminal governance’ and ‘criminal sover-
eignties’ do not occur in political vacuums but in geographies claimed by formal structures 
of the state and may be connected to political dynamics attached to global hierarchies. As 
Denyer Willis and Lessing point out: “In the spaces where criminal organisations arise and 
assert control (prisons, urban peripheries, and illicit markets), the state may be weak, but it 
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is far from absent”88. Criminal structures regulating violence in informal contexts tap into the 
drug business but operate most often by virtue of protection rackets established by actors of 
the state. As Snyder notes, “[p]rotection rackets are especially likely to emerge in connection 
with illicit products, because the “service” of non-enforcement of the law will have a high 
value to private actors”89. Two observations can be made as a result: first, that drug markets 
are notorious political economies operating at multiple political levels inclusive of the more 
alienated landscapes studied by social anthropology. Second, that these informal structures, 
although embodying state-like characteristics, become ‘entangled’ with the ‘formal’ state.  
What is often missing is a better picture of how criminal organisations (and especially drug 
traffickers) interact with the state at multiple levels. For this work, the interest lies in under-
standing the ways in which states often make use of criminal organisations to channel exog-
enous interests and security processes. Just as local drug economies often play a functional 
role in governance systems by structuring political authority and supporting security appa-
ratus at subnational levels (cacicazgos, favelas, prisons, etc.), the transnational drug econ-
omy has often played a less studied but analogous ‘bandit’ role in the structuring of hierarchy 
at the national and transnational levels. The examples of 18th- and 19th-century banditry ad-
vanced before hint at where I am trying to go: the ‘political’ importance of transnational drug 
trafficking, while often rooted in local processes, connects and is fully compatible with more 
‘macro’ processes in global history. The aim of the final section of this chapter is to show 
how transnational drug markets have often deployed these exogenous politics. The aim is to 
introduce transnational drug trafficking as a ‘bandit’ economy that has supported the state-
making and empire-making process at more recent historical junctures.  
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Drug trafficking in global history  
Authors have proposed different frameworks and typologies to understand the ways in which 
states interact with organised crime. These include, for example, Lessing’s distinction be-
tween ‘violent lobbying’ and ‘violent corruption’90, which echoes the plata o plomo [silver 
or lead] alternatives that politicians can face in their dealings with delinquents, as well as 
Stainland’s ‘armed politics’ framework, which focuses on the various types of interactions 
that occur between armed factions and criminal activities amidst civil wars91. These typolo-
gies tend to focus on confrontational types of interactions between state and criminals or 
contexts of considerable violence. A more complete typology that includes both coexistence 
and confrontation in both violent and non-violent contexts has been proposed by Nicholas 
Barnes92. I will briefly explain Barnes’ typology and use it as a platform to add additional 
analytical layers.   
Barnes argues that criminal organisations, like other non-state armed groups, develop various 
collaborative and competitive arrangements with states that, in turn, determine levels of vio-
lence. He distinguishes between four types of crime - state interactions, going from more 
adversarial to more collaborative: 1) Confrontation (high competition between criminal or-
ganisations and the state); 2) Enforcement/Evasion (low competition); 3) Alliance (low col-
laboration between criminal organisations and the state) and 4) Integration (high collabora-
tion). On the collaborative end of the spectrum, Barnes distinguishes alliance from integra-
tion. In an alliance, there is no incorporation but rather ‘cooperation’ between the state and 
criminal organisations in regions where the state competes with non-state armed groups and 
uses criminal groups to combat these organisations. Examples of alliances tend to revolve 
around criminal organisations ‘endorsed’ by the state and used as paramilitary proxies. Rural 
vigilantism and autodefensas [self-defenders] in contemporary Mexico and Colombia are the 
main examples used by Barnes to denote how a criminal organisation can be used by the state 
 
90 Lessing, Benjamin. "Logics of violence in criminal war." Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, no. 8, 2015, pp. 1486-
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to advance its interests without actually making it a ‘structural’ part of itself. A more com-
prehensive form of collaboration develops, in contrast, under integration. Here, differentiat-
ing between state actors and criminals becomes much more difficult: political actors of great 
importance are personally involved in criminal activity. Integration occurs “when […] [crim-
inal] organizations make more than common cause and become intimately intertwined”93. 
Under integration, organised crime gains access to “political influence, information and net-
works”, while state actors gain access to “financial, electoral and political resources”. Barnes 
explains that integration is especially common in two areas within the state apparatus: polit-
ical parties and the public security apparatus. Historical examples of integration pointed out 
by Barnes include Manuel Noriega’s tenure as Panama’s president, Peru under Alberto Fu-
jimori, the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-
Defenders of Colombia). The most notable example of “integration” pointed out by Barnes, 
however, is Mexico, where the PRI regime “exert[ed] its influence over criminal organiza-
tions by controlling and penetrating illicit networks”94 for several decades. Importantly, the 
direction of causality can go both ways: states can integrate criminal structures into their state 
apparatus, and criminal structures can ‘capture’ state institutions to advance their criminal 
interests.  
I would like to point to two limitations in Barnes’ model that will help underline some of my 
own ideas with regards to criminal-state collaborative relations and how I think the frame-
work can be enriched. The first limitation in Barnes’ approach, one that we can build on, is 
that it tends to think of the state and organised crime as monolithic structures. First, it is 
important to make the obvious remark that the alliances that develop between criminals and 
the state do not involve the entire state apparatus but are limited to certain actors and even 
certain sectors within institutions. This means that a particular criminal organisation may 
become integrated into an institutional or political circuit while, at the same time, a rival 
criminal organisation may develop links with other political actors and institutional circuits. 
Rather than seeing the ‘state’ as a block aligning or confronting ‘organised crime’ as another 
 




block, what sometimes occurs is a more complex dynamic constituted by multiple, and po-
tentially antagonistic, diagonal connections between the two spheres. Looking at state and 
criminal organisations as ‘blocks’ can lead to incomplete descriptions of how state and or-
ganised crime actually interplay. For example, Barnes’ central example for the confronta-
tional type of state-criminal interaction (defined as high competition between criminal or-
ganisations and the state) is the violent war that developed between drug trafficking organi-
sations and the Mexican government following president Felipe Calderón’s decision to 
launch an ‘all-out-war’ against the drug ‘cartels’. Although a much more confrontational 
stand did in fact develop between the state and drug trafficking organisations during this 
period, it is important to note that competing cartels at this point had already developed per-
vasive ‘relationships’ with political and institutional actors at both national and regional lev-
els. Neither organised crime nor the state can be understood here as responding to a single 
coherent directive. The more complex picture behind the ‘all-out war’ and the diversified 
penetration of criminals of a heterogeneous state underscores how the binary confrontational 
type is more complex in practice than in discourse. The fact that the Mexican state was al-
ready so deeply penetrated by criminal organisations is often cited as the reason why Calde-
rón’s strategy was doomed to fail from the beginning, not to mention the recent criminal 
indictments against the police actors who deployed this war. Alliances between ‘cartels’ and 
high-level security officials, governors, and national political actors continued to characterise 
criminal-state relations in Mexico despite Calderón’s ‘all-out war’. This makes it hard to 
make a case in which ‘state’ and ‘criminal organisations’ are seen as two blocks opposing 
one another even in the most ‘confrontational’ scenarios.   
The second observation, perhaps more important, has to do with the category that Barnes 
employs to denote the maximum degree of collaboration that develops between states and 
organised criminals: integration. In contrast to an alliance, where mutually beneficial agree-
ments between state and organised crime exist but where both parties remain structurally 
differentiated, integration refers to a form of collaboration in which organised crime is di-
rectly ‘integrated’ into the state apparatus, gaining access to political influence and in turn 
being influenced by the state. Barnes’ central example for the full integration type of state-
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criminal collaboration is the drug market under the PRI state in Mexico. Integration in this 
case, however, seems to be a misleading term because drug cartels never had any say in the 
decision-making process at the national level nor were they ever ‘integrated’ in the political 
process. One of the successes of the PRI establishment is that it managed to neutralise the 
political influence of drug markets in national politics by incorporating the market through 
its security services. As noted by Snyder, the centralised ‘institution of protection’ embodied 
by the PRI regime successfully contained the market’s intrinsic potential for violence and, as 
I suggest, generated key security processes expanding the reach of central actors and institu-
tions.  
To suggest that the state in Mexico ‘integrated’ drug traffickers because it was able to control 
them is not really equivalent and, more importantly, misses what I think is the most interest-
ing aspect in state - criminal ‘integrations’. What makes intense collaboration between states 
and organised criminals such an interesting topic is the way in which criminal economies 
help advance the agendas of institutional and political actors at multiple levels. Rather than 
arguing that drug trafficking in Mexico was ‘integrated’ into the state, more is to be gained 
by questioning instead how these subsidiary drug markets, as banditry more generally, be-
came an ancillary mechanism for the expansion of the local, national and transnational inter-
ests embodied in the PRI state. The same is true about other examples that Barnes uses to 
represent the integration type. Drug traffickers under Manuel Noriega and Alberto Fujimori 
were not ‘integrated’ into the state apparatus, rather Noriega and Fujimori tapped into the 
drug economy to fund security activity associated with a national, as well as transnational, 
political agendas. The state instrumentalised, rather than incorporated, drug trafficking. This 
points to a relationship between criminals and state actors that has less to do with ‘structures’ 
and more to do with ‘processes’. What I wish to underline here is that the aim of studying 
examples of ‘collaboration’ should  be to understand the structural, political, and geopolitical 
ends advanced by these blatant instrumentalisations of the transnational drug economy. In-
terrogating more centrally the political interests that are served by a specific instance of ‘col-
laboration’ between state and organised crime allows us, in addition, to incorporate a layer 
of analysis that Barnes’ model leaves out of the picture: the role of drug markets in structuring 
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transnational hierarchy and a global capitalist system. Barnes’ focus on what he describes as 
‘subnational’ contexts leaves out the ways in which organised crime is instrumentalised as a 
‘strategy of rule’ by political actors above the subnational level. Again, Mexico is a case in 
point. As I document in this thesis, the PRI regime instrumentalised transnational criminal 
economies to fund security services and a Cold War agenda that reflected the vital interests 
of the Mexican and American states. Moreover, as I also demonstrate, the U.S. government 
covertly endorsed and encouraged the involvement of Mexico’s national security agency in 
organised crime in ways that echo analogous strategies deployed in other latitudes of the 
Cold War. Mexico echoed patterns transpiring in almost every single country where transna-
tional drug trafficking developed after WW II. From this perspective, drug markets under 
Manuel Noriega and Alberto Fujimori were part of a larger political landscape where political 
objectives of supranational stature exploited local drug markets to advance exogenous polit-
ical and economic interests. Incorporating these dynamics into our analysis is important to 
transcend a typological description and understand the historical aims served by the ‘integra-
tion’ of banditry and global political processes. Finally, an additional observation with regard 
to Barnes’ model is that the historical examples that he uses to represent the integration type 
of state-criminal collaboration almost always involve the ‘integration’ of one market in par-
ticular: the transnational drug business. This is namely because the transnational drug busi-
ness arguably represents the criminal market with the highest stakes, summoning security 
apparatuses associated with national security institutions.  
Building from Barnes’ model, the suggestion here is that the state under the PRI was able to 
channel the political economies of drug markets by ‘integrating’ the operation of transna-
tional drug markets to advance the mandates embodied by central security institutions. This 
does not mean that all transnational drug activity came under the command of national secu-
rity actors, or that the political economy of drug markets lacked political weight at subna-
tional levels. Rather, what is argued is that the highly articulate and centralised nature of the 
regime allowed its agencies to exert control over the political economy of drug markets as a 
whole, channelling the interests of the regime rather than deploying the conflictual and cen-
tripetal dynamics of drug markets that characterised these economies before and after the PRI 
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regime. This instrumentalisation, in which national security agencies played a key part, is 
particularly evident in the orientation of the security processes generated by drug economies, 
which not only strengthened the capacity of central actors but empowered the deployment of 
policies that affected Mexico’s society as a whole. The successful ‘integration’ of transna-
tional drug markets limited enormously the ability of transnational drug markets to function 
as autonomous forces: the success of the bandit in this period of Mexican history was predi-
cated on its direct and indirect connections with the ‘nucleus’ of the state (the security agen-
cies attached to the executive). This is important to keep in mind because it underlines that, 
when it comes to ‘collaborative arrangements’ between states and the transnational drug mar-
ket, the analysis of the dynamics at play, actors involved, and political agendas enabled, can-
not be restricted, as Barnes suggests, to the ‘subnational’ level. What I propose to do here is 
to think less of these connections in terms of structures and see instead in these relationships 
a process that enables, too, the deployment of exogenous agendas.   
Transnational drug bandits 
Academic endeavours to give the transnational drug trade a more central place in national 
and global histories are becoming increasingly relevant in political and historical literature. 
The pioneering work in this regard is Alfred McCoy’s 1972 doctoral thesis The politics of 
heroin95. In it, McCoy documents how opium and heroin economies, criminalised by global 
prohibitionist regimes, supported paramilitary and counterinsurgency activity associated 
with the war on communism and nationalism in South East Asia (1930s to 1970s). The im-
portance of drug markets in the dynamics of the foreign intervention went, as is well known, 
way back. A key precedent to understand the importance of drug markets in the dynamics of 
imperialism is the ancillary role of the opium trade in the colonisation of the Far East in the 
18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. As underlined in multiple studies96, opium monopolies 
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under the control of colonial powers played an overlooked but crucial role in generating rev-
enue and balancing intercontinental trade in favour of European powers. According to Wong, 
opium sales in China made up 25-35% of Britain’s global visible trade deficit between 1855 
and 187397. More generally, taxes on opium often represented the single most important 
source of revenue for European colonies in East Asia. By the middle of the 19th century, 
opium was the second source of tax revenue of the British Empire in India and generated 
more revenue than all customs taxes combined 98. Opium was, of course, prohibited in China, 
but with the backing of the Royal Navy, British smugglers operated with tranquillity and 
devotion. In the Straits Settlements, the opium monopoly covered about 60% of administra-
tive spending99. In British Malaysia, it generated 40% of colonial revenues. Similarly, be-
tween 1876 and 1915, opium reduced the potential deficit in Dutch Java by 70% 100. In other 
words, a monopoly over drug addiction, imposed by coercive means (like it happened very 
explicitly during the Opium Wars) and a relatively small pool of drug addicts were econom-
ically ancillary to the colonial exploitation of these populations and geographies.   
The importance of the opium trade was particularly important in French Indochina. McCoy 
explains how the official dismantlement of colonial opium monopolies after WW II did not 
abolish the importance of opium in the economy of the French Empire. He documents, in-
stead, how the French security services continued to organise opium markets clandestinely 
in order to fund counterinsurgency activity directed against paramilitary forces seeking inde-
pendence from France. The ‘integration’, to use Barnes’ terminology, of clandestine opium 
markets to the war efforts against the Viet Minh represents the first example of the transna-
tional drug market being ‘integrated’ (as a criminal economy) into an interventionist political 
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agenda. McCoy and others101 note how the practice would be subsequently adopted by U.S. 
intelligence to support its paramilitary proxy in China, the Kuomintang. McCoy´s work was 
perhaps the first to provide a more complete account of what became a form of banditry 
associated with a more globalised period in international relations and indirect conflict. From 
South East Asia to Turkey to South and Central America, the evolution and geographical 
trajectory of the transnational drug market would in subsequent decades become closely en-
tangled with counterinsurgency and parapolice structures supporting, by large, America’s 
security agenda. As I note in the following chapters of this thesis, this is precisely what tran-
spired in Mexico, where the secret police of the single-party regime tapped into transnational 
drug and contraband economies in order to fund counterinsurgency and parapolice activity 
directed against dissent while enjoying the endorsement of the U.S. government to do so.  
Building from McCoy, new scholarly perspectives have enriched the literature on criminal 
activity during the Cold War. A particularly relevant country in this regard is, naturally, Tur-
key: a country where both legal and illegal opium markets were critical issues in domestic 
politics. Focused on the Turkish Republic, Ryan Gingeras notes how Turkish criminal syn-
dicates, particularly those that emerged out of the heroin trade in the mid-twentieth century, 
assumed important positions of political influence “in both opposition to and in collaboration 
with elements of the Turkish state”102. The use of opium and heroin economies to fund par-
apolice and paramilitary activity in Turkey replicated the use of co-opted banditry and çetes 
in the strategies of the late Ottoman empire. In particular, Gingeras points to the entangle-
ments that developed between the drug trade and the formation of paramilitary and parapolice 
bodies directed against Kurdish and Communist groups and mediated by the national security 
service. The notable input of criminal markets into the political process in Turkey, in partic-
ular the more reactionary sectors of its security apparatus, makes Turkey a particularly im-
portant case for a growing body of literature looking at the ‘deep’ structures of the security 
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services. Like McCoy’s research on South East Asia, Gingeras’ work on Turkey sheds light 
on the political agendas that the ‘integration’ of the heroin drug trade enabled in Cold War 
Turkey.  
Another work underlining the transnational agendas that the drug economy enabled is Scott’s 
and Marshall’s Cocaine Politics103. Here, the authors underline the way in which Condor 
operations in South America and death squads in the civil wars of Central America often 
tapped into the transnational drug market to fund counterinsurgency operations directed 
against armed and civilian adversaries in the so-called ‘Banana-republics’ and police states 
of the region. A well-documented case of how this practice was exploited by U.S. foreign 
policy is the overlap that developed between anti-communist guerrillas and cocaine networks 
during Nicaragua’s civil war. Looking at the history of the global trade, Scott and Marshall 
conclude that “[t]he most dramatic increases in drug smuggling since World War II have 
occurred in the context of, and indeed partly because of, covert operations in […] [these] 
regions. […] Although the CIA did not actually peddle drugs, it did form grey alliances with 
right-wing gangs deemed helpful against a common enemy”104. Involvement in drug traffick-
ing was often the very reason why U.S. allies such as Manuel Noriega in Panama and Luis 
García Meza in Bolivia were able to reach the pinnacle of the country’s security establish-
ment. More generally, involvement in transnational drug trafficking, smuggling, and boot-
legging has been a prominent ‘economy’ in U.S.-supported military dictatorships going back 
to Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza105 and Cuba’s Fulgencio Batista106.  
The central role that the transnational drug economy can play in national histories has also 
been highlighted in Lebanon: a country where transnational political interests, reflected in 
the country’s civil war, subverted drug markets to fund paramilitary activity. Marshall notes 
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how both Israel and Syria took advantage of their enclaves “to privilege traffickers who co-
operated with their respective intelligence services”107. According to Marshall, involvement 
in the drug trade extended to more than a few presidents, prime ministers, members of par-
liament, judges, police chiefs, and bankers in Lebanon. In fact, drug production in the Bekka 
valley was often the prime resource that paid for the arming and equipment of multiple Leb-
anese militias. A good example of the role that drug trafficking played in financing paramil-
itary groups in Lebanon is the prominent Falange leader Bachir Gemayel. Marshall notes that 
“Gemayel’s victorious militias, subsequently consolidated as the Lebanese Forces, today 
control the bulk of Free Lebanon’s protection rackets and vice trade, parcelling out a per-
centage of the profits to the smaller Christian militias. Their income comes from the esti-
mated $1 billion to $3 billion a year hashish trade”108. Gemayel not only collaborated with 
Mossad but was, according to Bob Woodward, a CIA asset109.  
Snyder110 and Meehan111 note the importance of the opium market in the political economy 
supporting Myanmar’s military junta. The opium economy was particularly important when 
the Myanmar government established in the 1990s what Snyder refers to as “institutions of 
joint extraction” in the national opium business112. These were joint enterprises in opium and 
heroin production established by the military junta and former insurgents. According to 
Meehan, the drug trade provided the Burmese state “with an array of incentives (legal impu-
nity, protection, money laundering) and threats (of prosecution) with which to co-opt and 
coerce insurgent groups over which it ha[d] otherwise commanded little authority”113. Snyder 
notes how revenue from the opium trade “enabled the regime to weather the international 
embargo imposed after its suppression of pro-democracy activists and students in the late 
 
107 Marshall, Jonathan. The Lebanese connection: Corruption, civil war, and the international drug traffic. Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2012, p. 3. 
108 Nation, June 19, 1982, cited in idem, p. 85. 
109 Woodward, Bob. "Alliance with a Lebanese leader". The Washington Post, September 29, 1987. 
110 Snyder, Richard, and Angelica Duran-Martinez. "Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored 
protection rackets." Crime, law and social change, vol. 52, no. 3, 2009, pp. 253-273. 
111 Meehan, Patrick. "Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drugs trade is central to Burma's changing 
political order." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2011, pp. 376-404. 
112 Snyder, Richard. "Does lootable wealth breed disorder? A political economy of extraction framework." Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 8, 2006, pp. 943-968, p. 950. 
113 Meehan, Patrick. "Drugs, insurgency and state-building in Burma: Why the drugs trade is central to Burma's changing 
political order." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2011, pp. 376-404, p. 376. 
55 
 
1980s”114. Profits from the drug trade were thereafter invested in legitimate businesses in 
Myanmar rather than laundered in Thailand or Hong Kong115. Importantly, by building insti-
tutions of joint extraction, the “Burmese military transformed narcotics from a ‘honey pot’ 
for hinterland rebels into the central pillar of the national economy”116. Using Burma as a 
notable example, Snyder argues that the intensity of state involvement is a critical factor 
determining the levels of violence associated with drug economies. He notes that “[i]f rulers 
are able to build institutions of joint extraction, lootable resources can provide the revenue 
with which to govern”117. Conversely, if joint extraction breaks down or if rulers fail to 
achieve it, “then lootable resources increase the risk of civil war by making it easier for in-
surgents to organize and get the income with which to rebel”118. Using the example of Mexico 
under the PRI system, Snyder and Duran Martinez further underscore the importance that 
state-supported rackets in the transnational drug business can have in determining its violent 
or peaceful nature119.  
An even more notable case underlining the importance that the transnational drug economy 
can have in national histories is the role that the opium and heroin market has played in recent 
decades in Afghanistan. The accelerated and pervasive expansion of the opium economy in 
the 1980s played a key role as a war economy during the civil war and the state-making 
efforts that followed the collapse of Soviet rule. As Felbab-Brown120 has noted, poppy culti-
vation in Afghanistan was triggered in the 1980s by the Soviet policy of crop destruction that 
sought to weaken support for the rebellious mujahidin. This forced a considerable portion of 
the population to turn to opium cultivation as a means of subsistence. The expansion of the 
opium economy was in turn capitalised by the major mujahidin leaders conducting the guer-
rilla warfare against Soviet occupation. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, perhaps the most important 
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of these warlords, depended on drug trafficking to support his militia121. Hekmatyar’s con-
nections with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence – the agency in charge of both the anti-
Soviet efforts in Afghanistan as well as the heroin markets around Peshawar122 - gave him an 
edge over other mujahidin leaders. Pakistani intelligence was the main conduit for U.S. as-
sistance in arms and resources reaching mujahidin leaders such as Hekmatyar. The opium 
trade in this respect became an important ‘proxy’ economy in support of the political agenda 
of Pakistan (under Zia ul-Haq), Saudi Arabia, and the Reagan administration against the So-
viet Union.  
When the Soviets were finally toppled in 1988, civil war between different mujahidin fac-
tions ensued. Throughout the 1990s, warlords in Afghanistan’s civil war relied to a very large 
extent on income generated by the opium and heroin trade (as well as contraband and gem 
smuggling) to arm their militias and battle one another 123. By 1996, one of these factions, 
the Taliban, began to tax opium farmers, traffickers, and heroin labs124. Felbab-Brown notes 
that the Islamic-oriented Taliban changed their antagonistic policy towards illicit narcotics 
and allowed poppy cultivation “to compensate for what its sponsorship of the illicit smug-
gling of legal goods could not provide: widespread legitimacy”125. Following the collapse of 
the Taliban after the U.S. invasion in 2001, Afghanistan’s reliance on the opium economy 
expanded further. By 2003, the drug trade generated about 40% of the country’s GDP126. 
Taxing opium geographies and heroin markets became strongly associated with warlord 
power in the Balkanisation that followed. As noted by Rubin, the overwhelming importance 
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of drug markets should not come as a surprise in a country ranking bottom in all measures of 
human development127.  
These examples suggest that the ‘political’ importance of the drug economy, while rooted in 
local dynamics, transcends ‘subnational’ contexts in two important ways. First, by becoming 
a key economy financing paramilitary and parapolice apparatuses, the transnational drug 
economy is often ‘integrated’ to support state-aims in functional ways. The transnational 
drug economy, which tends to develop in countries with weak fiscal and security apparatuses, 
becomes a key ‘low-barrier’ economy that states can tap into in direct and indirect ways. The 
relative importance of the transnational drug economy in places like Myanmar, Afghanistan, 
and Lebanon should not be underestimated. In contexts of austerity, exerting control over the 
transnational drug economy becomes a political imperative not only to fund the centre’s se-
curity capabilities but to prevent potential adversaries from capitalising on them. Second, 
drug trafficking affects global hierarchies, particularly by facilitating, as in these examples, 
security-oriented activity channelling exogenous agendas. In contrast to local drug markets, 
which operate by virtue of protection provided by local authorities (for example, local police) 
transnational narcotic flows often operate under the protection of federal-state institutions. A 
historical review of the transnational drug trade shows that it has often involved a particular 
kind of institution: national security. In other words, security agencies do not merely ‘regu-
late’ drug markets, but the ‘racketeering’ of drug markets is rather a process leading to the 
creation of political economies supporting security activity. Importantly, the illegal character 
of the transnational drug economy makes state involvement clandestine and purposely ob-
scured. This makes national security agencies adequate institutions to instrumentalise this 
modern form of bandit operating at national and transnational levels to generate security. 
National security agencies constitute relatively contained and detached institutional environ-
ments for the exploitation of these markets.  
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The political input of the transnational drug economy in global history highlights processes 
that we can safely characterise as ‘interventions’. Imperial penetration in South East Asia, 
Turkey, Central, and South America, has included in its toolkits a ‘functional’ association 
with transnational illegal economies. As noted by Colás and Mabee, “expressions of private 
violence like piracy, banditry and mercenarism have been facilitated by, and often instru-
mental to the commercial, military and political circuits of imperial power. […] Empires have 
in turn benefited economically, politically, and geostrategically from these very private 
sources of violence”128. Whereas the past section noted how state-making strategies involv-
ing banditry were particularly important in historical periods marked by the consolidation of 
new liberal polities, this section stressed, instead, its transnational implications. Situated at 
the intersection of historical sociology, comparative politics, and international relations, the 
following chapters will argue that patterns and processes noted in this chapter are also ob-
servable in Mexico. The thesis will document, but also reassess, the input of the drug econ-
omy in restricting the spectrum of historical possibilities in 20th century Mexico, or the role 
of the ‘bandit’ in the highly peculiar form of political modernity embodied by the PRI autoc-
racy. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to assessing the historical dynamics and structural 
drivers leading to the country’s contemporary brutal civil war.  
Conclusions 
Employing a Tillyian framework, the first section of the chapter noted that state-making is a 
historical process that results at a fundamental level from the interaction between security 
agents and economic actors. Capital needs a security structure, and any security structure 
needs capital to support itself. The ‘birth’ of capital in the Neolithic not only generated an 
object to protect but also enabled a supporting political economy capable of paying for a 
security apparatus. Protection to farmers, shepherds, and villagers in return for tribute is the 
kind of dynamic that established the early manifestations of a process invested in generating 
not only security but political hierarchy. All instances of racketeering, whether performed by 
 
128 Colás, Alejandro, and Bryan Mabee, eds. Mercenaries, pirates, bandits and empires: private violence in historical con-
text. Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 4. 
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states, gangs, criminals, vigilante groups, or extortionist mafias, are akin to state-making not 
as an end, but as a historical and political process.  In this respect, the chapter noted that, in 
socioeconomic contexts marked by low capital and fiscal austerity, illegal markets often rep-
resent a precious, low barrier commodity with enormous political potential for those power-
ful enough to operate and protect them. The key importance of these markets is observable 
at multiple levels, and different but complementary scholarly perspectives have addressed 
the various ways in which these economies affect the political process. Exerting control over 
illegal commodities allows for the generation of irregular security processes such as paramil-
itary proxies, para-policing apparatuses, informal governance, and even formal security pro-
cesses attached to the interests embodied by the state.   
Rooted in a primal past, the political input of ‘bandits’ and ‘criminals’ extends to contempo-
rary global history. The chapter argued that the bandit, the outlaw, the criminal, has been a 
key part in the making of capitalist modernity. On the one hand, the bandit embodies the 
alienating process implicated by the capitalisation of premodern economies. On the other 
hand, the bandit is often the instrument that the emergent liberal class employs to contain the 
social antagonisms created by its own ascendancy. Banditry attached to political and eco-
nomic elites was often a key vehicle in the consolidation of the much more extensive geog-
raphies of power represented by the nation-state. In this respect, the chapter noted the key 
importance of banditry in the emergence of liberal polities in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Rather than antagonistic to the capitalist state, bandits were often their seminal police forces, 
hired to secure new forms of property, push back on social discontent, and secure the new 
order emerging from the breakdown of the old one. Banditry was not only used to fight ban-
ditry itself, but to target separatism and ethnic nationalism, form early national policing bod-
ies, organise electoral markets, and above all, tackle the collateral antagonisms generated by 
structural transformation. What made co-opted bandits particularly attractive from the point 
of view of their state enablers was that, even when incorporated, they continued to function 
by selectively preying, robbing, kidnapping, and extorting. In other words, they represented 
a ‘self-financing’ apparatus resembling plundering armies mobilised by the promise of re-
wards. Although not always a vehicle for state power, banditry nevertheless did play a role 
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in the consolidation of states, and their input in constructing political modernity merits further 
reflection from political scientists and historians.    
After the end of WW II, the transnational drug business became the most profitable illegal 
market in the world. This made it a notable, and highly lootable, economy in the impover-
ished economies concentrating global production and transnational flows. Like banditry be-
fore it, transnational drug trafficking, generated by the international prohibitionist regime, 
was instrumentalised to advance exogenous agendas, economic interests, and foreign inter-
ventions. This instrumentalisation would strongly affect its geographical dispersion through-
out the second half of the 20th century – a dispersion that reflects its embeddedness in security 
processes of transnational character. As noted by McCoy and others, the instrumentalisation 
of drug markets to support ‘security-oriented’ activity was rooted in the historical exploita-
tion of the opium trade to advance imperialistic agendas in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
This policy persisted despite prohibition and became an important mechanism to deploy U.S. 
security interests aimed at pushing back on social actors resisting capitalist penetration. The 
chapter sought to provide a frame of reference suitable for a discussion that has remained 
somewhat peripheral to academia: the entanglements between security agencies and the drug 
trade. The chapter also sought to engage in a theoretical but historically informed discussion 
about illegal markets that speaks to political scientists, international relations scholars, and 




Chapter 2 - Protection rackets and state-formation after the Mexican Revolution 
This chapter describes the importance of ‘outlaw’ economies in the early centralisation pro-
cess that followed the Mexican Revolution, noting in particular how protection rackets on 
illegal economies assisted the establishment of a national security structure in support of an 
increasingly able and centralised state. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first intro-
duces the PRI regime by discussing the contrasting approaches that historians and social sci-
entists have employed to unpack its history. It builds on the most significant divide in recent 
historiography on Mexico: social versus political history. 'Social’ approaches tend to invoke 
the down-to-top permeability of political structures under the PRI state, a view that echoes 
the notion that states have limited autonomy and rather constitute a ‘reflection’ or ‘crystalli-
sation’ of the social (i.e. systems theory in political science, structural functionalism, behav-
iouralism, post-structuralism). In contrast to social accounts, perspectives emphasising the 
‘political’ adopt a top-to-down approach to the political process, established in hierarchy, 
allowing for domination, enabling internal colonisation, and accounting for the influence of 
macro structures over lesser social configurations. The section argues that an approach taking 
into account national elites, federal institutions and transnational geographies seems neces-
sary to make sense of key processes in Mexico’s history, such as the PRI regime’s formidable 
ability to impose swift, top-down and highly unpopular political agendas (agendas associated 
with crony capitalism, Mafiosi corporativism, low wages, low social investment, privatisa-
tion, radical neoliberal programmes, etc.) and collect an enormous portion of the benefits 
generated by these processes despite the protest and resistance that social histories rightly 
underscore and investigate. Broader geographies of power are necessary to account, also, for 
the neglected influence of global processes (and particularly U.S. interests) in political out-
comes in Mexico. In this respect, the chapter notes how U.S. interventionism became ‘em-
bedded’ in Mexico’s political system, as in many other Latin American countries, by sup-
porting and influencing the development of its national security capabilities after WW II. 
Finally, the PRI’s formidable ability to structure coherent and centralised protection rackets 
on criminal economies (in particular transnational drug trafficking and transborder contra-
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band) at a national scale (an ability greatly missed today) requires us to reckon with pro-
cesses, institutions and markets of national and transnational stature. Building on perspec-
tives that underline national histories, broader geographies of power and global regularities, 
the second part of the chapter looks at the early history of ‘outlaw’ economies in the PRI 
period, noting, in particular, the input of the bandit in the construction of the postrevolution-
ary state.   
The PRI regime 
The PRI party ran the entire state apparatus in Mexico. It staffed every political and bureau-
cratic position, both in the state and in the regions, and without any interruption or challenge, 
from the early 1930s to the late 1980s129. The regime was perceived as a ‘softer’ form of 
dictatorship in the sense that, in contrast to the military dictatorships in Latin America during 
the Cold War, it was successfully camouflaged as a pluralist, liberal and non-repressive po-
litical system, transferring power in a timely and peaceful fashion at the end of every six-
year presidential term, giving intellectuals ampler margins to criticise the system, and claim-
ing to embody the aspirations of the working classes through its elaborate corporative sys-
tem130. Unlike all of Latin America, there was never a coup d’état, a mass rebellion, an armed 
insurgency, a personal dictatorship, nor any kind of irregular alteration of the constitutional 
order. It was a ‘single-party regime’ in the sense that no real parties were allowed to exist, 
and in the sense that the party-controlled access to the legislative, the judicial, and the exec-
utive branches at all levels131. Like any other authoritarian state, access to power was not the 
 
129 Alternative political parties only began to make small gains at the municipal level in the mid-1980s. The first governor 
from a different party only won an election in 1989, and the presidency remained under PRI control until the year 2000. 
The best analysis of this late and very gradual political opening is: Lujambio, Alonso. El poder compartido: un ensayo 
sobre la democratización mexicana. Oceano, 2000. 
130 “La dictadura perfecta” is a term coined by renowned Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa. See: “Vargas Llosa: "Mé-
xico es la dictadura perfecta".” El País, September 1st, 1990, https://elpais.com/diario/1990/09/01/cul-
tura/652140001_850215.html.   
131 A useful discussion on single party regimes is Smith, Benjamin. "Life of the party: The origins of regime breakdown 
and persistence under single-party rule." World Politics, vol. 57, no. 3, 2005, pp. 421-451. Smith notes how the fiscal con-
straints that parties face at their inception generate long-lasting trajectories. Elites, he argues, that “face organized opposi-
tion in the form of highly institutionalized social groups such as mass-mobilizing parties or dedicated foreign or colonial 
armies and that have little or no access to rent sources are likely to respond to these constraints by building party institu-
tions to mobilize their own constituencies. By contrast, rulers who face only scattered opposition and enjoy access to plen-
tiful rents confront no such forced moves. As a result, they tend not to build much in the way of a party organization”.  
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result of democratic elections and open processes (elections were fully ceremonial, often 
rigged) but of negotiations conducted por debajo de la mesa [under the table] amongst party 
elites expressing a centralised web of clientelar and patrimonial synapses. The extent to 
which politics under the PRI took place in inaccessible corridors makes the scholarly task of 
carving out its highly informal mechanisms a particularly difficult, but ultimately important 
one, given that the PRI represents the most stable and durable political regime in the third 
world in all of the 20th century.  How did this happen? 
The party, established in 1929, was the child of the Mexican Revolution. It originated as a 
kind of ‘junta’ or assembly of regional caudillos [regional military strongmen] rather than a 
party in the mass, modern sense. It was a political platform meant to group and bridge the 
interests of revolutionary victors, lay down common rules to stop the civil war, and provide 
space for a decisively weak central government. Caudillos, in control of local, often dis-
jointed bands of armed men generated by the revolution, traded nominal adherence to the 
party in return to do as they pleased in their regional domains. This loose ‘compromise’ be-
hind the establishment of the PRI party laid down, however, the basis for a future, national 
state. The fact that the Mexican state was born from a political process centred around the 
creation of a party made party and state equivalent bodies. In any case, the structure created 
in the 1920s with the objective of preserving regional autonomy, by the mid-1930s began to 
do just the inverse. Its capacity to transfer power away from regional actors and towards the 
centre grew, in particular, by deploying an increasingly centralised and able structure allo-
cating patronage and spoils. By driving the allocation of patronage away from caudillos and 
caciques, and luring the working masses closer to the federation, the centre (and the party 
elite) became strengthened.  
The process of incorporating the masses into a more centrally managed system of social gov-
ernance began with the demand that mobilised the Mexican Revolution: reparto agrario 
[land distribution]. Landless peasants, representing more than 96% of the rural population, 
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longed for a piece of an hacienda132. The PRI at this early hour (1930s) began to weave the 
first pillar of a centrally managed corporative system by trading land in return for affiliation 
to ‘official’ peasant organisations. Eager campesinos in want of hacendado’s land could only 
realistically get it through one of these party organisations133. The first pillar of the PRI re-
gime, the so-called Sector Campesino, was established by means of a transparently populist 
‘fishing-net’. This quid-pro-quo with the masses soon expanded into labour, constituting the 
Sector Obrero, where only PRI-affiliated labour had a realistic chance of securing benefits. 
In other words, the party began to establish its grip over the masses by becoming what Oc-
tavio Paz called a philanthropic ogre providing land to peasants and rights to labour in return 
for incorporation and allegiance134. As I explain below, whereas this formidable corporative 
structure would remain in place for more than seven decades, its ‘populist’ and ‘grass-root’ 
orientation would only last a few years. By the 1940s, reparto agrario was downscaled and 
labour rights began once again to be curtailed. A much more entrepreneurial mindset took 
over the PRI party: theirs was to a capitalism of enablers, of compadres, with little regard for 
the masses they claimed to represent. By the time of this popular setback, the general frame-
work for the incorporation of the Mexican masses was already in place.  
The centralisation of patronage networks during this early period was enabled, in addition, 
by a relatively swift transition from a regionalised revenue structure to a largely federal one. 
Centralising taxation encouraged the centralisation of patronage, mining the autonomous 
power of actors in municipalities and regions and enhancing the reach of the federal govern-
ment and the executive branch135. As Smith notes, “[f]iscal policies introduced during the 
1940s and early 1950s increased the centralisation of revenue collection in the hands of the 
federal government, stripping states and municipalities of political autonomy”136. This shift 
in tax collection further weakened the ability of regional brokers to directly purchase social 
 
132 Cockcroft, James D. "Mexico: Class formation, capital accumulation and the state.” Science and Society, vol. 49, no. 2, 
1985, pp. 232-235. 
133  Niblo, Stephen R. Mexico in the 1940s: modernity, politics, and corruption. Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p.6. 
134 Paz, Octavio. El ogro filantrópico: historia y política 1971-1978. Seix Barral, 1979.  
135 Smith, Benjamin T. “Building the state on the cheap”. Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938–
1968, edited by Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith, Duke University Press, 2014. 
136 Idem, p. 256. 
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adherence by themselves, making them instead intermediaries (at best) or dependents (at 
worst) of the federation. The centralisation of the revenue system, despite resistance from 
regional powers, was almost complete by the late-1940s. 
Revenue, increasingly centralised, was nevertheless critically insufficient. In fact, as noted 
by Smith, Mexico ranked lowest in revenue per-capita in Latin America for most of the PRI 
period137. This resulted, as Aboites has argued, from a policy of tax exemptions used both to 
cement the relationship between the state and the masses (in particular, by not taxing com-
munal land allocations, or ejidos) but more importantly, a policy of tax exemptions and priv-
ileges used to cement relationships with capital138. British economist Nicholas Kaldor, com-
missioned by the Mexican government in the 1970s to undertake a study of the revenue sys-
tem, concluded that considering the alleged social aims of the PRI regime, its revenue system 
had no global parallel in its favouritism for big business139. This translated, unsurprisingly, 
into very low levels of social spending, a category where the ‘philanthropic’ regime ranked 
amongst the last in Latin America140. This striking state of austerity enhanced the importance 
of rent-seeking and extortionist practices in the reproduction and articulation of PRI hegem-
ony. An increasingly centralised allocation of ‘licenses’ to appropriate public authority al-
lowed those at high levels to pocket vast fortunes and those working at the base to make a 
living141. The officially sanctioned misappropriation of authority for rent-seeking purposes 
became a crucial, if often unaccounted, political economy in the making of the PRI state. 
Compensating in important ways for the lack of revenue, abusing the law became an alterna-
tive highway to build a political class and operationalise a state bureaucracy perpetually short 
 
137 Idem. 
138 Aboites, Luis. Excepciones y privilegios: modernización tributaria y centralización en México, 1922-1972. Colegio De 
Mexico AC, 2003. 
139 Cited in: Hansen, Roger D. The politics of Mexican development. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. For an 
analysis of the extremely pro-business orientation of the Mexican revenue system, see also: Cypher, James M. Estado y 
capital en México: política de desarollo desde 1940. Siglo XXI, 1992, pp. 100-103.   
140 Smith, Benjamin T. “Building the state on the cheap”. Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938–
1968, edited by Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith, Duke University Press, 2014. 
141Niblo, Stephen R. Mexico in the 1940s: modernity, politics, and corruption. Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 
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of resources. As Niblo142, Morris143, Flores Pérez144, and many others have noted, beginning 
in the 1940s, extortionist practices became much more than a footnote to the operation of the 
political system in Mexico and embodied instead the very mechanism articulating power re-
lations at multiple levels and allowing for the regime to perform relatively well despite its 
‘formal’ destitution. Importantly, a key area in the centralisation of ‘abuse’ (as Alan Knight 
has called it145) was the reorganisation of an overlooked but particularly important economy 
emerging in the 1940s: transnational criminal activity. 
But before discussing trajectories in criminal markets and their role in the making of the early 
PRI state, I will briefly describe the different frameworks through which political and social 
scholars have made sense of this longevous, and highly peculiar, system of national govern-
ance. The PRI regime has been studied from several perspectives, and a quick overview of 
the key divides in its historiography will allow me to note the additional layers of analysis 
that my work seeks to contribute.  
Historiographical approaches to the PRI regime 
In the 1970s, historiographical approaches to the PRI regime tended to emphasise its seem-
ingly centralised, hegemonic, and authoritarian character. These top-to-down views of polit-
ical agency in Mexico, thinking ‘state’ as a relatively independent actor in the historical pro-
cess, underlined the regime´s surprising capacity to cling on to power and impose social 
agendas. The presence of a ‘strong’ and ‘centralised’ state in Mexico was a given, noted by 
underlying qualities such as its particularly robust form of presidentialism, its highly efficient 
corporative grip over the working classes, its extensive bureaucratic capabilities, the absence 
of political options and democratic processes, as well as the extreme polarisation in wealth 
 
142 Ibid. 
143 Morris, Stephen D. Corruption & politics in contemporary Mexico. University of Alabama, 1991. 
144 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. El estado en crisis: crimen organizado y política: desafíos para la consolidación demo-
crática. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2009. 
145  Alan Knight notes that, after the Mexican revolution, the state in Mexico grew in three respects: “it expanded its in-
come and payroll (in a limited way), it acquired a mass base, and it deployed greater regulatory powers (over land, labour, 
property, education, the church, drug enforcement, etc.) that could be easily abused” (own emphasis). See Knight, Alan. 
“Narco-Violence and the State in Modern Mexico.” Violence, coercion, and state-making in twentieth-century Mexico: 
The other half of the centaur, edited by Wil G. Pansters, Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 307. 
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and power characterising its society. The ‘social’ capacity to affect the ‘political’ was per-
ceived as highly limited; the state apparatus was much more responsive to the interests of the 
party elite and its social intermediaries than to any social bases. The passive masses were 
exploited by a hierarchy established for the benefit of capital and the corrupt appetites of the 
political elite. Centralised PRI rule was all-pervasive, uncontested, homogenous, and elitist. 
Categories like asymmetry and hierarchy were the kind of voices used to describe a landscape 
fitted for ‘national’ historical accounts, attentive to macro structures, condensable in general 
processes.  
Proponents of this top-to-down approach were called the revisionist school. They were ‘re-
visionist’ in the sense that they were challenging the allegedly pluralistic, paternalistic, dem-
ocratic, and generally benevolent nature of the PRI regime held by previous historians of the 
oficialismo. Key works included Pablo Gonzalez Casanova’s “La democracia en Mexico” 
(1965), which analysed socioeconomic indicators under the PRI regime and characterised the 
political process as one invested on ‘internal colonisation’; Arnaldo Cordova’s “La ideología 
de la Revolución Mexicana” (1973) and “La política de masas del Cardenismo” (1974), 
which underlined the top-to-down orientation of the political process made possible by Mex-
ican corporativism; “Authoritarianism in Mexico”, by Jose Luis Reyna and Richard S. 
Weinert (1974)146, which underscored how corporativism ‘restrained’ the kind of social ac-
tion that one would expect in situations of extreme inequality like PRI’s Mexico; Judith Adler 
Hellman’s “Social Control in Mexico and the Mexican political system” (1986), highlighting 
the much more extensive use of repression used to contain social demands, as well as Roger 
Bartra´s “Campesinado y poder político en México” (1982), which framed the whole issue 
in strong Marxian terms.  
 
146 Two particularly useful reviews of Mexican historiography underlining the transition from state-centric to localist and 
culturalist views are: Knight, Alan. "Patterns and prescriptions in Mexican historiography." Bulletin of Latin American 
Research, vol. 25, no. 3, 2006, pp. 340-366; and Rubin, Jeffrey W. "Decentering the regime: culture and regional politics 
in Mexico." Latin American Research Review, vol. 31, no. 3, 1996, pp. 85-126. These reviews were very useful in point-
ing to me key references of the post-revisionist school in Mexican historiography and underlining key contrasts between 
structural and post structural apprehensions of Mexico´s past.  Additional historiographical reviews also include: Benja-
min, Thomas. “Recent Historiography of the Origins of the Mexican War.” New Mexico Historical Review, vol. 54, no. 3, 
1979, p. 169; and Vaughan, Mary K. “Cultural approaches to peasant politics in the Mexican revolution.” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, vol. 79, no. 2, 1999, pp. 269-305.  
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After the 1980s, however, post-revisionist accounts of the nature of politics under the single-
party regime began to challenge these ideas. From a state-centred approach emphasising 
PRI’s political hegemony and a preference for ‘national’ histories, the interest shifted to more 
regionally focused, culturalist accounts challenging the idea of even and unidirectional dom-
ination covering the whole geography of Mexico. ‘Social’ historians began to note that PRI 
power was not all that ‘unilateral’, ‘uniform’ and ‘top-down’, but the result of ‘negotiations’, 
‘resistances’, ‘compromises’ and ‘interactions’ between the powerful and the subaltern. The 
criticism in these works was inspired by Foucault´s ideas on ‘governmentality’, which gave 
weight to notions like the ‘decentred administration of life’, the ‘how rather than the why’ of 
power and ‘micro’ disciplinary technologies147. Rather than a coherent and uniform political 
process, the diversity of muchos Mexicos seemed to cancel the viability of a ‘national’ his-
tory, opening the door instead for a more narrow but detailed description of the multiple 
realities contained in micro-historias [micro histories]. The task of the new historian was 
understood more as a lookout for variation rather than generalisation, regularities, or histor-
ical synthesis. Post-revisionist accounts, therefore, documented the multicultural, multifocal, 
multidirectional trajectories of power relations in Mexico. Peasants, ranchers, industrial 
workers, social movements, households, women, social groups, and many other subalterns 
ignored by traditional accounts became the focus of a new breed of social scientists.  
The pioneering work in this regard was Luis González’ “Pueblo en Vilo”148, a 1972 ethno-
graphic account of rural Mexico which showed how local communities could exist in total 
isolation to the alleged national torrent. The book focused on the present, inspired a regional 
and cultural re-visiting of Mexico’s past aimed at bringing down the state-centric ‘myths’ of 
revisionist history. In this respect, Alan Knight’s examination of the Mexican Revolution 
was perhaps the most important work reassessing the heterogeneity of the social in the revo-
lution. His assertion that many Mexicos (classes, ethnicities, regional interests, social groups, 
demands) produced many Revolutions (rather than a uniform and generalisable conflict of 
 
147 A powerful criticism of the more ‘micro’-focused interpretation of Foucault’s work is: Jessop, Bob. “Constituting an-
other Foucault effect: Foucault on states and statecraft.” Governmentality, Routledge, 2010, pp. 64-81. 
148 González, Luis. Pueblo en Vilo. Microhistoria de San José de Gracia. Colegio de México, 1968. 
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explotados versus explotadores) captures his attempt to problematise national history by 
looking closer and digging deeper149.  
In 1994, Nugent and Joseph coordinated the key book on Mexican culturalism, “Everyday 
Forms of State Formation”150. It underlined the way in which local popular cultures affected 
the revolutionary process and the early decades of the PRI, stressing in particular how local 
agency led to negotiated, rather than imposed, political outcomes of heterogeneous character. 
Other historians became interested in dissecting the alleged all-powerful character of the PRI 
corporative system by noting how ‘incorporation’ to its mass organisations did not neces-
sarily translate into ‘top-down’ control: the corporate system in which the regime rested was 
less about control and more about compromise151. Gillingham and Smith used the term 
“dictablanda” to underscore the limits that “salient popular bargaining and veto power” im-
posed on the party elite152. Research on regional caciques (most notably Ankerson153 and 
Pansters154) was extremely influential for noting the persistence of patrimonial governance 
and pockets with high degrees of autonomy (especially) in the early PRI period. The work 
on Mexican caciques represented a major contribution to Mexican studies not only because 
it problematised the ‘national’ by noting the autonomy of the ‘regional’, but also because 
these works noted for the first time that violence and coercion played important roles in the 
construction of hegemony. Regional accounts began to uncover the input of violence in a 
country cast as an exception in a continent where state repression had played a heavy hand. 
 
149 Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. University of Nebraska Press, vol. 2, 1986. 
150 Nugent, Daniel, and Gilbert M. Joseph. Everyday Forms of State Formation. Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in 
Modern Mexico. Duke University Press, 1994. 
151 Rubin, Jeffrey W. "Decentering the regime: culture and regional politics in Mexico." Latin American Research Review, 
vol. 31, no. 3, 1996, pp. 85-126. 
152 Gillingham, Paul, and Benjamin T. Smith. Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938–1968. Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1993. 
153 Ankerson, Dudley. Saturnino Cedillo and the Mexican Revolution in San Luis Potosí. Northern Illinois University, 
1984.  
154 Pansters, Wil G. Política y poder en Puebla: formación y ocaso del cacicazgo avilacamachista, 1937-1987. Benemé-
rita Univ. Autónoma de Puebla, 1998. 
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As Pansters notes, “much scholarly work on Mexico […] tended to focus on “ballots” but 
has had troubles accommodating the “bullets” in a comprehensive interpretation”155.  
The regional accounts and historiographical critiques of Jeffrey W. Rubin articulated perhaps 
the most extreme attack on hegemonic views of the PRI by arguing that no single system of 
politics operated in the country156. Smith´s analysis of the history of revenue underscored the 
extreme fiscal limitations of a supposedly strong centro157. Hernández Rodríguez questioned 
the alleged hegemony of the federal executive by documenting the autonomy of state gover-
nors and municipal presidents158. Building from social anthropology, subsequent studies 
looked at informal economies (such as street vendors) to describe the complex synapses of 
informal constellations structuring everyday governance in urban peripheries159. What in-
formed these views was an idea of the state, not as the embodiment of “institutions and mech-
anisms that ensure the subservience of […] citizens”, but a reflection of compromises and 
negotiations taking place “in multiple local sites of contestation such as workplaces, families, 
associational groups, and institutions”160. By de-emphasising ‘elite history’, social histories 
provided a much more realistic understanding of the limitations of PRI governance, the input 
of social agency and the unnoticed input of state violence lacking in previous literature.  
While social historians did not seek to ‘de-politicise’ history, the strong impulse given to 
social accounts and micro-narratives inevitably drove interest away from structures, elite 
 
155 Pansters, Wil G., ed. Violence, coercion, and State-making in twentieth-century Mexico: The other half of the Centaur. 
Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 6. 
156 Rubin, Jeffrey W. "Decentering the regime: culture and regional politics in Mexico." Latin American Research Review, 
vol. 31, no. 3, 1996, pp. 85-126. 
157 Smith, Benjamin T. “Building the state on the cheap”. Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938–
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158 Rodríguez, Rogelio Hernández. El centro dividido: la nueva autonomía de los gobernadores. El Colegio de México, 
Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 2008. 
159 For example: Cross, John C. "Debilitando al clientelismo: la formalización del ambulantaje en la ciudad de México." 
Revista mexicana de sociología, vol. 59, no. 4, 1997, pp. 93-115. Also: Esquivel, Edgar, et al. La República informal: el 
ambulantaje en la Ciudad de México. Tecnológico de Monterrey/MA Porrua, 2008. 
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"Decentering the regime: culture and regional politics in Mexico." Latin American Research Review, vol. 31, no. 3, 1996, 
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power, and broader geographies of power. Atomising power rendered the historical and so-
cial sciences more exact, but also narrower and, in some occasions, sterile161. As da Costa 
notes, what began as a healthy criticism of the artificial separation between the infrastructure 
and the superstructure ended up in its complete inversion162. Paradoxically, the impetus of 
microhistories and its criticism of ideas like hierarchies and power differentials, corre-
sponded to a historical period (the 1980s and 1990s) in which transformative ‘macro’ eco-
nomic and political processes directed from ‘above’ (neoliberalism) were taking place with 
very little input (and resistance) from ‘below’. In other words, in its efforts to bring forth the 
demands of the subaltern, the more orthodox versions of culturalism and social history un-
wittingly obscured the very asymmetrical processes deployed by a period of ‘polarising’ 
global subalternity. 
The challenge against the most extreme claims of social history originated in the political 
sciences with the influential movement Bring-the-State Back-In (BSBI) associated with Ev-
ans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol, Levi, and of course, Tilly. Vu notes that BSBI was originally 
composed of four core groups of scholars who repositioned the state as a central (although 
no longer perceived as fully autonomous) agent in the historical process. Historical institu-
tionalists focused more narrowly on the evolution of concrete institutions of the welfare state; 
rational-choice institutionalists saw the state from a revenue-centred perspective and as a 
rational, rent-seeking maximiser; supporters of the state in society emphasised antagonism 
between the state and society (focusing namely on revolution) whereas finally, a group of 
political scientists began to study state formation in a comparative and historical light163. 
What characterised this last group (to which Tilly belonged) was that it approached state 
 
161 A general critique of culturalist hegemony in social sciences is: Hall, Peter A. “The dilemmas of contemporary social 
science.” Boundary 2, vol. 34, no. 3, 2007, pp. 121-141. 
162 da Costa, Emilia Viotti. “New Publics, New Politics, New Histories: From Economic Reductionism to Cultural Reduc-
tionism – in Search of Dialectics.” Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History: Essays from the North, edited by 
Gilbert M. Joseph, Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 17-31. 
163 Vu, Tuong. "Studying the state through state formation." World politics, vol. 62, no. 1, 2010, pp. 148-175. 
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formation from a macro-sociological perspective rather than “the mesolevel and the mi-
crolevel of causal mechanisms”164. As Vu notes, states in this last group were again treated 
“as institutional configurations whose formative processes are the focus of analysis”165.  
Attempts at historical reinterpretation and synthesis, and the inclusion of broader categories 
to understand the global connections of political processes, made their way back to the liter-
ature. Gilbert M. Joseph’s “Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History”166 as well as 
“Close Encounters of Empire”167 incorporated asymmetry as much as negotiation in the re-
assessment of political outcomes in the region. Joseph criticised the most extreme versions 
of social history in South America by noting how “much of the “newer” social and cultural 
history […] defangs or expunges the political […] diluting political analysis to the point of 
irrelevance”168. These new approaches proposed instead broader “arenas of power”169, the 
possibility of “historiographical synthesis” 170 and “world systems”. A key idea was that “po-
litical discourses, symbols, and identities are intimately related to social relations, economic 
processes, and power”171. Echoing critiques posed more harshly by authors like Vivek Chi-
ber172, da Costa noted how the processes that generate subalternity cannot be explained ex-
clusively through a narrow approach.    
The life of a peasant in some lost village in the backland, the 
labor conditions of a worker in a factory, a woman’s status in 
a society, the opportunities denied or opened to a black person 
- all depend not only on their own struggle or on the cold logic 
of the market, but also on decisions taken by those in power. 
 
164 Idem, p. 149. 
165 Idem, p. 171. 
166 Joseph, Gilbert M., ed. Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History: Essays from the North. Duke University 
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169 Idem, p. 4. 
170 Idem, p. 13. 
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… It is impossible to understand the history of the powerless 
without understanding the powerful. History from the bottom 
up can be as meaningless as history from the top down173. 
I would like to note three processes that, in contrast to some postulates in social histories, 
expose the power of the PRI state as authoritarian, elitist, and socially unresponsive. The first 
is the relative but notorious degree of autonomy that the party elite enjoyed from social bases, 
an autonomy that translated into an explicit capacity to impose highly unpopular agendas 
leading to structural and transformative change. As Davis174, Centeno175, Flores Pérez176 and 
others have noted, the steep social transformations implemented by PRI elites in the key 
periods of Alemanismo (1940s) and Salinismo (1990s) underline the PRI’s protracted ability 
to advance elite interests despite widespread opposition and with zero input from the ‘bases’. 
This capacity to affect the social was rooted, in particular, in the regime’s grip over the work-
ers’ movement and its striking capability to lay down a durable corporative system reflecting 
less the interests of peasants and workers and more the aims of party brokers, agrobusiness 
and industrialists. The second process signalling PRI’s ability to concentrate power at its 
summit was the party’s ability to successfully consolidate protection rackets in illicit econo-
mies in extended geographies and for remarkable periods of time. As I note in the following 
chapters, protection rackets under the PRI involved criminal and conspiratorial pacts oper-
ated from the pinnacle of state power. As many have noted, the drug market owed its remark-
ably low levels of violence to what Synder and Duran describe as a model of centralised 
institutional protection (‘one protector, one criminal organisation’) where federal institutions 
were key players in enabling selected drug traffickers. The extent to which the central state 
was able to regulate high-stake criminal activities is a capability that, reliant on a notoriously 
centralised political system, is greatly missed today.   
 
173 da Costa, Emilia Viotti. The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories. University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. xvii, cited 
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Finally, the third process highlighting power above is the ability of the U.S. government to 
affect political outcomes in its regional sphere of influence. The interest to look at the PRI 
system from a more global (or U.S.) perspective has been surprisingly scant in Mexican his-
toriography despite the notorious place of Mexico in the history of America’s global expan-
sion. In contrast to national histories in Central America, the Caribbean, and other latitudes 
in which U.S. influence is noted as unambiguously central, isolationist approaches have char-
acterised the history of 20th century Mexico. A ‘global’ approach to Mexican history could, 
nevertheless, enable two fruitful analytical possibilities: first, being able to compare Mexico 
to international political experiences and, second, being able to grasp how Mexico is con-
nected to this global experience as well177. With respect to the former, global comparisons 
“provide the spatial and chronological perspectives required for the appreciation of […] his-
tories […] that the majority of scholars study in greater depth […] but alas too often detached 
from potentially illuminating contexts with universal appeal”178. The possibility to look for 
clues and signs in other places is particularly useful when trying to make sense of a phenom-
enon of transnational nature (in this case, transnational drug trafficking) with comparable and 
enlightening political repercussions taking place in multiple national arenas.  
On the other hand, a global approach evokes connectivity within an international system and 
shows insightful connections between developments in Mexico and hierarchies and processes 
originating elsewhere. Looking for global connections “elucidates how history is made 
through the interactions of geographically (or temporally) separate historical communi-
ties”179. A global perspective sensitive to transnational hierarchy shows that political and 
social outcomes are not only the ‘synthesis’ or ‘reflection’ of localised social processes, but 
the expression, too, of exogenous interests and external interventions. The military dictator-
ships and national security states in Central America and the Caribbean during the Cold War 
are examples of the weight that external, rather than internal factors, can have as pillars of 
 
177 O’Brien, Patrick. "Historical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history." Journal of Global 
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sovereignty180. Looking for global connections and comparisons in the history of transna-
tional drug trafficking is particularly important to grasp regularities and patterns that, taking 
place in heterogeneous social landscapes, help us make sense of their input in state-making, 
global capitalism, extra-territorial expansion, colonialism and empire.  
A useful exercise to grasp the divergent views on the input of the global in Mexican history 
is to briefly assess the contrasting views contained in the landmark contributions of Alan 
Knight and John Mason Hart on the history of the revolution and their views on the input of 
‘America’ in the revolutionary process181. Focused on social forces, Knight argues that the 
causes of the revolution were multiple, heterogeneous, and diverse and that the outcome of 
the process had little to do with U.S. intervention. The causes of the revolution are to be 
found in the heterogeneous social mosaics generating muchas revoluciones –peasants, ranch-
ers, miners, artisans, an emergent bourgeoise, women, urban workers, cut across by strong 
regional variation and embodying a wide spectrum of mobilising grievances. Knight does 
note, however, the key importance of capitalist penetration of the Mexican countryside (the 
end of the commons and the commercialisation of agriculture) in laying the ground for the 
key antagonisms driving the revolutionary process. Admitting that U.S. interests played a 
key role in the deployment of this capitalism, Knight is critical, however, of ‘gringo-bashing’ 
accounts that focus on U.S. interests to make sense of political and socioeconomic outcomes 
in Mexico. Knight notes, for example, how key ‘revolutionary’ regions in the country were, 
paradoxically, those less penetrated by U.S. capital, a fact that points to domestic causes, 
rooted in local and variable interactions between multiple social groups, driving the eruption 
 
180 See: Coatsworth, John H. Central America and the United States: the clients and the colossus. Macmillan Reference 
USA, 1994; Holden, Robert H. “Securing Central America against communism: The United States and the modernization 
of surveillance in the cold war.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 41, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1-30. 
181 Foran, John. "Reinventing the Mexican Revolution: The competing paradigms of Alan Knight and John Mason Hart." 
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of Mexico’s ‘many revolutions’182. The actions of the U.S. government in Mexico, according 
to Knight, ought to be seen as a careless driver rather than a willful homicide183.  
In contrast, Hart adopts a more ‘voluntarist’ perspective to understand the causes and out-
comes of the revolution, the role of capitalism in the countryside and the cities, and the strong 
relationship between this capitalism and empire.  In his landmark work on late 19th century 
Mexico, Hart documents the extent to which the power of the Porfirio Diaz liberal dictator-
ship (one the longest dictatorships in the 19th century, which preceded the Mexican revolu-
tion) was contingent on the interests of “Texas landholders, New York bankers, railroad ty-
coons, the state and national print media, U.S. congressmen and senators, officers of the 
Texas state government, and U.S. Army officers”184. Hart notes that Diaz did not rise to 
power out of social support alone, but owing also to the weapons, fighters and $534,000 sent 
by U.S. financiers to pay for his Tuxtepec rebellion185. The extent to which U.S. capital pen-
etrated Mexico under Diaz is daunting: by 1900, more than half of U.S. foreign investment 
was located in Mexico, the U.S. controlled 80% of the country’s mines, 80% of the rolling 
stock, most of the country’s oil and the largest share of productive agriculture186. According 
to Hart, and in opposition to Knight, the Revolution was not only caused by the extreme, 
U.S.-led capitalisation of rural Mexico (which led to enormous grievances amongst the peas-
ants) but also by America’s decision to remove its support for Diaz after the dictator opened 
Mexican markets to European competitors. Going further, Hart documents the extent to 
which U.S. support was crucial in determining which faction won the revolution. The leaders 
of the winning factions (the early core of the post-revolutionary regime) would reciprocate 
this support with oil, mines, railroads, and other concessions to U.S. capital. Echoing Hart’s 
views on the revolutionary process, Friedrich Katz also notes how “every victorious faction 
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in Mexico’s long revolution enjoyed the sympathy and in most cases the direct support of 
U.S. authorities”187. Hart (and Katz) do not venture to explain the nature of U.S. involvement 
in building and supporting the subsequent PRI structure, but their findings and sensitivity to 
global processes offer a useful background to address this pending discussion.  
Despite the little attention given by scholars to the input of the global and U.S. intervention-
ism in Mexico, it is important to keep in mind that the history of the PRI regime, like the 
Diaz dictatorship and the revolution before it, was closely entangled with the global trajectory 
of American global interests. If the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz unlocked Mexico to Amer-
ica’s initial imperial adventures, the consolidation of the PRI regime is organically connected 
with the end of WW II and the beginning of the Cold War in Latin America. Half a century 
later, the transition to the U.S.-led neoliberal order and the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
a global shift that, in Mexico, turned the PRI regime redundant and transformed Mexico’s 
economy in accordance with U.S. interests. In every step of the way, key transformations in 
the global projection of U.S. power altered dramatically the political and social configuration 
of Mexico. In this respect, Hart’s framework seems more suitable to incorporate transnational 
processes and geographies of power that Knight seems less inclined to account for.   
To summarise this section: the PRI state is characterised here as an actor of importance, 
concentrating considerable power in the hands of the executive, with relative but considera-
ble capabilities to impose agendas despite the resistance and negotiation highlighted by social 
histories, capable of neutralising social activism through co-optation and violence, and in-
vested in a domestic agenda reflecting U.S. directives for the region. This capacity to force 
agendas was associated with its formidable ability to co-opt social intermediaries with pat-
ronage and racketeering opportunities, driving social representation away from the interests 
of the bases and closer to the interests of a political and economic elite in control of the party. 
Just as labour markets under the control of racketeering mafias tend to benefit the racketeer-
ing mafiosi themselves and the capitalists who resort to them to discipline workers, Mexican 
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corporativism, although a two-way street, was much more suited to advance the interests of 
PRI brokers and their capitalist sponsors than to effectively represent the demands of social 
bases (who unsurprisingly saw their living conditions decline once the corporativist system 
was put into place188). Framed by a context of austerity, extortion played a key role in artic-
ulating governance under the PRI regime at all levels, but those ‘above’, rather than those 
‘below’, were the key beneficiaries. Finally, the section argued that comparing and connect-
ing Mexico to global trajectories is of key importance to better grasp how developments 
‘outside’ compare and affect configurations within. Building on this expanded analytical 
framework, the rest of this chapter lays down the core subject of the thesis: the role of crim-
inal economies in the making of the PRI state. This will involve, at this hour, looking at the 
political instrumentalisation of illegal markets in the early efforts to centralise political 
agency and promote capitalist modernity in postrevolutionary Mexico. 
The making of the PRI regime: Alemanista centralisation 
The PRI’s ability to foster economic growth, develop a middle class, provide public services, 
amongst other achievements, provided the regime with more than a ‘modicum’ of social le-
gitimacy. By noting the input of coercion in the making of Mexican modernity, this thesis 
does not suggest that the long decades of PRI hegemony rested on coercive means alone. 
Pondering the respective weight of violence and consent in the key processes generating so-
cial compliance under the PRI regime is a complex discussion informing some of the tensions 
in Mexican historiography noted above. For example, while some scholars characterise the 
corporative system as a vehicle that allowed the masses to affect social policy, others under-
line the extent to which covert and overt coercion restricted the system´s potential to reflect 
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social demands. Legitimacy and violence, of course, are not exclusionary processes but con-
stitute rather a “knot of power relations189 symptomatic of the messiness and complexities 
characterising governance under the PRI.   
Pansters provides a useful analytical framework to situate the role of legitimacy and different 
forms of violence in historiographical perspectives seeking to unpack PRI rule190. Building 
on Gramsci, Pansters employs the categories ‘zones of hegemony’ and ‘zones of coercion’ 
to flesh out the input of consent and violence in the construction of Mexican modernity. The 
distinction between these categories is, of course, a matter of degree. Briefly stated, a zone 
of coercion enables a particular assemble of state institutions, political actors, economic in-
terests, and elite social groups to maintain/advance sectarian interests by deploying different 
forms of violence. This includes, for example, extrajudicial killings perpetuated by security 
agencies, the killing of activists or rival politicians, the creation of paramilitary forces to 
promote political and economic interests, and the violence implicated in everyday polic-
ing191. A zone of coercion is not merely inhabited by the possibility to deploy violence, but 
by the possibility to do so with impunity. In close association with the use of violence to 
secure political and economic interests under the PRI party, Pansters also notes the existence 
of ‘grey zones’ in which non-state actors, organically connected to the state, embody forms 
of para institutional violence, and provide ‘plausible deniability’ to enablers.  Echoing Robert 
Holden’s concepts of “public violence” and “field of the state”192, the notion of a ‘grey’ zone 
is particularly useful to situate the entanglements between state actors/institutions and organ-
ised crime noted in this work. Looking at the grey zones where “discretionary spaces […] 
permit the evasion and/or selective application of the law” is particularly important because, 
as Pansters argues, “what goes on here deeply affects people’s daily lives, the workings of 
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criminal organizations, political parties, and state-making in general” 193. The limited atten-
tion in Mexican historiography to coercive processes in the making of the PRI regime makes 
this category timely and useful to note what kind of social demands were coerced, as opposed 
to which were ‘incorporated’. As I note below, coercion and grey zones are particularly use-
ful categories to make sense of key political outcomes that transpired under the transforma-
tive period of Miguel Alemán’s presidency. 
The importance of coercion in the state-making process should not mean losing sight of the 
state’s capacity to meet, rather than repress, social demands. In contrast to coercion, pro-
cesses involving ‘zones of hegemony’ bring social actors to the negotiating table and articu-
late governance through consent. As Jessop notes, “the long‐term success of a hegemonic 
project will depend on a flow of material concessions to the subordinate social forces”194. Put 
differently, an analysis of the zone of hegemony prioritises processes “oriented towards es-
tablishing a common moral and social project between rulers and ruled, consensus-based 
mechanisms, rules, networks, and ideologies of identification and consent”195. In the Mexi-
can context, the ability of social forces to affect social policy resulted, in particular, from 
popular mobilisation. The prominent record in social mobilisation (‘marchas’)196 is im-
portant to note the input of popular agency in the political process and the extent to which 
popular demands were able to mobilise support “and increase the state’s costs for disregard-
ing their demands”197. Paradoxically, when mobilisations led to policy changes, they tended 
to reinforce authoritarian tendencies. As I note below, this was precisely what transpired 
under the presidency of Lázaro Cardenas. What I mean to underline here is that, while this 
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thesis focuses on making sense of the input of coercion in the making of Mexican modernity, 
this does not mean to suggest that stability under the PRI did not result from the state’s ability 
to incorporate and meet social demands.  
In the mid-1930s, the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) established the founda-
tions of the corporative system in Mexico by setting in motion the early stages of mass-
incorporation. Cardenismo laid down the PRI regime’s popular foundations by exploiting the 
most salient demand of the Mexican masses who took part in the revolution: reparto agrario 
[land reform]. Land redistribution under Cardenismo reached, by far, its historical high, and 
peasants enjoyed concessions and benefits from the state that would surpass anything that 
followed thereafter. The alliance between the state and the masses extended, likewise, to the 
urban proletariat, which benefiting from constitutional reforms saw its living standards reach 
its highest level in the entire 20th century. These notoriously populist and nationalistic poli-
cies earned Cardenismo the highest place in the pantheon of the Mexican left, but these pol-
icies ultimately laid down, as well, the mechanisms that would allow the PRI regime to orient 
the working and peasant movements in a very different direction. As Tzivi Medin notes, 
Cárdenas laid down the corporative system “as an instrument of centralisation, control and 
manipulation to conduct a class struggle in the countryside and the city, as well as to resist 
the influence of the U.S. government”. However, “this political apparatus could also be put 
in the service of a very different national project [seeking] to curtail agrarian redistribution, 
discipline workers and peasants”198. Tanalís Padillas points to similar ideas: “[I]f Cárdenas 
had opened the door to campesino leadership, he also reinforced the wielding of presidential 
power and the consolidation of an official party that would hold office for seventy-one years. 
Cárdenas encouraged the mobilization of popular sectors, but only within separate state-
sponsored unions and federations. Moreover, Cárdenas used this populist structure towards 
fortifying executive power. State-sponsored reforms would thus continue to depend on the 
goodwill of whoever held the presidential office”.199 In effect, the populist orientation of 
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Cardenismo, instrumental in laying down the early blocks of Mexican presidentialism and 
establishing the corporative pillars of social governance under the single-party system, began 
to relent and change its course even before Cárdenas left office. Economic crisis, problems 
with the industrialists, widespread land-related conflict, and U.S. pressure forced down the 
hand of the only ‘leftist’ government in the entire history of modern Mexico200. As Arnoldo 
Cordova correctly argues, the pillars laid down by this ‘populist moment’ become the vehi-
cles allowing for the notoriously unequal capitalist orientation subsequently adopted by the 
regime201.  
In spite of earning a more visible place in the national geography, the Cárdenas presidency 
and that of his successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), belonged still to a national 
landscape less characterised by a strong central government and more contingent on the re-
gional intermediation of regional caudillos. As Alvarado puts it, “the relationship between 
national authority and regional leaderships, rather than embodying a relationship between a 
nucleus and a periphery, was instead a complex of alliances and coalitions between multiple 
territorial elites (…). The constitution of a national authority was a regionalised process ex-
ercised within specific spaces and times” 202.  This exogenous orientation of the PRI system 
began to change course, however, under the subsequent, path-determining presidency of Mi-
guel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952). It is at this hour when a landscape composed of the auton-
omous pull of regional powers began to give way to inertia concentrating power in an in-
creasingly capable national government.  
Alemanismo represented the ‘charismatic’ moment in which, finally, an unprecedented con-
centration of power in the hands of a relatively small, coalesced and ideologically coherent 
elite reached the Weberian threshold to impose a set of routines that framed the subsequent 
socioeconomic development of an extended, national geography. Perhaps more importantly, 
Alemanismo also represented the moment in which the footing of PRI power traded the post-
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revolutionary social embeddedness that laid down the basis of its corporative system for an 
embeddedness with capital. The corporative system, originally deployed to tame capitalism, 
became the vehicle that allowed the state to deploy, beginning in the 1940s, a particularly 
bold capitalist agenda with remarkably little popular resistance203. The alliance between the 
Alemanista elite and big business resumed the process of capitalist accumulation that the 
Mexican revolution had halted. The resulting ‘Mexican miracle’, covering the two following 
decades, embodied a process whereby economic development was tantamount “to growth 
without a correlative distribution of national income […] therefore sharpening economic and 
social polarization both in the countryside and in the city”204. From Alemanismo onwards, 
the corporative system would play a crucial role in taming social mobilisation and empow-
ering an agenda framed by the reactivation of a (crony) form of capitalism with little regard 
for the working classes. The consolidation of an agrarian bourgeoisie, well-connected with 
the party elite, would go hand in hand with an attack on collective rural property (‘egido’) 
and the transfer of public resources to benefit a nascent agroindustry205. Agricultural workers 
would lose about 40% of their income in the following three decades206. In the cities, workers 
would lose about half of their income207. As Stephen Niblo points out, “the drive for indus-
trialization in Mexico in the decade of the forties consists of a transfer of resources from the 
rural population to private and public investors”208.  
In the ideological plane, the ‘socialist’ and ‘redistributive’ discourse of Cardenismo was sup-
planted by a homily of carefully curated nationalism deployed to eliminate notions of class 
and redistribution from the public conversation. Leftist ideologies were labelled as ‘unpatri-
otic’, ‘foreign’ and ‘exotic’. Social progress was cast, from Alemanismo onwards, in strict 
technical-economist terms. A representative illustration of the official ideological line towed 
 
203 Medin, Tzvi. “El sexenio alemanista: ideología y praxis política de Miguel Alemán.” Ediciones Era, vol. 60, no. 1, 
1990, p. 57. 
204 Idem, p. 174. 
205 Idem, p. 57. 
206 Gillingham, Paul, and Benjamin T. Smith, eds. Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in México, 1938–1968. Duke 
University Press, 2014, p. 2. 
207 Medin, Tzvi. “El sexenio alemanista: ideología y praxis política de Miguel Alemán.” Ediciones Era, vol. 60, no. 1, 
1990, p. 45.  




from Alemanismo onwards was enunciated in the speech that inaugurated Alemán’s presi-
dential campaign. As the chairman of the PRI party noted, “[s]ocialist politics and Creolle 
Marxism […] are strangers in our homeland […]. Communist and leftists are people without 
a country, orphans without a nation […]. Faced with theories imported from foreign coun-
tries, we affirm the creed of ‘Mexicanness’, since far from conforming to the dictates of 
others, we believe in Mexico"209. The socialisation of this blatantly opportunistic ideology 
would be, however, relatively easy and straightforward given that the national government 
and its político-impresario elite directly controlled the greatest share of the media, all televi-
sion channels, and the content of the entire public education programme in Mexico.   
The combination of material and immaterial capabilities to inoculate social directives in a 
much more general sense ran parallel with a growing capacity to affect the political process 
at local levels. The power of intermediaries and brokering figures would no longer rest solely 
on their autonomy or social representativeness but became dependent on being functional to 
a political group increasingly in control of patronage flows. As noted above, the power of the 
presidency rested thereafter not only in its enormous ability to affect the legislative and judi-
cial branches but in its capacity to unilaterally intervene in the politics of the states. Signs of 
the growing power in the hands of the central government and the president were already 
visible in the early days of Alemán’s administration. In contrast to his predecessors (includ-
ing Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho), Alemán was able to assemble his cabinet without incor-
porating members from other PRI groups210. These cabinet officials were members of the 
very industrial bourgeoisie backing the president’s efforts to give a new orientation to the 
PRI system. Likewise, Alemán renovated a state apparatus that had formerly exhibited a more 
‘plural’ composition, becoming the administration with the lowest rate of continuity in public 
office since the end of the revolution. The ability of Alemán to align regional politics to his 
agenda was, similarly, unprecedented: twelve governors were unilaterally removed from of-
fice by presidential orders (the highest number in the entire PRI period), demonstrating the 
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growing ability of the executive to intervene in the politics of the regions211. Political survival 
involved, more than at any time before, being on good terms with the occupant of Los Pinos 
and his political group. According to Medin, a ‘plural' form of Mexican authoritarianism was 
giving way at this hour to a much more ‘unilateral’ form of autocracy embodied by the pres-
ident212. However, rather than the source of this new power, Alemán and subsequent presi-
dents were rather the expression of an elite consensus composed by interests of an emergent 
rural and industrial bourgeoisie, crony politicians invested in exploiting business opportuni-
ties, and the interests of the U.S. government with regards to its southern neighbour. In con-
trast to the social ‘consent’ supporting the ‘hegemony’ of Cardenismo –resulting from the 
state’s commitment to meet social demands– the pro-business agenda of Alemanismo ad-
dressed these social demands, instead, with mechanisms gravitating closer to coercion.  
The empowerment of the executive branch under Alemanismo was the result of multiple 
processes. Here I would like to note three developments that gave Mexican presidentialism 
its distinct authoritarian stamp and that allowed for a relative but significant centralisation of 
political authority in the decades that followed the Alemán administration. The first was that 
ability of the PRI regime to establish a relative monopoly of violence213. The subordination 
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of the army to civilian rule and the co-optation or elimination of the last recalcitrant caudillos 
eliminated the potential for an insurrection that had plagued the country´s entire history. Ra-
ther than a threat to the regime, violence thereafter empowered, rather than challenged, the 
authoritarian synapses supporting PRI hegemony. An important process in constructing the 
PRI’s ‘monopoly’ of violence was the subordination of the army to civilian rule, which set 
Mexico apart in a continent plagued by military dictatorships and coups d’état214. Sevin notes 
that it was the Alemanista presidency where the ‘subordination’ of the army to civilian rule 
was finally completed: “[t]he absolute supremacy of the presidency over the army was not a 
given at the beginning of Alemán’s six-year term, but it would be so by the end of his ad-
ministration” 215. Sevin, however, goes a bit too far in characterising civilian preponderance 
over the army as an ‘absolute’ relationship of subordination.  While the subordination of the 
army to civilian rule is an undeniable ‘triumph’ of the PRI regime, it is important to note that 
this ‘subordination’ did not eliminate certain margins of autonomy available to the armed 
forces. The army’s role in policing the countryside and conducting brutal campaigns against 
social groups was, in fact, the foundation of this relative autonomy. As Rath notes, “as long 
as army officers agreed to do the PRI’s dirty work, they were free to engage in land specula-
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tion and logging, create private monopolies that supplied military equipment, smuggle con-
traband goods, protect alcohol monopolies, and possibly participate in the drug trade”216. 
From Alemanismo onwards, “officers could still expect to wield political influence in the 
provinces, to graft, to resist central policies of rotation and retirement, and to enjoy autonomy 
in operational matters”, provided that they deployed the necessary violence to contain the 
social, political and economic antagonisms attached to PRI rule217. Akin to other PRI actors, 
the army’s margin of autonomy was contingent on and conditioned to its functional role in 
‘pacifying’ the country on behalf of its key beneficiaries. As I will note below, the intelli-
gence services operated under a similar logic218.   
Second, a more centralised structure of power advanced through the concentration of revenue 
power, which took the country´s fiscal apparatus from orbiting the regions to orbiting the 
centre. The quick consolidation of a fiscal monopoly gave the executive and his allies a much 
greater say in the allocation of discretional patronage, expanding their ability to affect local 
politics when necessary. Federal expenditures grew from 631 million pesos in 1942 to 4.5 
billion pesos in 1950219. In the countryside, regional caciques continued to dominate the 
Mexican landscape, but unlike caciquismo in the past, their power originated less from their 
bases and became more reliant on the party providing them with patronage to dispense to 
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their clients. As Pansters has noted, by this time, caciques “understood that serving as inter-
mediaries within the new state and party structures would enable them to maintain local con-
trol. Those who were unwilling to adjust […] suffered repression”220.  
Third, the centralisation of power under Alemanismo was enabled by the state´s alliance with 
big business. The use of reparto agrario and support for militant unionism that allowed the 
Cárdenas presidency to challenge business and lay down the basis of the corporative system 
came to an end, making the party elite less dependent on the satisfaction of social demands 
and more reliant on its links (and actual partnerships) with capital. This translated into a 
policy of restricting the labour movement, a process that involved the systematic purge of 
Cardenista elements in the political and corporative system. As a former Supreme Court jus-
tice told U.S. diplomats, under Alemán “all of the experienced leftist leaders […] [were] 
being ousted from their former positions”221. Their places, in turn, were occupied by a highly 
corrupt and mafiosi breed of party racketeers known as charros imposed by the state to the 
labour and peasant movements. In this respect, Morris notes how ‘corruption’ helped to un-
dermine the potential of social organisation by providing channels of upward mobility to key 
actors222. According to Middlebrook, financial support for compliant charros helped defeat 
independent labour by matching declining contributions from membership with state 
funds223. Key to the alliance between the Alemanista state and big business was sheltering 
selected industrial tycoons from foreign competition through protectionist schemes, as well 
as providing them with enormous tax breaks with huge fiscal consequences for the country´s 
future224. For the following decades, these policies geared the interests of the country’s in-
dustrial class to the endurance of the PRI regime and vice-versa. The presidency of Miguel 
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Alemán represents perhaps the most profound reconfiguration and effective centralisation of 
power in the history of Mexico.  
Centralisation under Alemanismo also had a lot to do with the growing practice of allocating 
racketeering ‘licenses’ to allies, party members, social intermediaries, and bureaucrats. 
Knight notes how the systematic ‘abuse’ of expansive regulatory powers was a key mecha-
nism to structure the PRI state225. From Alemán himself to his close political allies, to legis-
lators, tax collectors, regulators, inspectors, prosecutors, union leaders, police officers, bu-
reaucrats, garbage-collectors, etc., the PRI at this stage began to provide its brokers with a 
license to use public office to extort rents from the public. Doing so built an ‘invisible’ but 
ancillary political economy in a very material sense. In contrast to what is argued by Smith, 
who reasons that the federal state was weak because low taxation severely reduced both its 
coercive and co-optive powers226, here I underline the key importance of officially sanctioned 
rackets as a compensatory mechanism in support, precisely, of PRI’s coercive and co-optive 
capabilities. In other words, the centralised, authoritarian system that became established did 
not result only from the growing pool of fiscal resources in the PRI´s hands (which was quite 
limited, as Smith notes) but also from the ‘dark’ but very important economies generated by 
systematic public abuse and enabled by the party leadership. Niblo notes how corruption and 
centralisation overlapped under Alemanismo and thereafter: 
This extraordinary public record of corruption begs the ques-
tion of how the corruption could have happened. The Mexican 
system of extreme political centralism was at the heart of the 
problem. Absolute power is vested in the hands of the presi-
dent for six years. The president is unrestrained by law, by the 
audit of public funds, or by the kind of political reality that 
flows from an independent legislature or judiciary. The lack of 
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presidential accountability is aided immeasurably by an ex-
tremely high level of secrecy. Finally, there is the phenomenon 
that Carlos Fuentes has described in “The Death of Artemio 
Cruz” as la chingada. This tradition of abusing the weak with-
out a trace of conscience is also central to the process227. 
In line with this increasingly articulate structure of state capabilities and party patronage, 
centralisation of power under Alemanismo advanced through a less visible but important 
domain: the criminal economy. Major criminal markets like contraband and drug trafficking 
had operated until this moment as political economies in some of the country’s most notable 
cacicazgos. Alemán’s coming to power and the establishment of a national security agency 
(the DFS) encouraged a process where the central state set to partly ‘capture’ these rackets 
by displacing autonomous actors and ‘reconfiguring’ protection rackets through allies and 
friends228. In Mexico, as in other authoritarian states, the creation of a national security ap-
paratus after WW II had a lot to do with instrumentalising these economies to suppress po-
litical dissent. Alemán’s involvement in what had formerly constituted regional protection 
rackets (in contraband and drug trafficking) would have important long-term institutional 
consequences for the country’s future.  
Reconfiguration of criminal markets under Alemanismo  
Contraband in Mexico went back a long time. It became established during Spanish times, 
was rampant during the liberal period, and became a cacique economy in the years that fol-
lowed the Revolution. For early post-revolutionary caciques in the North, controlling the 
transnational trafficking of goods, arms and drugs meant tapping into critical, low-barrier 
economies of key importance in a context of post-revolutionary austerity. Prohibition in the 
U.S. during the 1920s and early 1930s expanded the value of these rackets by introducing 
bootlegging to the political economy of border states. Bootlegging in Mexico, as in the 
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U.S.229, became closely entangled with local politics and gave way to a more delinquent so-
cial type of smugglers linked to transnational mafias. Brothels and gambling at the border, 
luring U.S. clienteles, operated under the protection (or direct ownership) of border caciques. 
Legality and illegality continued to blend.   
As I note in detail in chapter five, the largest share of illicit trade at the Mexican-U.S. border 
concentrated in the eastern state of Tamaulipas. There, border cities like Matamoros, Tam-
pico and Nuevo Laredo developed largely as the result of contraband activity230. Tamaulipas 
constituted the nearest point connecting Mexico’s interior with the American East Coast, 
giving it a strategic place in the contraband of goods. Political heavyweight Emilio Portes 
Gil, who had served as Mexico’s first president after the revolution, was Tamaulipas’s dec-
ades-old cacique. Contraband rackets were a key political economy in support of his cacica-
zgo231. When Alemán came to power, displacing regional caciques like Portes Gil was the 
primary route to consolidate central power and penetrate the regions. In practice, this not 
only meant displacing the caciques and their allies from formal positions of authority but 
subverting their control of illicit economies.  
To vanquish portesgilismo from the Northeast, Alemán recruited a former governor of Ta-
maulipas, Francisco Castellanos, to bring down the portesgilista governor, Hugo Pedrero232. 
The successful political manoeuvre led to the appointment of an Alemanista ally, Raul 
Gárate, as governor of the state, as well as the empowerment in the northeast region of Ale-
manista brokers Bonifacio Salinas and Tiburcio Garza. All these actors (Castellanos, Gárate, 
Salinas and Garza) not only became key political brokers in the Northeast but also became 
heavily involved in protecting contraband activity, enabling the early phases of a smuggling 
network that would control contraband operations in the Mexican Northeast for the following 
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decades: the (PRI-supported) contraband organisation of Juan Nepomuceno Guerra (de-
scribed in chapter 5). The displacement of portesgilismo involved appointing direct repre-
sentatives and friends of Alemán to head customs in the border cities to tap into the clandes-
tine flows. Flores Pérez documents some concrete examples of what he describes as a seminal 
institutional reconfiguration for illicit purposes operated by Alemán at the northeastern bor-
der: Jesús Vidales Marroquin, who had been a representative of Alemán in Veracruz, was 
directly appointed by him through a presidential decree in 1947 as administrator of Nuevo 
Laredo customs. Juan Gómez Sariol, Alemán´s personal friend, became administrator of cus-
toms in Tampico, while Miguel Solís Alemán, a relative of the president, was appointed head 
of customs in Matamoros233. Flores Pérez summarizes: “Control of customs, through persons 
linked to Alemán and his clique, provided systematic protection to organised smuggling of 
contraband goods and illicit drugs”234. Under the political protection of the Alemanista re-
gime, the operation of contraband rackets in the Northeast shifted control from cacique dy-
namics and helped consolidate the Alemanista brand in northeastern Mexico.  
Alemán’s tightening grip over criminal rackets was replicated in the Northwest. There, the 
key figure protecting contraband and drug trafficking until Alemanismo was the regional 
cacique, Abelardo Rodríguez. Rodríguez was, like Portes Gil, one of the initial post-revolu-
tionary presidents of Mexico., Rodríguez, an anti-communist politico-impresario, amassed 
as president one of the country’s biggest fortunes235, only surpassed by Alemán years later236. 
Rodríguez’s involvement in contraband, bootlegging and drug trafficking rackets dated to his 
tenure as governor of the Federal Territory of Baja California Norte (1923–1930)237. In this 
capacity, Rodríguez had taken over rackets formerly operated by a previous governor, 
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Esteban Cantu, who also consolidated power in this isolated region by tapping into drug traf-
ficking and contraband238. In addition, as governor of Baja California, Rodríguez established 
the country’s most notorious casino, Agua Caliente, in association with the Italoamerican 
mafia239. When president Cárdenas took office, a mechanism to eradicate the influence of 
Rodríguez was to issue a decree that prohibited the operation of casinos240. In the early 1940s, 
Rodríguez consolidated a major cacicazgo in the neighbouring state of Sonora, where he 
became one of the state’s most prominent landowners241. From there he continued to play a 
central role in contraband and drug trafficking in the Northwest. Like in Tamaulipas, the 
ascension of Alemán curtailed the power of Rodríguez by asserting Alemanista control over 
regional criminal activities. In this regard, a Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) cable re-
ported that, after the ascension of Alemán, Rodríguez’s place in the national drug trafficking 
business was drastically reduced in favour of Alemanista allies. These allies included, ac-
cording to the report, Jorge Pasquel (a frontman of Alemán who became one of the country’s 
most notorious drug traffickers) and Carlos I. Serrano (Alemán’s appointee to establish Mex-
ico´s secret police, the DFS, also heavily involved in drug trafficking)242. 
The ‘state-supported reconfiguration’ of illegal markets under Alemanismo extended to the 
opium-producing regions in the state of Sinaloa. This state hosted a different kind of ‘racket’: 
one focused on the racketeering of drug production rather than the smuggling of illegal goods. 
Opium harvesting was introduced to Sinaloa by Chinese settlers in the late 19th century243. 
During WW II, the pharmaceutical needs of the U.S. Army led to the temporal legalisation 
of opium production. After the war, when production became illegal again, opium geogra-
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phies did not disappear but became rackets brokered clandestinely by Sinaloa’s leading pol-
iticians244. Opium and heroin production in Sinaloa became rampant, however, only after the 
1944 assassination of Governor Rodolfo Tostado, a politician close to Cardenismo, promoter 
of reparto agrario, and antagonistic to Alemán. Military records cited by Hector Aguilar note 
that the order to kill governor Loaiza had come from Pablo Macías, a politician who repre-
sented the interests of the state’s landed elite, close to Alemán, and who became the new 
governor after the killing of Tostado245. The assassin was a man called Rodolfo Valdés, a.k.a. 
El Gitano, a full-time criminal close to opium producers in Sinaloa and leader of anti-
agrarista paramilitary brigades supported by landowners close to Alemanismo. The arrival 
of Macías to the governorship of Sinaloa led to a massive increase in opium production246. 
According to newspaper reports, Macías became implicated in drugs to the extent of owning 
planes to transport them to the border247. According to a U.S. intelligence cable, Alemanista 
associates Carlos Serrano and Jorge Pasquel became influential actors in Sinaloa’s drug busi-
ness after the arrival of Macías248.  
The encroachment of the central government did not eliminate the importance of criminal 
markets in regional politics. As Pansters249, Smith250, Maldonado251, Flores Pérez252 and oth-
ers have argued, contraband and the drug economy (especially drug production) continued to 
be exploited by local institutions (such as local police) and local political actors (such as 
governors and caciques) to advance local agendas. Notwithstanding the embeddedness of 
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criminal markets in local political dynamics, Alemanismo represented the beginning of a 
period in which the Mexican state would increasingly involve itself in the organisation and 
racketeering of contraband and transnational drug trafficking activity. It signified a point of 
inflexion in which the importance of illegal economies began to transcend the politics of a 
cacique-dominated Mexico and became embedded, instead, in a broader process of state-
formation proper. Far from suggesting that the centre thereafter ‘controlled’ transnational 
criminal markets, the point is to underline the relative but growing capacity of central politi-
cal actors and institutions to intervene in them. This development, in fact, corresponded to a 
global pattern after WW II whereby the racketeering of transnational drug markets (in gen-
eral) outdid its exclusive local or domestic orientation to enter a larger stadium of national 
and international political processes. These processes often involved the creation of state-
supported rackets brokered by central security agencies. In the case of Mexico, the extent to 
which central security institutions were able to establish a relative monopoly over the rack-
eteering of the drug business in the following decades (integration) cannot be explained with-
out referencing this path-determining precedent established under Alemanismo. This is the 
moment in which the political economy of crime transcends its largely local dimension and 
connects with security processes of much grander scale and managed by the intelligence and 
security bodies attached to the PRI regime.  
Mexican intelligence: criminal embeddedness in transnational context 
National security apparatuses began to play a notable role in Latin America by the end of 
WW II and the beginning of the Cold War. The creation of a national security agency in 
Mexico in 1947, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS), echoed the importance that in-
creasingly bureaucratic and centralised security sectors operating under the purview of the 
U.S. government began to have in Latin American countries. Overseeing these apparatuses 
became, in Mexico and elsewhere, an important step for politicians aspiring to occupy the 
pinnacle of national power. The vast majority of Mexican presidents under the PRI state 
would first serve as interior ministers (including Alemán) before becoming executives, a pat-
tern that underlines the importance of controlling these apparatuses in the construction of 
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presidential careers. Akin to dynamics in Central America, heading the security services not 
only involved assuming control of an increasingly able apparatus for infiltration and surveil-
lance but enjoying crucial access and key support from the U.S. security establishment. The 
relationship between Mexican interior ministers and the U.S. intelligence services during the 
first decades of the Cold War was, as in neighbouring countries, remarkably close253. Three 
of the first five presidents in post-WW II Mexico worked as paid informants of the U.S. 
government while serving as interior ministers under CIA programmes254.  
When Alemán assumed office, Mexico already had an intelligence bureau, the Dirección 
General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS), which operated under the purview 
of the interior minister. The DGIPS was the successor of the Departamento Confidencial 
(1924), the Oficina de Investigaciones Politicas y Sociales (1925), and the Departamento de 
Investigaciones Politicas y Sociales (1938), which in contrast to the DGIPS were attached to 
the army. Throughout this intelligence continuum, the backbone of analysis and strategy was 
the creation of political profiles of all officeholders and candidates. Reflecting the political 
configuration of the early post-revolutionary Mexico, a key responsibility for those heading 
the intelligence services was to directly report on potential insurrections to the president255. 
The DGIPS exhibited a limited but growing institutional tendency characterised by longer 
tenures of service among agents “who no longer resigned en masse when the head of the 
department was replaced”256. According to Navarro, “a new sense of politicisation permeated 
DGIPS reports as agents developed loyalty to the system that provided them with a living”. 
By the 1930s, “agents chose to align themselves with the ever more powerful political project 
of the PRI and became tools of political control for the party"257. However, prior to WW II, 
the intelligence-gathering capabilities of this bureaucratic continuum remained extremely 
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limited, with “intelligence reports often containing nothing more than hastily typed, random 
data gathered in the course of the day.” The element of “analysis, crucial to the production 
of useful intelligence, was sorely lacking” 258. Like its predecessors, the DGIPS continued to 
embody a “poorly organised and underfunded amalgamation of local police, regional inform-
ants and federal agents”259.  
As interior minister, Alemán was able to gain control of the existing intelligence services of 
Mexico and began to shape them into a tool for the political elite260. As noted by Navarro, 
“Alemán’s efforts to expand and professionalise the secret police forces must be considered 
alongside his role in the process of “civilising” politics”. Alemán, Navarro notes, “had been 
a popular and powerful governor in Veracruz before agreeing to serve as campaign manager 
for Avila Camacho. As [secretary of interior], he was able to solidify his connections to tra-
ditional power centres and mastermind a strategy for consolidating [PRI] influence while 
simultaneously reducing military authority in political matters”261.  
Shortly after becoming president, Alemán ordered the creation of an alternative and more 
proactive agency committed to the agenda of the president, the PRI, and the U.S. security 
establishment. The Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) embodied, thereafter, the consol-
idated security directives of the PRI elite (amalgamated under Alemanismo) and the U.S. 
security sector (established during WW II). As Navarro notes, "this newly trained intelligence 
bureaucracy became one of the PRI's crucial tools for political control throughout the 20th 
century as the political elite used it to close avenues of dissent to reformist politicians and 
citizens alike"262. The creation of the DFS, established with U.S. financial and logistical sup-
port, was in line with the U.S. tradition of sponsoring, arming, training, and supporting ap-
pendant Latin American national police forces, constabulary bodies, national guards and in-
telligence services stretching back to the late 19th century263. These programmes opened 
 
258 Idem, p. 164. 
259 Idem, p. 150. 
260 Idem.  
261 Idem, p. 183. 
262 Idem.  
263 Huggins, Martha Knisely. Political Policing: The United States and Latin America. Duke University Press, 1998. 
98 
 
channels for intervention to U.S. security actors, ‘embedding’ interventionism into the host’s 
security processes. As Martha Huggins notes: “[w]hen one country trains another´s police 
forces, some key issues are raised. When domestic police forces become a tool in interna-
tional relations, the presumed monopoly becomes permeable”264. After WW II, the U.S. de-
fined its intelligence objectives as aimed against “any activism which may interfere with 
American interests”265. Mexico in this respect was part of a broader effort seeking “to furnish 
arms and equipment to Latin American countries in order to standardise the hemispheric 
military and its training under American lines”266. Supporting, funding, and equipping these 
local forces made U.S. intervention an embedded, institutional process occurring from 
within, rather than an ‘event’ coming sporadically from outside267. During the first four dec-
ades of the 20th century, U.S. military interventions in the region were usually followed by 
the creation of constabularies and national guards supporting U.S. clients. This mechanism 
secured U.S. interests in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Pan-
ama, and the Philippines. Unsurprisingly, regional dictators like Anastasio Somoza in Nica-
ragua, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier in 
Haiti, among others, rose to power via the bureaucratic ladder of these U.S.-supported insti-
tutions268. The role of constabulary forces and national guards as breeding-nests for future 
leaders gave the U.S. important leverage to effect, ultimately, who came to power in its 
sphere of influence. The result was the empowerment of local dictators and security bodies 
more responsive to U.S. directives than to the local population. Incidentally, McCoy notes 
that the establishment of the world’s first modern system to surveil a population took place 
during the U.S. occupation of the Philippines. Fingerprinting, classifying and systematizing 
information about the population –techniques later to be imported into the U.S. – made it 
much easier for the U.S. to affect the political process of its host. Surveillance also produced 
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intelligence on the Filipino elite, documenting its involvement in corruption, crimes, and 
indiscretions, making it permeable to U.S. demands269.  
After WW II, with military rule firmly established in the region, U.S. interventionism became 
less invested in supporting regional strong-men and more oriented to developing impersonal, 
long-term security bureaucracies270. In particular, interventionism in Latin America took the 
form of growing FBI (and later CIA) assistance for establishing intelligence organisations in 
host countries271. Security bureaucracies developed “a capacity to penetrate more deeply than 
ever before into civil society and thereby stifle citizen participation”272. As Leslie Gill notes 
in her study on the School of the Americas, this process entailed the consolidation of national 
armed forces into a single, overreaching system of U.S. military might guided by U.S. inter-
ests273. For Huggings, “[w]hat had been absent during the twentieth century’s first four dec-
ades was an ideology justifying Latin American governments’ giving over some internal se-
curity autonomy in exchange for protection by the United States”274. The Cold War and its 
‘internal enemy’ enabled this transfer. Governments were offered technology and assistance 
to contain, at a price, social movements and resistance transpiring from grass-root levels. 
Often seen as a predominantly domestic affair, the establishment of the DFS replicated, how-
ever, historical patterns associated with U.S. security. As Higgins also notes,  
[In] pushing its training of Latin American police to combat 
Communism, […] [the U.S. advanced] an ideology that legit-
imised their loss of some autonomy over internal control in 
exchange for increased technical professionalism. […] This 
belief […] made foreign technical specialists relatively auton-
omous within the host country’s internal security system. […] 
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[D]oing so required new linkages between U.S. and recipient 
government security agencies, […] [a process that ended up] 
expanding and fortifying powerful elites in both protector and 
recipient nation states275.  
Like in other Latin American countries, U.S. leverage entered the Mexican security blood-
stream after WW II through collaborative agreements, information sharing, technological 
assistance, training of agents, allocation of aid, covert operational support, and a considerable 
degree of political protection – all provided in particular to the new security agency, the DFS. 
From the beginning to the end of the Cold War, the DFS was the most important conduit 
linking the operation of the political process in Mexico to American interests. Like in other 
Latin American countries, U.S. hemispheric security became invested in supporting an au-
thoritarian state by assisting its ability to curve, police and repress political and social oppo-
sition. The creation of the DFS assisted the ‘centralisation’ process undertaken under Ale-
manismo by consolidating the state’s capabilities to penetrating, as I explain below, the so-
cial. These capabilities included, for example, a much greater capacity to generate intelli-
gence on social forces, to manipulate political outcomes (for example, elections), to surveil 
and infiltrate labour, peasants and students movements, to conduct targeted and mass killings, 
to deploy counterinsurgency and to enforce overall a ‘state of exception’ seldom associated 
with Mexico but crucial in the historiography of every other Latin American state. All these 
operations enjoyed the support of a U.S. government which, at the same time, was providing 
key support to authoritarian political structures from Guatemala to Argentina.  In the follow-
ing decades, the importance of the DFS in the PRI system of governance grew in accordance 
with the regime’s decreasing popularity and the growing need to use coercion to suppress 
social discontent. 
The construction in Mexico of a security structure with national ambitions and capabilities 
took place, nevertheless, in a context of austerity. As noted in Chapter One, austerity contexts 
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tend to push security actors to establish rackets over low-barrier commodities, such as con-
traband and drugs. Likewise, the PRI regime’s need to invest in expanding its internal secu-
rity capabilities at the beginning of the Cold War drove the ‘securitisation’ process towards 
alternative sources of funding. Akin to the distinctive ‘racketeering’ dynamics that assisted 
the reproduction of the PRI regime more generally, the creation of security structures (at all 
levels) under the PRI involved to an important extent capturing the ‘low-barrier’ economies 
represented by illegal markets. In Mexico, putting in place a national intelligence network 
able to consolidate a much more centralised form of control and ability to shape social out-
comes involved an ‘understanding’ that rackets over criminal activities were to provide a 
substantial part of its income. The involvement of the DFS in criminal markets not only com-
pared to other early Cold War experiences but also connected to the Cold War as a whole.  
As noted by Aguayo,  
[t]he general indifference allowed the intelligence services 
to confirm their belief that they were part of an elite that had 
no controls or limits276.  
As the budget was insufficient to finance the activities en-
trusted to them and as agents received very low salaries, 
commanders, delegates and agents were forced to obtain ex-
tra income. This constituted a practice accepted by the higher 
ranks as part of the rules of the game. Letting them “search” 
for income through extortion, spoils, protection rackets, and 
drug trafficking was part of those rules. This lack of institu-
tionalism would nevertheless have a tremendous cost for the 
country277.   
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Carlos I. Serrano established and operated the DFS under Miguel Alemán278. Serrano em-
bodied the extent to which the construction of national security ran parallel to structuring 
protection rackets over criminal economies. Serrano was Alemán’s most trusted subordinate 
for decades. Throughout his career, he was an established pistolero, criminal and racketeer, 
operating always under the shadow of Alemán. According to Cedillo, his relationship to Ale-
mán dated back to the early 1930s, a time when Alemán’s rising star in the state of Veracruz 
demanded the services of ‘violent entrepreneurs’ like Serrano. Also according to Cedillo, 
Serrano’s involvement in organised crime dated back to the trafficking of Cuban rum during 
Prohibition279. Alemán gave Serrano protection to run criminal rackets and Serrano assisted 
in clearing Alemán´s way in state and national politics. According to the FBI, Alemán´s po-
litical rise in the state of Veracruz reported a toll of no less than 50 assassinations, mostly 
ordered by Alemán (and most likely involving Serrano)280. The 1930s were particularly vio-
lent times in Mexico, often the result of disputes between organised peasants invading haci-
endas and paramilitary bodies funded by hacendados to dissuade them. Alemán’s political 
rise in Veracruz was strongly associated with the interests of these land-owning elites seeking 
to vanquish revolutionary leftovers. In fact, Alemán became governor of Veracruz only after 
the elected governor, Manlio Fabio Altamirano (a Cardenista politician with communist in-
clinations and a staunch promoter of land reform) was assassinated at a public rally. Altami-
rano’s murder and the appointment of Alemán in his place represented, in Veracruz, the liq-
uidation of reparto agrario281. Alemán appointed Serrano as the head of Veracruz police282. 
A pattern of abuse and criminality followed, involving land grabbing, criminal rackets (gam-
bling, drugs, prostitution) and systematic graft283. Flores Pérez284 cites multiple letters sent 
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to present Ávila Camacho describing how Serrano used his position to evict peasants and 
grab their lands in regions like Mocambo and Boca del Rio (unsurprisingly, the U.S. ambas-
sador would report to the State Department: “[i]t seems that [Alemán] was the owner of 
‘Mocambo’, an extremely valuable property consisting of a large part of waterfront land ex-
tending from Veracruz south to Boca del Río, including the resort Hotel Mocambo”285. Ser-
rano sold nominations to public office, ran gambling operations, and was accused of killing 
prominent leftist politicians, such as the state prosecutor, Adolfo Moreno286. According to 
Aguayo, when Alemán was nominated presidential candidate of the PRI in 1945, Serrano 
was appointed head of his security routine287. As president, Alemán made Serrano chair of 
the Mexican senate (making him the most important powerbroker in Mexican politics) and 
gave him the rank of colonel despite lacking military credentials. More importantly, Alemán 
tasked Serrano with establishing and running the new national intelligence agency, the DFS. 
By this time, the FBI began to refer to Serrano as the second most powerful politician in 
Mexico288.  
Serrano’s unofficial appointment to establish and oversee the DFS provided him with covert 
channels and credentials to intervene and reorganise criminal markets at the national level 
and in line with the interests embodied by Alemanismo. The reconfiguration of drug and 
contraband economies at the U.S. border noted above had a lot to do with Serrano’s and DFS 
‘s penetration of illicit activities. According to FBI cables, Serrano became during this period 
the country’s leading protector of the transnational heroin network in Mexico289. He estab-
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lished contacts with Sinaloan producers and participated in heroin smuggling at the U.S. bor-
der290. U.S. intelligence reports note that Serrano partnered with notable and intimate asso-
ciates of president Alemán (for example, Jorge Pasquel and Enrique Parra291) in the transna-
tional drug business. He personally operated multiple houses of prostitution as well292. CIA 
memos described him as “an unscrupulous man, […] actively engaged in various illegal en-
terprises such as the narcotics traffic. He is considered astute, intelligent and personable, 
although his methods violate every principle of established government administration”293. 
In 1951, a car owned by Serrano was seized at the U.S. border containing 64 cans of opium 
in hidden compartments294. The person driving the vehicle was a nephew of Juan Ramon 
Gurolla, second-in-command at DFS.295 A U.S. Treasury cable reported to Washington that 
Serrano was the most important politician in Mexico involved in drug trafficking296. Like-
wise, according to a 1947 U.S. embassy memo, the deputy director of the DFS, Manuel 
Mayoral Garda, controlled the marijuana market in Mexico City297. Both Serrano and the 
director of the DFS, Marcelino Iñurreta, are noted in U.S. embassy cables as “persons of 
questionable character”, noted for “their involvement in dope-smuggling activities”298. The 
cable adds: “[i]t appears that they are using the organisation as a front for illegal operations 
to amass personal fortunes”299. The memo also added that Serrano “has unlimited power over 
National Security Police and is fully cognizant of its ‘side-line’ operations”300. Importantly, 
as I document in the following chapters, DFS involvement in criminal activity was not only 
known by U.S. government circles but endorsed and encouraged by U.S. intelligence as part 
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of what I describe as a transnational strategy resorting, in Mexico as elsewhere, to more con-
temporary forms of ‘banditry’ to promote U.S. interests. 
Articulating national security and tying its actions to the executive, the DFS was established 
to enable, perhaps even more importantly, the distinct ‘capitalist’ orientation set in motion 
by Alemanismo. This meant, in practice, empowering a much more centralised and coordi-
nated system of informants and operatives that could infiltrate, tame, and purge the party’s 
left flank (especially those organisations responsive to grass-root militancy) and carve out a 
corporatist regime much more accountable to the business and landowning interests. At the 
time of its establishment, the DFS agenda included, in particular, two goals: on the one hand, 
breaking the independent labour movement, represented above all by the formidable Railroad 
Workers Movement (Movimiento ferrocarrilero) and its leader, the communist Valentin 
Campa. On the other, suppressing collective demands for land reform, particularly those as-
sociated with the militant Henriquista peasant movement. The operational debut of the DFS 
took place in October 1948 when its agents launched a successful assault on the headquarters 
of the Movimiento ferrocarrilero and broke a crucial, national strike301. The attack was 
headed and coordinated by Serrano302. The DFS subsequently planted propaganda in the 
press falsely accusing the union of acts of sabotage and linking its leaders to communist 
plots303. The DFS campaign of violence, intimidation and co-optation led to the downfall of 
Campa and his replacement by the plaint Jesus Diaz de Leon, a.k.a. El Charro. ‘Charrismo’ 
became a synonym for the characteristically PRI practice of violently imposing extremely 
corrupted leaders through violence in peasant organisations and labour unions, a practice that 
allowed the state to exert control over the corporative system. The campaign against Campa, 
the ferrocarrileros and the communist party were coordinated by Serrano and the DFS di-
rector, Iñurreta304.  
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In the countryside, the social movement of Henriquismo orbited around the Cardenista pol-
itician Miguel Henriquez. It represented the most important movement demanding land for 
campesinos after the revolution, as well as the greatest challenge for the type of landowning, 
conservative interests backing Alemán. Elisa Servín notes how, shortly after its creation, a 
key task for the DFS involved generating intelligence on henriquistas and delivering it on a 
regular basis to the president305. The effort, taking place in 1950 and 1951, constituted the 
most important covert effort to put the brakes on reparto agrario. Intelligence was gathered 
through the infiltration and surveillance of all local and state committees, local federations, 
groups of professionals as well as members of the military who sympathised with the move-
ment306. Rex Applegate, a U.S. advisor at the DFS and one of its main arms procurers, was 
hired to train and arm 26 recruits to infiltrate henriquista ranks307. The DFS assault on the 
movement reached its climax in 1952 with the violent repression of a massive rally in down-
town Mexico City308. The importance of Henriquismo thereafter declined, and so did the 
independence of the peasant movement, which became strongly and widely incorporated into 
the PRI’s Sector Campesino and its notable Confederación Nacional Campesina.  
To recapitulate: the DFS played a particularly important role in putting down the remaining 
fires of a dying revolution. These had included, centrally, demands for land, rights for labour, 
and opposition to a particularly harsh form of crony capitalism enabled by foreign powers. 
The DFS consolidated the Alemanista grip by purging the system of its leftist elements, 
bringing labour and peasant bodies closer to business and landed interests, and providing a 
platform for the party elite to deploy covert violence when required and with impunity. The 
direction given to the single party by Alemanismo defined, like no other, the lasting orienta-
tion of the PRI state. At the same time, the DFS also represented an ‘embedded’ form of U.S. 
interventionism, in line with the American tradition of developing appendant security appa-
ratuses in host nations. Crucially, DFS agents established notable racketeering networks in 
 
305 Servín, Elisa. El delator, una figura cotidiana del alemanismo priista, Antropología. Boletín oficial del Instituto Na-
cional de Antropología e Historia, 2016. 





contraband and drug trafficking with the endorsement of the PRI regime and the implicit 
validation of the U.S. government. These seemingly trivial mechanisms were key, however, 
to compensate for the austerity under which these new security apparatuses were being built, 
allowing them to nevertheless address the growing social and political antagonisms generated 
by the reactivation of capitalist accumulation in Mexico. The involvement of the DFS in the 
transnational drug trade would expand, as I note in the following chapter, in accordance to 
the market’s value and in close relation to rising social discontent.   
Conclusions 
The chapter provided a brief overview of the peculiar form of political modernity embodied 
by the PRI party. It built, in particular, from key debates and scholarly divisions in recent 
Mexican historiography. State-centred views highlighting the PRI as a homogenous, central-
ised, top-to-down authoritarian system of governance gave way, after the 1980s, to ‘post re-
visionist’ perspectives underscoring pluralism, limitation and social permeability. The inter-
est thus shifted from describing ‘national’ landscapes (elites, domination, hierarchy) to em-
phasising discontinuities emanating from ‘below’ and from the ‘periphery’. These academic 
inertias also drove interest away from what da Costa calls ‘broader arenas of power and the 
possibility of historical synthesis’309. An emphasis on processes involving ‘negotiation’ ig-
nored the extent to which violence, embodied by the DFS and other actors, was ancillary in 
the making of the PRI regime.  
The chapter underlined three key processes in the making of the PRI regime that call for a 
‘macro’ approach. First, the chapter argued that the PRI was not the mere reflection of social 
forces. The state in Mexico had a huge capacity to implement transformative and swift agen-
das contrary to the interests, and despite the resistance, of the masses it claimed to embody. 
This capacity for relative but significant autonomy is demonstrated more explicitly in mo-
ments like Alemanismo (and later Salinismo) whereby political and business elites (rather 
 
309 da Costa, Emilia Viotti. “New Publics, New Politics, New Histories: From Economic Reductionism to Cultural Reduc-
tionism – in Search of Dialectics.” Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History: Essays from the North, edited by 
Gilbert M. Joseph, 2001, pp. 17-31. 
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than input from the sectores) account for profound historical transformations. The chapter 
noted that this relative autonomy had a lot to do with the PRI’s tremendous (perhaps un-
matched) ability to block social action by co-opting intermediating bodies. This not only 
involved centralising the allocation of patronage and licensing discretionary ‘rackets’ as a 
state-making strategy but deploying considerable institutional violence to forcefully produce 
social consent (charrismo, caciquismo).  
Second, the chapter underlined the importance of weighing in external factors and U.S. in-
fluence in historical outcomes in Mexico, PRI included. The chapter argued that, like other 
countries in the region, the state in Mexico has never been the verbatim reflection of internal 
and social processes but also the result of actual and embedded external interventions. In this 
regard, the most important mechanism employed by the U.S. to affect political outcomes in 
its sphere of influence (including Mexico) consisted of embedding ‘intervention’ as an insti-
tutional process radiating from ‘within’ its security apparatus (by means of funding, arming, 
training, and participating in the construction of national guards, constabularies and intelli-
gence agencies) rather than an ‘event’ coming from outside. Underlining this external influ-
ence – surprisingly absent in the historiography of Mexico – is an important driver in this 
thesis. By the end of Alemanismo, the U.S. government had embedded its influence enough 
to confidently assert that: “[i]n Mexico as in other countries in Latin America, approval of 
an administration by the U.S. is essential to stability, and by the same token, revolutionary 
groups would have little chance of success without the tacit or explicit approval of the 
U.S.”310.  
Finally, the chapter noted that the ability of the PRI regime to affect social outcomes ad-
vanced through the expansion of the regime’s security capabilities: a national security appa-
ratus attached to an executive branch, itself guided by notably elite interests and a crony, 
rent-seeking spirit. In this regard, state-formation in Mexico (a process that accelerated con-
 
310 CIA Report SR_18, "Mexico.", Jan 24, 1951, p- 16. NARA, Washington DC. Record Group 84, Box 130; cited in Na-
varro, Aaron W. Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954. Penn State Press, 2010, p. 258.  
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siderably under Alemanismo) involved the expansion of a modern, post-WW II type of se-
curity apparatus with much broader capabilities not only to shape political outcomes but to 
penetrate society and generate a social order fitted to capitalist requirements. The context of 
austerity in which Alemanismo operated (which extends to almost the entire PRI period) 
reproduced state power by virtue of systematic abuse of an expanding pool of regulatory 
activities. For the security apparatus, this abuse centred in the enablement and extortion of 
crime. Alemanismo hence also involved a process whereby criminal rackets became attached 
to a national programme supported by national security. It signified a point of inflexion in 
which the importance of illegal economies began to transcend the politics of a cacique-dom-
inated landscape. Without this path-determining precedent, the extremely peculiar ‘integra-
tion’ of state and drug markets occurring in Mexico cannot be explained, and much less so 
its ancillary functionality to advance interests that transcend Mexico. The following chapter 
will look at the persisting overlap between transnational criminal market and DFS activity, 
noting, in particular, the role of protection rackets as political economies associated with 




Chapter 3 - Criminal rackets, political mandates 
Inspired by a Tillyian framework, a key idea in this thesis is that the relationship between the 
political and the criminal in Mexico is best captured if we think of the latter as an invisible 
political economy supporting security-oriented activity, a process leading to securitisation. 
More than any other illegal commodity, security actors at every level have shown a tendency 
to ‘tax’ most conspicuously the low-barrier commodity represented by drugs. Tapping into 
the flow of drugs and other criminal commodities and putting in place a protection racket is 
relatively easy if you are a security official. Andreas notes that “[perhaps] more than any 
other state regulatory activity, drug enforcement provides extraordinary incentives to use 
public authority for private gain. And these incentives only increase under conditions of fiscal 
austerity, economic uncertainty, and low wages”311. But by establishing protection rackets in 
drug markets, security officials not only generate a personal gain; they establish a political 
economy that supports the reproduction of the state’s security apparatus in contexts where 
the underlining capital is deficient. From gangs in the ghettos to paramilitaries in proxy con-
flicts to secret parapolice in authoritarian states, no other illegal activity has provided more 
‘support’ for the security capabilities of ‘rulers’ in recent decades than rackets over drug 
peddling.  
Behind the contemporary violent explosion of transnational drug markets in Mexico lies a 
history in which the state-making process (and especially the bureaucratisation of its security 
and policing services) became embedded in rackets on criminal activity. The following two 
chapters document how the security apparatus of the PRI regime continued to rely on political 
economies generated by bandits. This chapter documents how the DFS, chief guarantor of 
the regime’s security, instrumentalised these markets to support counterinsurgency opera-
tions and the repressive agenda of an increasingly authoritarian state. The ‘instrumentalisa-
tion’ of drug rackets as low-barrier economies to fund national security operations in Mexico 
was covertly endorsed by the U.S. government. It was part of a secret mechanism, employed 
 
311 Andreas, Peter. “The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico.” Current History, vol. 97, no. 618, pp. 160-
165, p. 162. 
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in other theatres of the Cold War, to neutralise the ‘internal enemy’ at a bargain price.  The 
input of banditry into the logistics of empire, of course, was far from new. 
Local and supralocal criminal governance 
Throughout its 70-plus-year-old history, the drug market in Mexico has attracted racketeering 
actors and institutions of protection at multiple state levels. Recent scholarly literature has 
focused on the political economies that the production of drugs (cannabis and opium) gener-
ated at subnational political geographies in the early decades of the PRI regime. In contrast 
to the transnational trafficking of drugs, which often involves larger geographies, multiple 
borders, powerful political protectors, connections to transnational mafias, international 
banks, and a much greater pool of earnings, local drug production is a potential racket more 
accessible to immediate powerbrokers. A good example of the local dimensions of drug pol-
itics has been documented by Benjamin Smith’s work on the history of opium production in 
the state of Sinaloa. Smith notes how unofficial ‘licenses’ to exploit opium and cannabis 
harvesting during the 1940s, 50s and 60s were instrumentalised by Sinaloan leading political 
authorities (caciques and governors) in order to appease discontented right-wing ranchers 
and co-opt leftist agrarian groups. Toleration to cultivate opium in Sinaloa, which represented 
until the 1970s a small part of global output, operated as a political escape-valve that helped 
governors navigate the complexities of agrarian and anti-agrarian politics. Smith notes how, 
“[i]n basic terms, from the 1930s to the 1970s, state governors, not traffickers, controlled the 
Sinaloa drug industry - regulating the trade, manipulating its economic and political benefits, 
and (when necessary) using state police to protect their investments”312. By virtue of control-
ling protection to local production, political actors in Sinaloa were able to generate networks 
of support for their cacicazgos. Smith refers to these early entanglements in the political 
economy of drug production in Sinaloa as forms of narco-populismo: control over limited 
opium production became a crucial populist tool to pragmatically balance off the agendas 
 
312 Smith, Benjamin T. “The Rise and Fall of Narcopopulism: Drugs, Politics, and Society in Sinaloa, 1930–1980.” Jour-
nal for the Study of Radicalism, vol. 7, no. 2, 2013, pp. 125-165, p. 128. 
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and demands of different social groups313. In contrast, the trafficking and transborder smug-
gling of opium and heroin, which was very limited until the mid-1970s, involved state insti-
tutions like the DFS and the PJF, becoming entangled with supralocal political processes 
from the very beginning. 
Similar to Smith, Pansters314 employs the concept of narco-caciques to describe the informal 
networks of friendship and/or extended kinship in which the non-application of drug enforce-
ment was transformed into a political commodity in local politics. The ‘informal order’ in 
which local drug production thrived was all about ‘interrupting’ the universal application of 
the law to advance the political agenda of a power figure. A good example of the embedded 
nature of drug production and caciquismo in Sinaloa during these early times is the figure of 
Héctor Melesio Cuén Ojeda. Cuén, Pansters notes, was municipal president of Badiguarato 
(the epicentre of opium production in Sinaloa) during the 1940s and early 1950s. He had 
influence over the appointment of judges, police and civil servants, and became involved in 
poppy cultivation by selling protection (disímulo) to local producers. Cuén represents an ex-
ample of a narco-cacique “whose local power was based on a mixture of licit and illicit 
businesses, formal authority and informal political networks”315. The endogenous focus of 
Smith and Pansters help us understand the extent to which drug production or a local bandit 
became embedded in the informal governance systems of opium-producing regions in Mex-
ico at a time when the drug output of the country was globally limited, but locally crucial.  
More macro-focused accounts of the drug economy by Luis Astorga316, Carlos Flores Pé-
rez317 and Oswaldo Zavala318 underline the extent to which protection of transborder drug 
trafficking (as opposed to raw-commodity production) involved supralocal political pro-
 
313 Idem.  
314 Pansters, Wil G. “Drug trafficking, the informal order, and caciques. Reflections on the crime-governance nexus in 
Mexico.” Global Crime, vol. 19, no. 3-4, 2018, pp. 315-338. 
315 Idem, pp. 321f. 
316 Astorga, Luis. El siglo de las drogas: el narcotráfico, del Porfiriato al nuevo milenio. Plaza y Janés, 2005. 
317 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social, 2013.  
318 Zavala, Oswaldo. Los cárteles no existen: Narcotráfico y cultura en México. Malpaso Ediciones SL, 2018.  
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cesses from the beginning. This is a permeable divide in the literature that echoes the bound-
aries between regional/culturalist accounts and more state-centric, macro approaches to Mex-
ican history. Whereas works by Smith and Pansters note how narco-caciques afforded pro-
tection to the production of narcotics (cannabis and opioids in Sinaloa and adjacent states) 
and therefore enabled a political economy closer to regional politics, more state-centric ap-
proaches like those of Flores Pérez, Zavala and Astorga underline how the transborder traf-
ficking of drugs involved protection networks embedded in national and international politi-
cal processes. Flores Pérez notes how, as described in the previous chapter, prominent mem-
bers of the national elite under Alemanismo imposed themselves as leading brokers in the 
national market of drugs and fayuca (contraband)319. In turn, Zavala notes the role of these 
criminal rackets as political economies supporting the opening of Mexico to capitalism, ne-
oliberalism, and foreign influence. Building from Astorga’s criticisms to the ‘mitologia del 
narcotraficante’, Zavala challenges the ‘depoliticised’ interpretations of the history of drug 
markets in Mexico. For him, the picturesque narratives of narcos are depoliticised images 
that divert attention away from its political embeddedness in national and transnational po-
litical processes. Zavala’s analysis underlines how manufactured narratives engineered by 
the PRI regime (mis)informed until very recently public and scholarly notions of how the 
drug trafficking market operated, the extent to which the federal government and political 
parties were involved in it, and the instrumental role of these criminal economies in support-
ing broader political processes in Mexico320. Zavala’s work draws from the seminal critique 
of Luis Astorga, who noted more than two decades ago the ‘mythological’ character of an 
official ‘narco’ narrative aimed at disguising official involvement at the highest levels. 
Capturing famous traffickers is also an act of symbolic power. 
The ´evil´ is fought, the "society" is protected, some "plebe-
ian" heads fall, the enemy is created, and the conceptual and 
 
319 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social, 2013. 
320 Zavala, Oswaldo. Los cárteles no existen: Narcotráfico y cultura en México. Malpaso Ediciones SL, 2018. 
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social limits that must be taken into consideration to cognize 
drug trafficking become established321.   
Although this work underlines the embedded character of drug trafficking in transnational 
political processes affecting Mexico as a whole, local and supralocal perspectives on the drug 
racket ought to be seen as complementary. If local drug-peddling and the production of raw 
narcotics represented a crucial source of economic or political capital supporting governance 
in fiscally deprived local contexts, something similar can be said about the transnational 
level, where the racketeering of transborder trafficking in contraband and drugs enabled po-
litical economies advancing exogenous interests through global security processes operating 
under fiscal constraints. Because stable drug markets are unlikely to escape the need of pro-
tection, the whole spectrum of the drug commodity-chain (production, refinement, transpor-
tation, transnational smuggling, money laundering, retail markets, etc.) involves a large col-
lection of enablers operating in distinct but interconnected political geographies. From our 
perspective, these enablers constitute political and security synapses of a broader process 
capitalising on the multiple stages of the drug economy to enforce the divides of the world 
system. The aim here is to understand the aggregated effects of drug rackets in enabling 
market-based modes of accumulation and exploitation of the global periphery. What is im-
portant to note here is that macro and micro approaches focus on distinct but necessarily 
complementary dimensions of the political economies generated by the political economy of 
narcotics as a whole. In this work, the aim is to provide an account of the aggregated effects 
implicated by the drug economy from the perspective of global hierarchies and structural 
processes seeking to advance economic and political agendas through the instrumentalisation 
of this contemporary form of ‘banditry’.  In the rest of this chapter, I put forward a set of key 
findings that shed light on the relationship between protection rackets in transnational crim-
inal activity and political processes in Mexico. The chapter documents several cases that 
show how drug trafficking and contraband markets became further incorporated in the 1970s 
 
321 Astorga, Luis. Mitología del “narcotraficante” en México. Plaza y Valdés, 1995, pp. 76f. [own translation]. 
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and 1980s at the highest levels of state security. The first section documents the embed-
dedness of contraband rackets and national security. The second turns the attention to the 
drug market, underlines its proximity to state-supported paramilitarism, and documents its 
close relationship to counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the DFS. It notes how the 
very DFS leaders conducting the Guerra Sucia [dirty war] were also leading racketeers of 
drug and contraband economies. The section focuses on the landmark operation that led to 
the incorporation of a more centralised DFS drug racket in Mexico in the 1970s, Operación 
Trizo/Condor. Both sections shed light onto crucial but often neglected aspects in the history 
of national and international security in Mexico. This and the following two chapters employ 
archival material reviewed at the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City, the National 
Security Archive at George Washington University, the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration in Maryland, and the Charles Bowden Archive at the University of Texas in San 
Marcos. They also include the testimonies of three former Drug Enforcement Administration 
agents (DEA-1322, DEA-2323, DEA-3324) as well as the testimonies of two former high-rank-
ing PJF officers with knowledge of DFS operations (PJF-1325 and PJF-2326).  
Contraband rackets and the DFS 
In 1980, an FBI investigation into an established and vast car-theft syndicate at the U.S/Mex-
ican border found that the DFS was behind it. U.S. authorities estimated that the agency, in 
 
322 DEA-1 refers to Phil Jordan, former Special Agent in Charge of DEA operations in Arizona, Oklahoma, New Mexico 
and Texas, Senior Inspector, Deputy Chief of Cocaine Operations and Deputy Regional Director for DEA's European Op-
erations in Washington, D.C. Jordan was the Director of the DEA Intelligence Centre (EPIC), located in Ft. Bliss, Texas. 
EPIC is the premier intelligence centre for monitoring worldwide drug intelligence and drug trends in a multi-agency co-
operative effort.  
323 DEA-2 refers to former DEA agent, Salvador Martinez, who operated in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an under-
cover agent in Tamaulipas and Chihuahua, attached to the PJF.   
324 DEA-3 refers to former DEA agent Donald Ferrarone, in charge of the first investigation on the assassination of DEA 
agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico, as well as multiple high-profile investigations into political involvement in drug mar-
kets in South East Asia.  
325 PJF-1, who will remain anonymous for security reasons, refers to a former high-ranking PJF agent active from the early 
1980s to the late 1990s. He was particularly acquainted with DFS operations.      
326 PJF-2, who will remain anonymous for security reasons, was to a former high-ranking PJF agent active from the late 
1980s to the early 2000s. He operated as part of the personal team of at least two attorney generals. 
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this racket alone, had stolen four thousand luxury vehicles (Mercedes Benzes, Porches, Vic-
torias, Maseratis, Ferraris) since at least 1975327. The network extended to cities like San 
Francisco and San Antonio. As many as twelve new vehicles were stolen on a daily basis328. 
Cars were taken to Mexico by DFS agents and sold at various locations329. Some cars were 
also presented as gifts “to political people in Mexico so that other contraband destined for 
the DFS could be passed into Mexico unimpeded”330. The FBI investigation, led by federal 
prosecutor William H. Kennedy, pointed to the active DFS director, Miguel Nazar Haro, as 
the head of the criminal operation. The charges against Nazar were based on the testimonies 
of 15 defendants apprehended in the U.S., most of them members of the Mexican govern-
ment331. The DFS was extensively involved not only in the smuggling of stolen cars but the 
smuggling of contraband and its distribution across Mexico more generally. As PJF-2 notes, 
the economies generated by these and other rackets provided a considerable income for DFS 
agents (far above their salary) as well as for the undertaking of clandestine operations332. 
Even the very vehicles used by the DFS in remote regions to hunt down the guerrilla were 
often stolen cars introduced by agents through these criminal methods333. Crime thus pro-
vided to national security what an impoverished fiscal apparatus could not.     
As the FBI sought to press charges against DFS director Nazar, agent Kennedy was sum-
moned to Washington to discuss the potential ramifications of the indictment. Representa-
tives of the U.S. embassy in Mexico City conveyed to Kennedy in the “strongest terms pos-
sible the serious political and security ramifications that such a step would generate for U.S. 
interests in Mexico”334. Moving against director Nazar would lead to his resignation, a “dis-
aster” for U.S. interests. It was the embassy´s view that the chances of prosecuting Nazar in 
either the U.S. or in Mexico were in any case nil because of the high-level political protection 
 
327 From Assistant US Attorney to Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum, November 4, 1981, The National Security 
Archive. 
328 From SAC San Diego to FBI. Memorandum, 1981, The National Security Archive. 




332 Interview with PJF-2. 
333 Idem.  
334 From US Embassy Mexico City to Director FBI. Memorandum, November 1981, The National Security Archive. 
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that Nazar enjoyed in both countries335. According to the U.S. embassy, Nazar had afforded 
“the only true positive assistance in terrorism and foreign counter-intelligence areas” in Mex-
ico for years336. He was the CIA’s most valued asset operating in Mexico, according to the 
CIA. His removal from the political scene, especially under ‘ignominious’ circumstances, 
would cause damage to “U.S. coverage of hostile intelligence agencies and persons which 
would take years to rebuild, if they could be rebuilt at all”337. Press coverage of the FBI´s 
purported indictment against Nazar generated a national security ‘emergency’ in both coun-
tries. The indictment against Nazar and other top-ranking members of the DFS exposed a 
common understanding underlining crucial but often overlooked mechanisms associated 
with U.S. involvement in Mexico. These transnational mechanisms involved the indirect use 
of criminal economies for national security purposes, providing collaborators at the highest 
levels of the security apparatus in host nations with protection and logistical support to un-
dertake these activities.  
Commanders at the DFS reacted strongly against what they perceived as the U.S. govern-
ment´s incapacity to contain the secrets of what was ultimately a political economy serving 
the interests of both338. A CIA memo points to the level of irritation that the indictment 
against Nazar generated in DFS circles: “There are many in the DFS who are refusing to 
work for us because of this incident”. Nazar “demanded that the Department of Justice issue 
a press release clarifying that there are no formal charges pending against [him]”. Nazar is 
also cited as saying that “Kennedy should be fired for irresponsibility”339. Another cable 
conveyed the extent to which the U.S. government risked its ability to conduct covert opera-
tions in Mexico: “There are some in the DFS who are ready to go to the press and reveal all 
 
335 In a similar case, earlier that year, a group of DFS agents convoyed a collection of stolen vehicles from Tijuana to So-
nora. Upon arriving to Sonora, custom and federal car registry officials denied passage of the DFS convoy into Mexico. 
Cables indicate that DFS agents opened fire with automatic weapons and were able to escape. The DFS group was later 
arrested by soldiers in Hermosillo and subsequently freed. The DFS agent in charge of escorting the vehicles was Ju-
ventino Romero. Romero was part of Nazar Haro´s close circle at the DFS and a leading figure in Mexico’s guerra sucia, 
for which he was convicted for crimes against humanity in 2002. Infamously, Romero was responsible, among other 
crimes, for the disappearance of Jesus Piedra Ibarra (a member of Mexico’s guerrilla movement Liga Comunista 23 de 
Septiembre) in what constituted one of the most (if not the most) renowned case of desaparecidos during the mid-1970s.  
336 From US Embassy Mexico City to Director FBI. Memorandum, March 1982, The National Security Archive. 
337 Idem. 
338 From US Embassy Mexico City to Director FBI. Memorandum, November 1981, The National Security Archive. 
339 From US Embassy Mexico City to Director FBI. Memorandum, March 1982, The National Security Archive. 
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the FBI’s […] sensitive investigations, wiretapping, surveillance, etc., [undertaken] in Mex-
ico throughout the years”. The cable adds: “Needless to say, such a revelation here should 
absolutely terminate both our agencies operations”340. Mexican President José López Portillo 
(1976-1982) wanted to be reassured of the U.S. government’s ability and willingness to avoid 
such sensitive disclosures in the future. The U.S. ambassador concluded that “the concern of 
the Mexican president should be brought to the personal attention of the U.S. Secretary of 
State, the Attorney General, and President Ronald Reagan”341. The memo added that disci-
plinary action against Kennedy would provide assurances to the DFS. Kennedy was, in effect, 
subsequently fired for compromising national security operations342. The case is thus also 
representative of the tensions generated by the clash of national security and law enforce-
ment.  
From the early 1970s, Nazar had become the CIA’s most important collaborator in Mexico 
and Central America343. Nazar was arguably the most valuable agent in the historical LI-
TEMPO spy network: a complex of CIA-paid informants recruited from the highest levels of 
the Mexican security establishment dating back to at least 1960344. LITEMPO collected in-
formation on matters associated with the behind-the-scene politics in Mexico and the status 
of actors associated with the Mexican left (including foreigners in Mexico)345. Top LI-
TEMPO informants included at least three Mexican interior ministers who subsequently be-
came presidents: Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964), Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) and 
Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976)346, as well as two DFS directors: Francisco Gutierrez 
 
340 Idem. 
341 From Criminal Investigative Division San Diego. Informative note, April 1, 1982, The National Security Archive. 
342 Pound, Edward T. “U.S. attorney in San Diego Dismissed”. New York Times, April 6, 1982. Also: “Reagan Fires Ken-
nedy After He Refuses to Quit as US Attorney.” San Diego Union, April 6, 1982.  
343 A collection of declassified cables underlining the relationship of Nazar and the U.S. can be accessed online at: Mary 
Ferrell Foundation, LITEMPO-12, https://www.maryferrell.org/php/cryptdb.php?id=LITEMPO-12. 
344 For LITEMPO declassified material, files from the National Security Archive are available online at: The National Se-
curity Archive. LITEMPO: The CIA's Eyes on Tlatelolco, available at 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB204/#doc1 [last accessed 15 January 2020]. 
345  See also: Morley, Jefferson. Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA. University Press of 
Kansas, 2013. 
346 CIA Memo. Redacted. April 11, 1964, The National Security Archives, available at 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB204/index.htm#documents [last accessed 22 January 2020]. See also: To: 
Chief WH Division, From: Chief of Station. “LITEMPO/Operational Report. Tasks assigned to LITEMPO". Memoran-
dum, October 24, 1963, The National Security Archives, available at 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB204/3.pdf [last accessed 25 January 2020]. 
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Barrios (1965-1970) and Miguel Nazar Haro (1978-1982)347. Nazar´s (Litempo-12) relation-
ship with U.S. intelligence went back to the 1950s and his training at the School of the Amer-
icas at Fort Gulick, Panama (the training and indoctrination centre for the U.S.-supported 
security establishment in Latin America)348. Before directing the DFS in the early 1980s, he 
became the agency’s leading actor in counterinsurgency operations, representing for decades 
the most important interlocutor and ally of the U.S. government in operations in Mexico and 
Central America. In this respect, Nazar’s key involvement in running the national security 
apparatus and managing the criminal rackets supporting its operation made of him an explicit 
embodiment of what the Cold War security literature refers to as the ‘dual’ or ‘deep’ state in 
Mexico. Coined by Ola Tunander349, the ‘deep state’ refers to security structures operating 
under what Carl Schmitt referred to as a ‘state of exception’ that provides its members with 
the ability to violate the rule of law on grounds of national security350. From our perspective, 
what makes the concept of ‘dual’ states of particular interest for historians and political sci-
entists is not the alleged ‘ultra-secretive’, ‘conspiratorial’ and ‘all-powerful’ qualities com-
monly associated with it, but rather the extent to which, in the countries where these struc-
tures have been noted to exist by historians, national security apparatuses establish functional 
relationship with criminals (much like the CIA and the DFS) to advance concrete political 
agendas in a territorial and extraterritorial direction351. Morgenthau discussed the existence 
of a “dual state” in the U.S. which is able to “exert an effective veto over the decisions” of 
 
347 Idem. According to documents cited in Aguayo, Nazar joined the DFS under director Francisco Gutierrez Barrios (LI-
TEMPO 4) in the mid-1960s. According to Pável Urganga, whose parents were both tortured by Nazar himself at Campo 
Militar N1, Nazar began his intelligence career in 1952, debuting in a failed plot to kill the leftist Cardenista campesino 
leader Miguel Henriquez Guzmán, orchestrated by the DFS. 
348 Castellanos, Laura. México Armado. Ediciones Era, 2014. Similarly, an excellent monograph on the School of the 
Americas can be found in: Gill, Lesley. The school of the Americas: military training and political violence in the Ameri-
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the regular state hierarchy when deemed necessary. This, according to him, limits the range 
of democratic options available to the public in the name of national emergencies352. Barry 
Buzan argues that “the urgency of an existential threat” permits the state to resort to con-
sistent violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed”353. Before them, Marx 
attempted to capture the logic of the state of exception by noting that when the manipulation 
of the political process to engineer the rule of law in favour of capitalist interests is not suf-
ficient, extra-legal political violence is likely to follow354. For Eric Wilson, the politics of the 
‘dual’ state are inexplicable without understanding its commitment to the capitalisation of 
the global economy through new forms of ‘enclosures’. He notes that “the 80-plus military 
operations conducted in the South in the post-war period […] were deployed to forcibly open 
markets and establish national political-institutional architectures conducive to labor dispos-
session and Western capitalist penetration”355. In spite of its centrality to the success of cap-
italist expansion, these ‘exceptional’ mechanisms “have been concealed from the public’s 
understanding not only through liberal ideologies that naturalise globalisation as an inevita-
ble techno-economic process, but also through political propaganda [to justify] the adoption 
of draconian emergency powers along with the institutionalisation of anti-left policies”356. 
In other words, what authors have often referred to as ‘dual’ or ‘deep’ structures is in practice 
a process whereby, among other activities, (trans)national security apparatuses co-opt ‘ban-
dit’ economies as a strategy of rule. This process, whose illegitimate nature forces liberal 
states to conceal it, is nevertheless an integral mechanism in the construction of the capitalist 
structures that support liberal states. In this respect, Nazar Haro signified the ‘deep’ or ‘dual’ 
state in Mexico during the 1970s and 1980s in the sense that he embodied the covert im-
portance that criminal economies had in the construction of a (trans)national security appa-
ratus committed to a capitalist agenda. According to witnesses at two different trials, Nazar 
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was not only heavily involved in contraband, but his illegal activities included transnational 
narcotics at the very time that the CIA was trying to defuse the FBI indictment against him357. 
Lawrence Victor Harrison, a government-paid witness who had extensive dealings with both 
Mexican intelligence and leading drug traffickers, testified that Nazar was deeply involved 
in drug trafficking358. Witnesses at two different trials confirmed this, along with PJF-2359. 
The CIA’s indirect use of criminal rackets (and transnational drug trafficking in particular) 
to support the operation of satellites was not an ‘omission’ but a deliberate and more widely 
reproduced mechanism to generate funds and enable proxies employed in clandestine opera-
tions. The DFS embodied a double mandate shared by other intelligence agencies in the Cold 
War: a mandate to enforce political agendas by clandestine means, and a mandate to support 
their implementation by racketeering criminal economies. Nazar embodied this more general 
process in the reproduction of security systems during the Cold War and the PRI period.  
A political economy for counterinsurgency 
In 1943, Ruben Jaramillo, a peasant activist, fled to the mountains in the state of Morelos to 
avoid arrest after organising an illegal worker’s strike at a sugar mill. Under Jaramillo’s guid-
ance, a group composed by subsistence farmers, seasonal labourers, migrants, sugar-mill 
workers, and a few rural schoolteachers began a limited form of irregular warfare aimed at 
taking intermittent control of local populations and pushing back on commercial estates ex-
panding on the commons and collective ejidos. Rather than seeking to bring down the gov-
ernment, the first guerrilla movement in Mexico demanded the return of credit, technical 
assistance and basic government services provided by Cardenismo but withdrawn shortly 
after360. According to Tanalís Padilla, “Jaramillo confronted the limitations of a system in-
creasingly designed to suit the needs of an export economy, corrupt public officials, and a 
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new group of latifundistas (large landholders)”361. The army’s inability to eliminate the guer-
rilla drove the government of Ávila Camacho to offer amnesty to Jaramillo’s movement, a 
tactic subsequently deployed to co-opt subversive leaders before deploying full military 
force. The PRI regime’s commitment to agribusiness led, ten years later, to a second Jara-
millisita insurrection. After a short struggle where the government was again incapable of 
suppressing his movement, Jaramillo was again pardoned in 1958. The Cuban revolution and 
growing antagonisms in the Mexican countryside drove the DFS to keep a close watch on 
Jaramillista members. When in 1962 Jaramillo and his followers invaded agro-industrial 
lands expanding on ejidos, this time the state’s response was the brutal killing of Jaramillo 
and his family, which effectively ended his movement. The assassination of Jaramillo was a 
massive setback for the peasant struggle in Morelos, but soon other guerrilla movements, 
generated by similar class antagonisms, began to transpire in the country’s north, setting in 
motion the early phases of the dirty wars in Mexico.  
To address these growing class antagonisms, Nazar established in 1964 the country’s top 
counterinsurgency squad, a group called C-047, later renamed Brigada Especial Antiguerril-
las, or BEA, operating under the umbrella of DFS362. BEA was a multi-agency task force 
composed of around 200 members from the DFS, the armed forces (military police and judi-
cial military police), the Attorney General and Mexico City police363. BEA represented the 
vanguard for the elimination of guerrilla activity during the early years of what became 
known as the ‘Guerra Sucia’, a period lasting from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s. BEA’s 
first success was neutralising the guerrilla movement in Mexico that followed Jaramillismo, 
the Movimiento 23 de Septiembre364. Methods used by BEA included infiltration, interroga-
tion, disappearances, torture, rape and executions not only of guerrilla men and women but 
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union leaders, social activists, relatives, supporters, etc. Nazar not only directed these opera-
tions himself but often directly partook in them, as ample testimonies, court records and re-
ports associated with the Truth Commission have shown365.  
Trained, in many cases, by U.S. instructors, BEA’s commanders were notorious not only for 
the brutality employed to neutralise the enemigo interno [internal enemy] but also for their 
involvement in major criminal rackets. The leading members of BEA, as well as those of 
subsequent anti-guerrilla task forces, were all established racketeers with one hand in the 
most profitable illegal markets and another in counterinsurgency operations. Under Nazar’s 
tight command, the core of BEA was integrated by Arturo Durazo Moreno, Mario Arturo 
Acosta Chaparro, Arturo Izquierdo Hebrard, Ricardo Quiroz Hermosillo, Francisco Sahagun 
Baca, Jesus Miyasawa Álvarez, Javier Barquin Alonso, Guillermo Álvarez Nahara, among 
others. All of these actors, who represented the very core of an anti-insurgency effort taking 
place during the most repressive period of the PRI period, have documented links with drug 
trafficking in multiple periods of their careers.  
To provide an account of the racketeering activities of all of these security actors goes beyond 
the scope of this work. Looking briefly at some key examples, however, will underline the 
more general entanglements between those heading the national security apparatus and the 
extent to which their careers and activities were supported by major criminal economies. One 
such example is BEA member Arturo Durazo Moreno. Durazo became a DFS commander 
in the late 1950s and joined BEA in the late 1960s366. His counterinsurgency credentials made 
him the most powerful member of the secret police in Mexico City. His efficiency in disman-
tling the local branch of the Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre, Mexico’s most prominent 
urban guerrilla force, elevated him in the mid-1970s to the position of director of police of 
Mexico City and arguably the country’s most powerful police chief 367. On the guerrilla, chief 
Durazo declared: “The police is prepared to fight the guerrillas regardless of whether judges 
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absolve them or not”368. “We will hunt them down like dogs until not one is left, and by that 
achieve their extermination”369. Systematic torture and desapariciones committed against 
guerrilla suspects were undertaken by Durazo and his subordinates during his rise as BEA’s 
top official in the capital370. Paired to the task of dismantling the guerrilla, however, laid the 
duty of establishing rackets and ‘regulating’ the full spectrum of criminal activity in Mexico 
City. As Proceso Magazine noted, Durazo “turned the Dirección General de Policía y 
Tránsito in Mexico City into an instrument of terror and drug trafficking. He protected pros-
titution, fraud, smuggling, extortion, theft, violence, nepotism, vendettas, tortures and exe-
cutions”371. As head of Mexico City Police, Durazo established a confidential branch, the 
División de Investigaciones para la Prevención de la Delincuencia (DIPD) which operated 
as the DFS’s counterinsurgency vanguard in Mexico City372. DIPD provided valuable infor-
mation to U.S. intelligence and exchanged information with the CIA while running extensive 
criminal rackets373. In fact, Durazo was, according to his own testimony, involved in CIA 
operations running drugs for guns for the Nicaraguan Contra in the late 1970s374. When, fol-
lowing his appointment as head of Mexico City’s police, a U.S. ambassador noted to Presi-
dent José López Portillo the extent to which Durazo was involved in drug trafficking, the 
president defended his choice by pointing out that “law enforcement and illegal activities 
frequently intertwine, not only in Mexico but in other countries as well”375. President López 
Portillo was, in effect, pointing to a fundamental characteristic of the security bureaucracy in 
Mexico: its inevitable and structural reliance on the criminal element to generate a particular 
social order. As head of Mexico City’s police, Durazo institutionalised a system of obligatory 
‘quotas’ whereby each policeman had to collect and channel levies on criminal activities on 
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a monthly basis to the very top. He is quoted by his right-hand man as saying to new police 
recruits: “If you want a police vehicle to ‘work’ a street - read extort - you will have to pay 
all your expenses yourself”376. Durazo’s rewards included a Swiss-style chalet equipped with 
a greyhound racing-track, horse-stables, tennis courts, a parking lot for his collection of lux-
ury cars, and a replica of the Studio 54 nightclub377. Another one of his mansions, near Aca-
pulco, was aptly called ‘El Parthenon’378. He was accused of cocaine-trafficking in courts in 
California and Florida, was apprehended by the FBI during a short visit to the U.S. in the 
early 1980s, but immediately released and allowed to return to Mexico379. Durazo’s long 
career as one of the key actors behind the counterinsurgency and political-policing efforts of 
an authoritarian state, while running rackets in criminal activities, underlines the dynamics 
supporting the so-called ‘deep’ security structures operating in Mexico and other theatres of 
the Cold War.  
The involvement of BEA’s leading officials in organised crime is overwhelming. Apart from 
Nazar and Durazo, BEA’s top-ranking comandantes included agent Arturo Izquierdo He-
brard (brother-in-law to Durazo380, also involved in cocaine and heroin trafficking381, con-
victed for the assassination of the leftist Veracruz senator, Mario Angulo382); agent Francisco 
Sahagun Baca (head of the infamous Mexico City police department División de Investi-
gaciones para la Prevención de la Delincuencia, which represented BEA’s core group in the 
capital383, arrested on drug trafficking charges in 1989384); agent Javier Barquin Alonso (who 
in parallel coordinated the little-known Grupo Sangre – a state-supported, secret paramilitary 
death-squad operating in the country’s hotspot of guerrilla activity, the state of Guerrero, 
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celebrating at the same time arreglos [arrangements] with poppy and marijuana traffick-
ers385); agent Guillermo Álvarez Nahara (linked in FBI reports to drug traffickers386); agent 
Jorge Carranza Peniche (convicted in the U.S. of introducing Bolivian cocaine387); agent 
Javier Garcia Paniagua (DFS director and national president of the PRI party, close to Nazar, 
and father to Javier Garcia Morales, executed in drug trafficking disputes years later388); 
among others. These individuals did not constitute isolated cases but represented the very 
core of a U.S.-supported counterinsurgency effort in Mexico.  
Another example of the close relationship between the racketeering of criminal markets and 
the operationalisation of national security during the country’s counterinsurgency plateau is 
the career of General Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro. Acosta received counterinsurgency 
training at Fort Brag and Fort Benning. He joined BEA in the early 1970s389. In that capacity, 
he directed operations in the country’s guerrilla hotspot, the state of Guerrero. He became 
known for using brutal tactics against suspected guerrilla fighters and those allegedly sup-
porting them. He was pointed out by the Frente Nacional Contra la Represión for being 
directly or indirectly responsible for the killing of 355 people in Guerrero390. He pioneered 
the infamous ‘death flights’ whereby guerrilla suspects were dropped from flying planes into 
the Pacific Ocean after brutal interrogations391. Acosta headed the paramilitary organisation 
Grupo Sangre, described in DFS memos as a vehicle to eliminate guerrilleros and generate 
agreements with drug traffickers392. Acosta Chaparro operated what DFS files describe as 
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“manejos turbios” [murky business] “that pocket him a strong sum of monthly rent” from 
protection rackets in the drug business393. He coordinated drug trafficking operations with 
local police in Guerrero, which according to intelligence memos was also involved in gun-
running394. Acosta appears in the DEA database as an official who associated with and pro-
vided protection to narcotics traffickers395. According to PJF-1, military planes in Guerrero 
were not only used for ‘death flights’ but also to ship drugs to the U.S. border396. After head-
ing repression efforts in Guerrero for the federal and local governments, Acosta relocated to 
Baja California as commander of the 68th Battalion and was later appointed head of security 
in Veracruz. In the late 1970s, Acosta was mentioned in DFS cables as a likely successor of 
Miguel Nazar as head of the DFS (a position that went, however, to Antonio Zorrilla, who 
was subsequently charged in both Mexico and the United States for drug trafficking). In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, Acosta spent seven years in prison in Mexico under drug traf-
ficking charges, was released on appeal in 2007, and was assassinated in 2013. Men like 
Acosta, Durazo, Nazar and other leading members of Mexico’s intelligence services person-
ify the embedded character of the transnational criminal market and the security complex of 
a regime reaching its authoritarian and repressive plateau. As Aguayo Quezada concludes, to 
address a potential and unconfirmed threat to national security [i.e. insurgency and guerrilla], 
the regime created the conditions that would favour drug trafficking, which became in sub-
sequent years the main threat to national security397. As PJF-1 told me: 
What do you think is going to happen if, just like that, you 
close the tap to the heroin and crack-addicted population in the 
U.S.? The only thing that you would get is total chaos. No. 
You manage the system. The drug system is managed by se-
curity institutions. This does not mean that the Mexican gov-
ernment has total "control" of the drug trafficking business, 
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but that it “administers” the drug trade in a clandestine fashion. 
By doing so, the Mexican government generated profits often 
employed in clandestine operations398.  
Focused on Guerrero, Aviña notes how “the origins of Mexico’s drug wars can be found in 
the Mexican state’s decades-long attack on popular movements advocating for social and 
economic justice”399. The ‘War on Drugs’ provided from its very inception a vehicle for 
“state-sanctioned violence and terror against poor people whose political and economic de-
cisions and/or actions symptomatically reflected deeper structural and historical mala-
dies”400. In some regions, the war on drugs generated a form of militarised governance in 
which networks of military, caciques, politicians, police and narcotraffickers constituted ob-
scure bodies identifying and eliminating rural teachers and professors, university students, 
peasant communities, indigenous movements, and guerrilla cells401. By the early and mid-
1970s, the accumulated social antagonisms generated by the ‘structural maladies’ attached 
to PRI governance began to translate into increasingly assertive pockets of insurrection. Tak-
ing place amidst the plateau of guerrilla activity in Latin America, the PRI state was ill-
equipped to address an expansive threat to its crony authoritarianism. Confidential memos 
by U.S. security agencies note that the growing threat of guerrilla “suggested the possibility 
that impoverished Mexicans were beginning to wake up against the one-party system”402. 
Memos also underline “that the capacity of the Mexican state to address these challenges was 
very limited despite ever-increasing commitments of manpower and resources”403. In 1971, 
for example, a much more forceful military assault on guerrillas in the West dubbed 
"Operación Telaraña" failed to achieve its ends because of the limited security capabilities 
available to the Mexican state, as well as the ample social support enjoyed by the insurrection. 
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As in concurrent U.S. theatres in South East Asia and Latin America, the war against the 
guerrilla called for a war against its social bases. A U.S. embassy cable notes, for example, 
that “the terrain (in the sierras) inhibits the manoeuvres of the security forces, and on the 
most recent occasions the guerrillas have been able to engage army inflicting heavy casual-
ties”404. Another cable noted that: "It is apparent that Cabañas [the leader of guerrilla activity 
in Guerrero, assassinated by the army in 1974] and his group operate freely in Guerrero. 
Implications are that local populace, for whatever reasons, continues to afford Cabañas cover. 
It therefore is problematical whether announced new [military] campaign will be any more 
successful than were previous efforts to capture Cabañas”405. As declassified memos show, 
it was becoming clear for the U.S. government that its Mexican counterpart lacked the coer-
cive infrastructure to address the more assertive by-products of its political and socio-eco-
nomic model.  
As I note below, a much more determined (and successful) effort to neutralise this growing 
threat was the U.S.-supported drug-eradication campaign Operación Condor. Deployed be-
tween 1977 and 1979 to hamper a surge in opium production in the Western sierras, the 
campaign set in motion two key dynamics in the subsequent evolution of drug enforcement 
in Mexico that again, challenge normalised perceptions of the aims and methods of the war 
on drugs. First, Condor was conceived from its inception as an instrument to increase the 
limited policing infrastructure available to the Mexican state to deploy counterinsurgency 
technologies and dirty wars on surging rural and urban mobilisation. Led by U.S. agencies, 
Condor shifted for the first time the ‘securitisation’ narrative from an alleged communist 
threat to the peril posed by drug trafficking. Second, Condor represented a highly successful 
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Operación Condor/Trizo: national security via selective drug enforcement  
Taking place amidst this counterinsurgency highpoint, the Mexican government launched in 
January 1977 a massive drug enforcement operation whose most important outcome, besides 
pushing back on peasant insurrectionary activity, would be an even tighter form of ‘integra-
tion’ of its security services and the drug market. Operación Condor/Trizo was a ground-
breaking, multi-year, U.S.-overviewed and U.S.-financed expansion of Mexico’s internal se-
curity capabilities aimed officially at suppressing poppy cultivation in the sierras406. Thirty 
helicopters, remote sensing devices, high-aerial reconnaissance equipment, computer termi-
nals, telecommunication kits, training programmes, intelligence, among other items, were 
allocated by the U.S. to the Mexican Army and the federal police under this new platform 
for binational cooperation407. According to Watt and Zepeda, the total number of aircraft 
supplied by the U.S. to Mexico under Condor was 76, with a total investment of $150 million, 
or about $700 million today408. Condor/Trizo involved the Mexican Army, the DFS and the 
PJF, as well as the DEA, the CIA and the State Department409. A key aspect to the operation 
was that it opened drug enforcement operations in Mexico to the direct participation of U.S. 
agencies for the first time410. Anticipating the kind of rationale behind the U.S.-supported 
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model for subsequent operations in South America. First, Mexico allowed aerial spraying of herbicides –the first time 
toxic compounds were used for drug eradication purposes. Second, it involved vast contingents of the military in a drug-
eradication effort (Reuter estimates that a third of Mexico´s army became involved in the effort). Third, Mexico had no 
domestic consumption of opioids: in contrast to other drug producing nations, it was a producing country, not a consumer. 
See Reuter, Peter, and David Ronfeldt. “Quest for integrity: The Mexican-US drug issue in the 1980s.” Journal of Intera-
merican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 34, no. 3, 1992, pp. 89-154. 
131 
 
militarised drug enforcement campaigns subsequently deployed in South America (espe-
cially in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru), the objectives of Condor/Trizo were not limited to 
drug enforcement. Rather, they embodied a concurrent and unequivocal effort to strengthen 
Mexico’s security capabilities and provide a platform to deploy ‘pacification’ campaigns 
against guerrilla movements and its social bases in the sierras. Condor/Trizo concentrated in 
regions that, accounting for the largest share of domestic opium production, hosted the most 
active guerrilla groups in the country (in the sierra of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Guerrero). As 
I document below, the covert use of Condor infrastructure to placate peasant discontent in 
the impoverished sierras was accompanied, in addition, by a successful effort to exert an even 
more centralised form of control over the drug economy, leading to the tightest phase in the 
‘integration’ of state and drug markets embodied by the PRI party. 
Condor focused mostly on the poppy-growing states of the Golden Triangle: Sinaloa, Chi-
huahua, Durango, as well as the state of Guerrero. Opium and heroin production in Mexico 
originated from temporary legalisation of poppy-cultivation during WW II to meet U.S. de-
mand. After the war, when the ban was re-established under U.S. pressure, opium-growing 
campesino families in Sinaloa (as well as Durango and Chihuahua) such as the Herreras, 
Quinteros, Treviños and Beltran refused to switch back to the survival economies of beans 
and maize. Beginning in the late 1960s, eradication campaigns against opium production 
were conducted by the Attorney General (PGR), the Policía Judicial Federal (PJF), and the 
Mexican military. The results of these campaigns were modest, selectively targeted and 
plagued with corruption. As noted above, opium production in Mexico was embedded in the 
governance systems of these regions, implicating governors and caciques411. In turn, the key 
brokers of this international heroin and cannabis market (representing until the mid-1970s a 
 
411 According to Aguilar Camín: “It was during the government of Leopoldo Sánchez Celis, between 1963 and 1969, 
when drug trafficking broke out openly in Sinaloa. Sánchez Celis began to surround himself with gunmen. These gunmen 
included Miguel Ángel Felix Gallardo (the head of the Guadalajara cartel)” (Aguilar Camín, Hector. “Narco-historias ex-
traordinarias”. Nexos, May 1, 2007 [own translation]. See also: Smith, Benjamin T. “The Rise and Fall of Narcopopulism: 




limited share of global output) were national and foreigner mafiosi operating under the pro-
tection of federal agencies like the DFS412. From the early 1970s onwards, this central in-
volvement in drug markets would not only grow in proportion to the size (and value) of the 
market but also in accordance to the growing social instability the security forces were called 
to police and repress. In other words, the PRI state provided its repressive bodies, already 
enjoying a well-established foothold in the market, with a ‘licence’ to integrate drug markets 
even tighter with federal bodies, as long as these bodies undertook the policing and repressing 
activity instructed by the regime.  
Mexico´s position in global heroin and opioid markets, limited until the early-1970s, began 
to quickly increase when the so-called French Connection –– the Turkish-Corsican network 
that had supplied heroin to U.S. markets since WW II –– was dismantled by the Nixon ad-
ministration413.  From Turkey and Marseilles, heroin production bound to the U.S. relocated 
to the sierras and laboratories of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua414. The share supplied by 
the French Connection to U.S. consumers fell from more than half in the late 1960s to 10% 
by 1972415. In parallel, Mexico’s share of the U.S. market increased from about one-third in 
1972 to about three-fourths in 1974416. By 1975, what had been throughout the 1950s and 
 
412 In particular, international operations of the Mexican drug markets were at this hour brokered by the U.S. mafia and his 
chief envoy to Mexico, Alberto Sicilia Falcon. Sicilia was a Cuban veteran from the Bay of Pigs invasion; a drug-traf-
ficker that, after the mafia’s collapse in Cuba, became part of the criminal syndicate of Cuban expats in Miami. Alberto 
Sicilia Falcon is often noted for its involvement in CIA-supported arms trafficking operations. His prominence in the pre-
1976 drug market in Mexico partly owes to his high-level social connections in Mexico, which included president Luis 
Echeverría’s wife, herself part of a family associated with drug markets in Guadalajara, the Zuno Family (See: Lupsha, 
Peter A. “Drug trafficking: Mexico and Colombia in comparative perspective.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 35, 
no. 1, 1981, pp. 95-115; Enciso, Froylan. Nuestra historia narcótica: Pasajes para (re) legalizar las drogas en México. 
Debate, 2015.). 
413 The drug ban only lasted 3 years in Turkey. Legalising it was the electoral platform of the party that displaced the mili-
tary junta. Its reintroduction, however, occurred under efficient controls to prevent deviations to illegal markets.  
414 The Nixon administration is commonly associated with the beginning of the War on Drugs. This belief is misplaced. 
On the international front, Nixon’s war on drugs consisted namely of pressing the French and Turkish governments to 
dismantle the transatlantic heroin trade. It also consisted of Operation Intercept, which nearly shut down the U.S. border 
with Mexico for 20 days to pressure the latter to tackle marihuana production in Sinaloa and Durango. Marihuana use was 
closely associated with the hippy movement. The criminalisation of drug consumption (at the domestic front) and the mili-
tarised approach to eliminate the “source” of the drug market (at the international front) is actually much closer associated 
with the subsequent `neoconservative´ administrations of Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, as well as George H.W. Bush. 
It was also under these administrations that drug trafficking was used as a proxy economy to advance the national interest 
in third world conflicts.      
415 For: Phil Buchen, Robert T. Hartmann, Jack March, Bill Seidman, Max Freidersforf, Jim Lynn, Brent Scowcrowft. 
From: Jim Cannon. Domestic Drug Abuse Report. Memorandum. September 30, 1975. Gerald Ford Presidential Library. 
416 Allen Heath, Edward. “Mexican Opium Eradication Campaign.” The National Security Archive, 1981. 
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1960s a small Mexican global output was providing between 50 to 80% of the drug consumed 
in the quickly expanding heroin market in America417. Aimed at reducing this opium and 
heroin spike, the Mexican government bowed to U.S. pressure by the end of 1976 and ac-
cepted to undertake the first militarised, binational eradication campaign conducted in any 
country. The result was Operación Condor/Trizo.  
Condor/Trizo operations were significant and involved military contingents whose size var-
ies according to sources418. The army seems to have contributed 15,500 soldiers (including 
1,225 officers and 20 generals)419 while the PJF devoted 350 agents (about 80% of its force). 
In any case, the operation involved unprecedented and massive troop deployments that turned 
drug enforcement at this hour into the key focus of the armed forces420. The success of the 
official aims of the programme (opium eradication by aerial spraying accompanied by troop 
deployments) was, according to both governments, impressive. In its first year, Condor/Trizo 
reported an eradication increase of 153% in comparison to the previous year (when the Mex-
ican government was conducting eradication operations alone)421. Eradication peaked at 
9,311 hectares in 1977, then dropped to 1,819 hectares in 1978, to only 863 hectares in 
1979422. According to figures provided by the Mexican army (likely exaggerated), 94% of 
cannabis crops in the region covered by Condor were destroyed between 1976 and 1980423. 
The effectiveness of Condor was felt in the streets. Retail prices of heroin in the U.S. rose 
from $1.15 per milligram in 1975 to $2.19 in 1979424. Heroin-related deaths in the U.S. de-
creased from 1,597 in 1976, to 597 in 1977, and to 471 in 1978425. By 1980, the National 
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) estimated that Mexico was no longer 
 
417 Idem. 
418 Pérez Ricart notes that “the absence of reliable information prevents us from determining the amount of military forces 
and MFJP operatives deployed for Condor. Estimations vary from just 1,200 men to more than 10,000”. See: Pérez Ricart, 
Carlos A. "Taking the War on Drugs Down South: The Drug Enforcement Administration in Mexico (1973–1980)." The 
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, vol. 34, no. 1, 2020, pp. 82-113.  
419 Camp, Roderic A. Generals in the Palacio: the military in modern Mexico. Oxford University Press, 1992.  
420 Idem. 







the first provider of heroin to U.S. markets, down from 80% before Condor426. The pro-
gramme, marketed strictly to the public as a drug enforcement operation, had nevertheless 
the additional mandate of counter-insurrection.  
The deployment of troops and agents under the Condor/Trizo programme had the concurrent 
and undisclosed aim of suppressing guerrilla organisations once and for all. The most brutal 
operations under Condor/Trizo concentrated in regions were guerrilla activity was densest. 
This included the highly impoverished Sierra Tarahumara in Chihuahua (where the 1965 
pivotal attack led by Arturo Gamiz on the Madera army barracks inspired guerrilla activity 
in Mexico), the equally poor sierra of Guerrero (hosting the most important guerrilla organ-
isation in the country, initiated in the late 1960s by Lucio Cabañas) as well as urban pockets 
of insurrection in Sinaloa. It is important to keep in mind that Condor/Trizo took place at a 
moment when U.S.-supported counterinsurgency operations in Latin America were reaching 
their highpoint. A CIA cable on Condor/Trizo puts this double standard unambiguously: 
“Army eradication [under Condor/Trizo] may devote as much effort to internal security as to 
eradication. […] [T]he Army also will take advantage of the eradication campaign to uncover 
any arms trafficking and guerrilla activities”. For this purpose, “[t]hey may seek helicopters 
and other equipment from the Attorney General [furnished by the U.S. government]”427. As 
journalist Craig Pyes noted, “Mexico’s acceptance of the program had more to do with ac-
quiring police hardware to suppress peasant insurgency movements than drug-enforce-
ment”428.  
According to a 1977 study by the Prisoners Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, 
90% of the 457 inmates in Culiacán (Sinaloa’s capital) apprehended under Condor were poor 
campesinos. Desaparecidos under Condor/Trizo ran in the hundreds429. An exodus from rural 
areas took place, capitalised by state actors involved in drug activities. Amnesty International 
 
426 Idem. 
427 CIA. “Mexico: Increases in Military Antinarcotics Unit.” Memorandum. Redacted. MD00404 MEX-
USA_C.P_DNSA, 1983. 
428 Pyes, Craig. “Legal Murders.” The Village Voice, June 4, 1979. See also: Cabrera, José L.G. 1920-2000 ¡El Pastel! 
Parte Uno. Palibrio, 2012.  
429  Cited in Pyes, Craig. “Legal Murders.” The Village Voice, June 4, 1979.  
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condemned the atrocities under Condor430. José Ángel Gómez Mora, a journalist from Sina-
loa, noted in his chronicles hundreds of ‘extra-judicial’ executions and the evictions of thou-
sands of peasants in the Sinaloan enclaves of Guasave, Guamúchil and Culiacán. Cases of 
documented torture committed under Condor against suspects included blows with the fists, 
pistol butts, rupture of eardrums, opening of the legs to its maximum extension, electric 
shocks, rape of women “by the normal and abnormal way”, introduction of nails to eyes and 
ears, torture of children and wives in the presence of detainees, crucifixions of suspects, 
among others431.  
Similarly, the profile of the army generals in charge of Condor points in the direction of an 
anti-insurgency campaign. Generals José Hernandez Toledo and Manuel Díaz Escobar, ap-
pointed to command the operation, were also the highest-ranking officers involved in the 
student massacres of Tlatelolco (1968) and Jueves de Corpus (1971). The commander of the 
military zone in Sinaloa, Alberto Quintanar López (appointed after the beginning of Condor) 
had been the head of Batallón Olympia, the paramilitary organisation responsible for initiat-
ing the Tlatelolco massacre. Quintanar is also noted in DGIPS reports for his involvement in 
the torturing of campesinos and the racketeering of drug traffickers during Condor. Memos 
note the presence of BEA members in Guerrero and Sinaloa during the operation432. In one 
of the few reports in the Mexican press documenting Condor abuses, journalist Francisco 
Ortiz Pinchetti described scenes more commonly associated with the Southern Cone than the 
PRI regime. “Y no Argentina. Ni Chile. Ni Uruguay. Es México: Sinaloa, Culiacán”433. These 
massive human rights violations, deployed by a war against an “internal enemy” and taking 
place under the excuse of drug enforcement, could only go unreported in a state whose con-
trol of the media was remarkable. In this respect, the single-party regime´s grip on national 
media outlets allowed it to keep these atrocities away from the public´s eye to an extent that 
other ‘Condor nations’ were likely incapable of achieving.  
 
430 Astorga, Luis. El siglo de las drogas: el narcotráfico, del Porfiriato al nuevo milenio. Plaza y Janés, 2005. 
431 Ortíz Pinchetti, Francisco, et.al. La Operación Cóndor. Editorial Proceso, 1981. 
432 Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales. Caja 1711-C, Exp. 14. Archivo General de la Nación. 
433 Ortíz Pinchetti, Francisco. “Sinaloa: un trasplante de Sudamérica. La Operación Condor, letanía de horrores.” Proceso, 
October 7, 1978. 
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In absolute contrast to the official narratives legitimising drug enforcement and the nascent 
war on drugs, Condor marked a key stage in the history of the drug racket in Mexico by 
enabling a much stronger involvement of central security agencies in all aspects of the busi-
ness. As noted before, by global standards, the pre-Condor drug market in Mexico had been 
quite small. Limited opium production in the sierras was racketeered by local powerbrokers 
such as governors and caciques. Transnational trafficking of Mexican heroin, representing a 
small portion of global output, was controlled by foreign mafiosi traffickers protected by the 
DFS. Condor changed this by providing an opening for a much deeper insertion of national 
institutions like the DFS and PJF in the racketeering of the drug market as a whole. The role 
of the PJF during Condor is a case in point. As noted by journalist Craig Pyes, “[w]hile lower-
level [PJF] agents pilfered to augment salaries [...], the field commanders – using access to 
comprehensive intelligence data supplied by American law enforcement – ran a sophisticated 
protection racket based on selective enforcement and arresting drug traffickers who would 
not pay”434. James Mann, a U.S. congressman who visited Sinaloa at the time representing 
the House Select Committee on Narcotics, expressed distress about the highly selective na-
ture of targeting under Condor, a practice that he referred to as a “lack of aggressiveness on 
certain areas”435.  
A notable embodiment of the extent to which Condor involved a parallel effort to establish a 
tighter protection racket in the drug business was its top law enforcement official, Carlos 
Aguilar Garza. In one memo, for example, the DFS reports that Aguilar extorted multi-mil-
lion bribes from apprehended Sinaloan drug traffickers to secure their release under Condor. 
Reports note how traffickers Alvaro Morales Beltran and Esteban Beltran Felix (from the 
notorious Beltran drug trafficking family) were released after paying bribes to Aguilar and 
his men436. Aguilar told the press that these drug traffickers had escaped custody437. Another 
confidential report notes that a major heroin-trafficker from Sinaloa referred to as “Onofre” 
 
434 Pyes, Craig. “Legal Murders.” The Village Voice, June 4, 1979.  
435 Idem. 




was freed by Aguilar in return for an extortion fee438. The report notes how Aguilar and his 
men offered him to reclassify his offence as ‘accessory’ to a crime (as opposed to drug traf-
ficking) in order to secure his release439. Aguilar demanded 3,000,000 pesos in return for the 
courtesy. The same report notes how the notorious drug trafficker Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, 
who would later become the second-in-command of the ‘cartel’ consolidated by Condor, 
‘escaped’ from Aguilar’s custody while in detention in Culiacán. Aguilar and his Condor 
team extorted leading drug traffickers with the knowledge of the Attorney General, the over-
seeing agency of the PJF. A DFS memo states: “When the attorney general was shown the 
arbitrariness and plundering of millions of pesos that [Aguilar and his team] obtained from 
drug traffickers, he promised to fire them, but instead simply rewarded them with [new] ap-
pointments”440. Furthermore, court records, confidential memos, reports by civil society and 
newspaper accounts document the vast number of desapariciones, acts of torture, executions, 
arbitrary detentions and systematic brutality employed by Aguilar and other top law-enforc-
ers in this ‘reorganisation’ of the racket. After less than a year of heading Condor, Aguilar’s 
position became untenable and was transferred by orders of the Attorney General to head 
drug enforcement in Tijuana (1978) and Nuevo Laredo (1980)441. There he continued to ex-
tort drug traffickers and invest in multiple businesses, including media outlets442. His deputy, 
Cruz López Garza, also widely involved in drug trafficking443, torture444 and executions445, 
was selected as his replacement in Condor446. In 1982, Aguilar joined the DFS by direct 
appointment of its director, José Antonio Zorilla Perez447 (widely regarded as being involved 
 
438 Idem.  
439 Idem. 
440 Idem. 
441 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 123. 
442 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 150. 
See also : Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. "Political protection and the origins of the Gulf cartel". A war that can’t be won: 
Binational perspectives on the war on drugs, edited by Tony Payan, Kathleen Staudt, and Z. Anthony Kruszewski, Uni-
versity of Arizona Press, 2013, p.138. 
443 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 3-4. 
444 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 7-34, 
121-122, 238-239. 
445 Pyes, Craig. “Legal Murders.” The Village Voice, June 4, 1979.  
446 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 125. 
447 "Los diarios de Carlos Aguilar, en poder de sus trabajadores". Proceso, August 12, 1989. 
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in drug trafficking himself, convicted for the murder of noted journalist Manuel Buendía in 
1985448). Aguilar was assassinated in 1992.  
The top hierarchy of PJF comandantes assigned to Condor was also involved in the extortion 
of drug traffickers and extensive human rights violations. These included Aguilar’s deputy, 
agent Cruz López Garza (cited in reports for his involvement in drug trafficking and tor-
ture449); agent Jaime Alcalá (coordinator of PJF agents in Condor, also noted in DFS memos 
for extorting drug-traffickers and committing acts of torture, subsequently appointed director 
of all PJF agents in the country450 and assassinated in gang-style fashion in Guadalajara in 
1977451), agent Roberto Martinez (head of information of Condor, assassinated in 1977 by 
orders of Aguilar according to confidential reports452) and agent Pablo Antonio Hernández 
(chief prosecutor under Condor, subsequently appointed delegado of the Attorney General 
in the border town of Hermosillo)453. A DFS report notes: “By these new appointments, this 
group of criminals, who have become multi-millionaires, closed the main drug trafficking 
axis in the country […] under the Attorney General”454. As I note below, these early protec-
tion rackets established by the PJF and DFS during Condor represented the germ of what 
later became the Guadalajara Cartel, a structure that came to represent the full ‘integration’ 
of Mexican security services and the drug market.  
The deployment of Condor in Sinaloa and the assertiveness of federal institutions took place 
in a context where local corruption associated with drug trafficking was getting out of con-
trol. Condor provided a channel endorsed by the Mexican government to ‘regulate’ a drug 
racket that, after 1978, would never cease to expand. Files at the Archivo General de la 
Nación contain numerous examples of the extent to which local political actors and institu-
tions were tapping into the expansion of the opium economy shortly before Condor. One 
 
448 Bartley, Russell H., and Sylvia Erickson Bartley. Eclipse of the Assassins: The CIA, Imperial Politics, and the Slaying 
of Mexican Journalist Manuel Buendía. University of Wisconsin Press, 2015. 
449 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 1-6. 
450 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 123. 
451 Idem. Also: Blancornelas, Jesus. “Fingimiento”. Zeta Tijuana, November 13, 2004.  
452 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 120. 
453 Idem, f. 123. 
454 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Carlos Aguilar Garza, legajo único, f. 124. 
139 
 
DGIPS memo notes, for example, that the assassination (in the early months of Condor) of 
Sinaloa’s deputy police chief, Alfredo Reyes Curiel, was the result of his extortionist prac-
tices over drug traffickers, pointing to a likely vendetta455. A news report notes that in Ma-
zatlán (western Sinaloa), the former mayor, along with the head of the local penitentiary, was 
found to be heading a “red de narcos”456. A DGIPS report notes that the state Attorney Gen-
eral “is releasing people who have been detained under drug trafficking charges” because “of 
the obligations he has contracted with the main drug traffickers” of the region457. Another 
report notes how members of the security team of Sinaloa’s governor, Alfonso Calderón Ve-
larde, assassinated an army major after the latter pointed out to his superiors the whereabouts 
of an ‘important’ drug stash belonging to them458. A CIA report on the situation in Sinaloa 
advises that the governor was highly upset because “the army has been patrolling a rich sub-
urb of Culiacán renowned as an enclave of drug traffickers”459. Similar reports also detail the 
way in which the heads of PJF clashed with the local authorities in disputes over the racket460. 
A local newspaper editorial asked: “What is the reason for the recent spike in violence in our 
state?”. To which it replies: “In good measure, to the violence generated by conflicts between 
law-enforcement institutions”.  
Towards ‘integration’ 
Condor led to what became a very pervasive or ‘symbiotic’ integration of federal security 
institutions and the drug market. Two dynamics taking place in the context of Condor en-
couraged this. First and foremost was the rising value of the transnational drug market in 
Mexico, going from a sleepy heroin and cannabis economy to a major drug trafficking corri-
dor and producer. DFS involvement in the transnational drug business during the PRI regime 
was, in fact, always proportional to the value of the market –– the underlining racketeering 
tendencies were always there, the true variable was the availability of low-barrier economies 
 
455 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Caja 1734 – C Exp. 16 Marzo 1973 – Diciembre 1978, f. 16. 
456 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Caja 1711 – C. Exp. 13 Enero 1977- Marzo 1972, f. 237. 
457 AGN. DFS-IPS Caja 1711 – C. Exp. 13 Enero 1977- Marzo 1972, f. 48. 
458AGN. DFS-IPS Caja 1711 – C. Exp. 13 Enero 1977- Marzo 1972, f. 70. 
459 CIA. RP ALA 77-047 Latin America: Regional and Political Analysis. July 7, 1977 (FOIA CIA-
RDP79T00912A000700010002-0).  
460 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Caja 1734 – C Exp. 16 Marzo 1973 – Diciembre 1978, f. 48. 
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to tap into. Beginning in the late 1970s, as social tensions began to increase and to transpire 
in growing guerrilla movement, the availability of a much larger pool of resources increased 
the state’s appetite to take over the drug economy. Likewise, by the early-1980s, Mexico’s 
growing importance as a transport corridor for cocaine shipments owned by Colombian car-
tels demanded guarantees that only national agencies and powerful powerbrokers could de-
liver. The surging value of the drug market and its increasingly transnational character called 
for a more pervasive involvement of central security agencies.   
The expansion of the drug trafficking racket in Mexico involved selective law enforcement, 
centralised racketeering and targeted killings undertaken in 1977 and 1978. These policies 
allowed the central government to consolidate a group of traffickers with a major foothold 
on the Mexican drug market working under the tutelage of federal institutions, in particular 
the DFS. As Charles Bowden notes: “When Condor wreaked temporary havoc in Sinaloa, 
many [heroin] traffickers left the state and settled in Guadalajara to the south. This migration 
was the origin of what became the Guadalajara cartel”461. Condor produced a consolidated 
group of protected Sinaloan drug traffickers commonly referred to as the Guadalajara Cartel. 
The group was headed by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo ‘El Padrino’ (a former PJF official) 
and his lieutenants Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, Rafael Caro Quintero, Juan José Esparragoza 
Moreno, Manuel Salcido Uzeta, Gilberto Ontiveros Lucero, Rafael and Juan José Quintero 
Payán. Most of these cartel-lieutenants were former gomeros [opium producers] from Sinaloa 
and Chihuahua. According to DEA-2, the Guadalajara cartel concentrated about 80% of the 
sale of heroin and had a near-monopoly over cocaine shipments transiting Mexico in the 
years that followed Condor462. The relocation of prominent gomero trafficking figures from 
Sinaloa to the city of Guadalajara (where they continued to control opium and cannabis pro-
duction in the western sierras and cocaine shipments coming from South America) under-
scored how political protection to drug trafficking involved expanding geographies. Protec-
tion to drug traffickers accelerated with the appointment of Javier Garcia Paniagua (1975-
 
461 Bowden, Charles. Down by the river: Drugs, money, murder, and family. Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 136. 
462 Interview with DEA-2. 
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1978) and Miguel Nazar (1978-1982) as DFS directors463. Top DFS agents such as Rafael 
Chao, Tomás Morlet464, Juan Esparragoza (top member of the Guadalajara cartel), Rafael 
Aguilar (top member of the Juarez cartel), among others, became leading racketeers in the 
drug business.  
This DFS/PJF racket established during Condor would survive, with adjustments, for the 
following two decades ––a highly notable achievement of the PRI state, to be missed in later 
periods. Until the late 1990s, the racket would allow the regime to both retain managerial 
authority of the drug business as well as generate a political economy in support of policing 
and security activity attached to presidential authority. The political exploitation of the drug 
economy in Mexico to fund security and para political structures was, importantly, a practice 
fully endorsed by the U.S. government. The exploitation of drug markets by regimes and 
great powers during this period continues to underline the importance that updated forms of 
co-opted banditry had at key junctures in global history. A DFS agent, interviewed by 
Padgett, notes the increased involvement of federal agencies in drug trafficking after Condor: 
If you analyze the effects of Operación Cóndor in Sinaloa, be-
tween 1977 and 1981, with the alleged purpose of dismantling 
drug trafficking, the only result was its “incorporation”, pro-
tected by the DFS and the army465. 
All ‘reconfigurations’ thereafter involved nefarious consequences for security in Mexico. 
The drug-trafficking landscape that followed Condor became characterised by large-scale 
concentrations of drug production in estates operated by Guadalajara figures, enabled by DFS 
agents. The most notable example in this regard is El Búfalo ranch: a twelve square-kilometre 
marijuana plantation in Chihuahua employing 12,000 campesinos in slave-like conditions 
 
463 Quezada, Sergio Aguayo. La charola: una historia de los servicios de inteligencia en México. Editorial Ink, 2014. 
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which remained active from the late 1970s to 1984466. According to some estimates, its pro-
duction was the equivalent of what the U.S. marijuana market consumed in one year467. The 
sheer size of the estate (the largest cannabis plantation ever recorded in the world) conveys 
the extent to which drug markets were operating under the tutelage of the Mexican intelli-
gence services. The ranch was directly overseen by DFS men, including the agency’s dele-
gate for the states of Chihuahua, Durango and Coahuila, Rafael Aguilar Guajardo468 - a DFS 
agent who subsequently established drug rackets in Tamaulipas and became the founding 
figure of the Juarez Cartel (assassinated in 1993)469. A retired high-ranking PJF agent with 
knowledge of DFS operations noted to me how under Condor,  
DFS agents were dispatched to regions that they knew well, 
usually regions where they came from. The exposure of DFS 
agents to racketeering opportunities in poppy and cannabis 
growing regions slowly began to consolidate a DFS racket 
over production and trafficking. Exposure to drug markets dur-
ing Condor led to the “rationalisation” of the drug market un-
der the DFS. The profits generated in this fashion came to rep-
resent the economic foundation of the agency. DFS and PJF 
agents where expected to live off by the money generated by 
extortion470.  
 
466 Astorga, Luis. El siglo de las drogas: el narcotráfico, del Porfiriato al nuevo milenio. Mexico City: Plaza y Janés, 
2005.  
467 Scott, Peter Dale, and Jonathan Marshall. Cocaine politics: Drugs, armies, and the CIA in Central America. University 
of California Press, 1998, p. 37. 
468 Bowden, Charles. Down by the river: Drugs, money, murder, and family. Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 149. The AGN 
contains a report on Aguilar’s drug trafficking activities, focused on the Northeast. However, the file was recalled again 
by the AGN. Flores Pérez cites the item as: AGN. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente “Organización de Tráfico de 
Drogas (Rafael Muñoz, Carmelo Avilés y Rafael Aguilar)”, DFS, legajo único, fojas 1-6.  
469 In Guadalajara, protection to the families also involved the services of governors Flavio Romero de Velasco (1977-
1983) and Enrique Álvarez del Castillo (1983-1989). Romero de Velasco was found guilty in 2005 of protecting drug traf-
fickers from the Juarez Cartel. Álvarez del Castillo, also widely suspected of providing protection to drug traffickers dur-
ing his tenure, was subsequently appointed Attorney General during the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). He was 
charged in the United States of providing protection to Guadalajara cartel members.  
Bowden, Charles. Down by the river: Drugs, money, murder, and family. Simon and Schuster, 2002; “Extortion of drug-
traffickers by authorities charged.” El Diario de Nuevo Laredo, CIA, March 21, 1981.    
470 Interview with PJF-1. 
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Events taking place in the Mexican drug business under Condor mirrored and connected with 
wider geopolitical strategies. From Afghanistan to Central America, the late 1970s and early 
1980s was a period in which transnational drug-running economies expanded again their role 
as paramilitary facilitators in Cold War theatres471. In Mexico, this instrumentalisation began 
to outdo its exclusively internal orientation and lay down support for broader security objec-
tives. A DEA investigation found that U.S. agencies indirectly extorted the Guadalajara Car-
tel (via the DFS) to channel funds and provide training infrastructure for Contra rebels in the 
early 1980s472. The Contra effort, aimed at deposing the socialist government in Nicaragua 
and at rolling back widespread social protest in Central America, tapped into transnational 
cocaine flows after the Reagan administration was prohibited by congress from allocating 
right-wing paramilitaries (the Contra) with weapons and economic support. As a result, and 
with the direct logistical support of America’s national security establishment, the Contra 
began to compensate this state of austerity with drug money. These covert mechanisms em-
ployed in Central America by the U.S. clandestine services were amply documented in an 
official investigation undertaken by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations473. In Mexico, the operation to 
support the Contra-effort enjoyed the support of the DFS474. The DEA investigation cited 
earlier was based on the testimony of Lawrence Victor Harrison, an employee of the Guada-
lajara cartel who witnessed the training of Contra operatives in Mexico475. Other DEA agents 
subsequently confirmed the use of the Mexican drug racket in the Contra effort (including 
the former head of DEA intelligence, Phil Jordan, interviewed for this thesis). The use of 
 
471 In Afghanistan, for example, opium markets and heroin laboratories protected by Pakistani intelligence under the anti-
communist islamist dictator Mohamed Zia-Ul-Haq served as the central political economy underlying the concurrent US-
supported mujahedeen efforts against the Soviet Union. See Haq, Ikramul. “Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspec-
tive.” Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 10, 1996, pp. 945–963. See also: Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Kicking the opium habit?: Af-
ghanistan's drug economy and politics since the 1980s: Analysis.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 6, no. 2, 2006, 
pp. 127-149; Coll, Steve. Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion 
to September 10, 2001. Penguin, 2005.  
472  DEA – 6. Report of Investigation. February 13, 1990. 
473 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Oper-
ations. “Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy.” Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 
OCLC 968628011, 1989, S. Prt. No. 100-165. 
474 DEA – 6. Report of Investigation. February 13, 1990. 
475 Idem.  
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drug money to fund paramilitary activity subsequently expanded into Colombia476. The cen-
tral involvement of the intelligence services in the cocaine market would be notable at dif-
ferent moments in the history of early 1980s Bolivia477 and 1990s Peru478.   
In 1985, after almost four decades of service, the time of the DFS was finally up. What can 
be regarded as the PRI’s Cold War ‘deep-state’ –– the equivalent to Turkey’s derin devlet, 
by far the most studied ‘dark’ network hosted at the heart of the state’s security apparatus –
– was ‘officially’ dismantled. For four decades, the DFS had successfully mediated between 
economies of banditry and the PRI state: by doing so, it had incorporated political economies 
that played key logistical roles in the consolidation and retention of power in modern Mexico. 
The DFS was the regime’s arm to locate and avert structural challenges –– challenges that 
crossed the line of what the state was able to co-opt or willing to tolerate. These internal 
challenges often transpired from labour movements, peasant organisations, student bodies, 
political foes, rural and urban guerrillas, and other forms of organised discontent challenging 
the top-to-down methods and orientation of governance under the PRI system. By the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the ‘integration’ of the transnational drug economy and the security 
apparatus was, by most accounts, complete. The liquidation of the DFS came after revelations 
brought about by the Camarena scandal: an obscure episode in which DFS agents abducted, 
tortured, and assassinated the DEA chief in Guadalajara, Enrique Camarena479. The scandal, 
 
476 A study about the links between the Colombian government and paramiliary bodies is: Mariner, Joanne, and Malcolm 
Smart, eds. The" Sixth Division": Military-paramilitary ties and US Policy in Colombia. Human Rights Watch, 2001. 
Findings by the International Criminal Court, pointing to the links between these paramilitary bodies and the Alvaro Uribe 
government, are summarized in Vieira, Constanza. “Colombia: International Criminal Court Scrutinises Paramilitary 
Crimes.” Inter Press Service, August 27, 2008, http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/08/colombia-international-criminal-court-
scrutinises-paramilitary-crimes/. A recent study on the historical links between paramilitarism, cocaine markets and the 
Colombian government, focused on the city of Barranquilla, is: Martinez, Franklin Martinez, Luis Fernando Trejos Ro-
sero, and Reynell Badillo Sarmiento. "Aproximación a las dinámicas del conflicto armado en la ciudad de Barranquilla. 
“Entre la marginalidad insurgente y el control paramilitar 1990-2006”." Papel Político, vol. 23, no. 2, 2018, pp. 1-22.  
477 Mitchell, Christopher. "The new authoritarianism in Bolivia." Current History, vol. 80, no. 463, 1981, p. 75. 
478 Allegations on the involvement of Peru's central security agency, SIN, in drug markets under the presidency of Alberto 
Fujimori are registered in a number of declassified memos, dating from 1996. For example: DEA. "Public allegations of 
drug trafficking against the head of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service (SIN) Vladirimiro Montesinos.” Report of 
Investigation, August 27, 1996, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB37/04-01.htm [last accessed 20 January 
2020]. 
479 The Camarena scandal is analysed in: Bartley, Russell H., and Sylvia Erickson Bartley. Eclipse of the Assassins: The 
CIA, Imperial Politics, and the Slaying of Mexican Journalist Manuel Buendía. University of Wisconsin Press, 2015. See 
also: Castellanos, Guillermo V. Historia del narcotráfico en México. Aguilar, 2013.  
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which echoes Turkey’s Susurluk scandal, sent shockwaves across the Mexican political es-
tablishment, exposing for the very first time to the public just how deep DFS involvement in 
criminal activity went480. The DFS director, Antonio Zorrilla (appointed after Nazar’s in-
volvement in contraband markets was made public) would subsequently be convicted on drug 
trafficking charges as well as for masterminding the assassination of Mexico`s top journalist, 
Manuel Buendía481. As Aguayo eloquently puts it, in the end, the DFS was devoured by its 
own practices: “La perversidad del método acabaría por destruir a sus oficiantes” [the 
method’s perversity destroyed its officiants]482. The Guadalajara Cartel attached to the DFS 
became more fragmented, although still tied by kinship relations, giving nevertheless way to 
a more fragmented ‘reconfiguration’ of the narco underworld. But drug trafficking in Mex-
ico, which thereafter expanded exponentially, remained nevertheless subordinated to the 
Mexican state. The next chapter documents how the PRI regime at this time resorted to an-
other agency, the PJF, to continue to tap into drug markets after the DFS was, supposedly, 
out of the picture. These protection rackets continued to support to a formidable extent the 
very operation of federal security in Mexico. A new liberalisation process, starting in 1982, 
would make the input of banditry crucial.  
Conclusions 
The centralisation of the PRI regime after WW II was accompanied by a process in which a 
new state, framed by austerity, expanded its security capabilities by establishing protection 
rackets in illegal activities. The present chapter documented the acceleration of this process 
 
480 DEA agent Celerino Castillo stated that Camarena “had been trying to get the US government to pressure Mexican 
authorities to take down the industrial-size marihuana plantations in Chihuahua and Sonora, but the Reagan administration 
was reluctant to do so because it was protecting Rafael Caro Quintero in return for his support to the Contras” (Bartley, 
Russell H., and Sylvia Erickson Bartley. Eclipse of the Assassins: The CIA, Imperial Politics, and the Slaying of Mexican 
Journalist Manuel Buendía. University of Wisconsin Press, 2015, p. 214). DEA former Intelligence chief, Phil Jordan, in 
interview with this thesis’s author, confirmed that the DFS was supporting Contra training camps. This was part of a 
larger pattern where transnational drug traffickers provided support for the realization of covert operations.   
481 For a thorough look into the murder of Buendía, see: Bartley, Russell H., and Sylvia Erickson Bartley. Eclipse of the 
Assassins: The CIA, Imperial Politics, and the Slaying of Mexican Journalist Manuel Buendía. University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2015. 
482  Quezada, Sergio Aguayo. La charola: una historia de los servicios de inteligencia en México. Editorial Ink, 2014, p. 
227 [own translation]. 
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in the mid-1970s — a period in which extended state involvement in contraband and trans-
national drug trafficking supported an agenda now focused on neutralising guerrilla activity. 
Central institutions and leading figures in the country´s security sector, tasked by the regime 
with responding to this growing threat, continued to be provided in parallel with a license to 
extort these markets. The ‘instrumentalisation’ of this updated version of co-opted ‘banditry,’ 
aimed at developing parapolice and paramilitary structures abroad, embodied a broader 
mechanism employed in other geographies of the Cold War by American intelligence. Le-
gality and illegality thus continued to blend in Mexico, but this blending served a process 
leading to the securitisation of peripheries and the neutralisation of internal enemies. A con-
ceptual remark worth noting at this stage is that the instrumentalisation of the bandit embod-
ied the key process generating the ‘dual’ or ‘deep’ state in Mexico. What tends to characterise 
these ‘parallel’ state structures is the necessarily covert and inevitably conspiratorial instru-
mentalisation of crime to advance security ends.  
The chapter also noted that, whereas the drug trafficking market of the pre-Condor era in 
Mexico (representing a limited share of global output) operated closer to regional powers and 
key trafficking figures operating under DFS cover, the much larger market that followed 
Condor witnessed an expansive presence of the federation´s security services over all aspects 
of the drug business. In this respect, the chapter argued that contraband and drug economies 
were at all times ancillary to the operation of these security processes. The expanded involve-
ment of the security services took place amidst a U.S.-sponsored expansion of Mexican se-
curity infrastructure serving, concurrently, dirty wars. What Barnes describes as the ‘integra-
tion’ of transnational drug trafficking and the PRI state reached, at this hour, its most thor-
ough manifestation. The formation of the Guadalajara Cartel in 1977 and 1978 represented 
an effort conducted by Mexican and U.S. intelligence to further align the protection racket 
with national security objectives. The official drug trafficking narrative socialised by the state 
after Condor, centred in picturesque and all-powerful ‘narcos’, successfully concealed the 
extent to which the state exploited the drug market to advance security objectives. The dis-
mantlement of the DFS in 1985 took place, precisely, when this cover was rendered no longer 
credible. In this regard, the chapter sought to shed more light onto the structural motives and 
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aims behind the instrumentalisation of drug economies, noting the extent to which the Mex-
ican experience, far from exceptional, resonated with broader patterns associated with Cold 
War conflict. As I note in the following chapter, the drug trafficking market that followed 
the dismantlement of the DFS, while still orbiting around the Mexican state, lost its associa-
tion with national security mandates, giving federal policing (now under neoliberalism) a 
more predatory orientation.  
Finally, the chapter underlined the overlooked importance of Operación Trizo/Condor in the 
history of the security services in Mexico. As Aviña noted, repression and drug enforcement 
shared a common root483. Whereas Condor is mostly remembered as a successful drug en-
forcement operation, evidence suggests that the U.S. government rather equipped Mexican 
security agencies with technology, equipment, training, aid, intelligence and other infrastruc-
ture to address its guerrilla problem. Finally, Condor was a landmark movement because it 
represented the testing ground for a policy that the U.S. would subsequently deploy in South 
America: the use of drug enforcement programmes to, discretely, expand the host´s ability to 
target internal dissent. Unsurprisingly, the actual result of U.S.-sponsored drug enforcement 
programs was, from Condor to Plan Colombia, not an enduring reduction in drug output but 
rather a lasting expansion of the host´s abilities to suppress internal dissent. In this regard, 
the chapter shed light onto the widely suspected but little understood processes and long-
term objectives that underline the militarisation of the war on drugs implemented originally 
under Condor/Trizo.  
  
 
483 Aviña, Alexander. "Mexico’s Long Dirty War: The origins of Mexico’s drug wars can be found in the Mexican state’s 
decades-long attack on popular movements advocating for social and economic justice." NACLA Report on the Americas, 
vol. 48, no. 2, 2016, pp. 144-149. 
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Chapter 4 - From national security to policing neoliberal chaos: the ‘commoditi-
sation’ of drugs 
Historically speaking, extortion rackets in illegal economies were ancillary to the develop-
ment of law enforcement in Mexico. The coercive mechanism underlying the state’s ability 
to secure property rights and shape the social order was contingent, paradoxically, on the 
enablement of criminal activity. This mechanism generated the crucial political economies 
permitting emergent capitalist classes to lay down the coercive bodies (formal and informal) 
necessary to ‘secure’ accumulation. As noted in the preceding chapters, the input of banditry 
into the construction of policing in Mexico was a notable characteristic in the historical evo-
lution of federal law enforcement under the single-party state. Unsurprisingly, the trajectory 
of Mexican policing reflects not only the history and phases of capitalist penetration but the 
contingency of capitalist accumulation to the instrumentalisation of criminals and bandits.   
Established in 1860, Mexico’s first ‘national’ policing body, Los Rurales, deployed the nec-
essary violence to secure the ‘primitive’ accumulation process implicated by the commer-
cialisation of agriculture, the end of the commons and the implementation of enclosures un-
der the liberal state. When completed, this process would leave 97% of the rural population 
without land484, 90% of the indigenous communities without traditional communal plots485, 
and make land concentration in Mexico the worst in the continent486. This period of general-
ised dispossession laid down the key driver of social antagonisms erupting in the Mexican 
Revolution. Like most policing bodies established in the transition to capitalist modes of 
production, the creation of the country’s first national policing body, Los Rurales, repre-
sented a form of ‘shock-troops’ to address the discontent, revolts and strikes generated by 
liberalisation, but also the vehicle to curb another notable manifestation of social alienation: 
the expansion of criminality. The coercion embodied by Los Rurales was directed in partic-
ular against rural protests and peasant invasions associated with the end of the commons, the 
 
484 Hamilton, Nora. The limits of state autonomy: post-revolutionary México. Princeton University Press, 2014. 
485 Klooster, Daniel James. Conflict in the Commons: Commercial Forestry and Conservation in Mexican Indigenous 
Communitites. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1997. 
486 De Ita, Ana. “Land concentration in México after PROCEDE.” Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Re-
form, edited by Peter Rosset, Raj Patel, and Michael Courville, 2006, pp. 148-64, p. 149. 
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expansion of haciendas, and the end of traditional rights487. Progressively, as the new capi-
talist spirit expanded into the cities, Los Rurales became a key instrument in the creation of 
wage labour. John Mason Hart notes that, between 1900 and 1910, Los Rurales became al-
most entirely invested in protecting textile factories, railways, communications, mines, com-
merce, as well as repressing peoples and towns opposed to the penetration of the commercial 
enterprise488. By 1905, 80% of Los Rurales was stationed in manufacturing centres with the 
sole purpose of keeping workers in line. American capitalists collected about half of Mex-
ico’s economic output during this period489. 
As expected, the undercapitalisation of Mexico’s economy made it impossible for the federal 
government to meet the costs of securing this particularly harsh transition, leading to the 
instrumentalisation of organised crime to form local and federal policing bodies. Paul 
Vanderwood describes Los Rurales as a "fusion" of criminal and police: "Half police, half 
bandits, Los Rurales operated both sides of the law. […] The common Mexican, who suffered 
under their hand […] despised and feared them […] while political detractors called it the 
bête noire of the dictatorship”490. The extra-legal 'rents' generated by Los Rurales, writes 
Vanderwood, were ultimately the economies that allowed for the maintenance of peace in a 
country experimenting a process of unprecedented transformation491. As López Portillo also 
notes, “[i]n practice, the Mexican police was created not to protect, but to control the popu-
lation, allowing it to repress, extort and bribe in exchange for loyalty to the authority”492.  
After the Revolution, which wiped out Los Rurales, the reconstruction of national policing 
services not only continued to rely on bandits but progressively integrated them into the 
security apparatuses of the emerging, single-party state. López Portillo notes how law en-
forcement in the early post-revolutionary period entailed “a close relationship between post-
 
487 See: Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. Volume 1, Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants and Volume 2, Counter-
revolution and Reconstruction. University of Nebraska Press, 1986, pp. 619, 679.  
488 Mason Hart, John. Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution. University of Califor-
nia Press, 1987. 
489 Idem. 
490 Vanderwood, Paul J. Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police, and Mexican Development. Rowman & Littlefield, 1992. 
491 Idem. 
492  “From US Embassy to Secretariat, Department of State.” Memorandum, August 25, 1976. [own translation]. 
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revolutionary political elites and organized crime, whereby the regime used its police 
forces—as well as other parts of its repressive state apparatus—to control and ‘tax’ organized 
criminals”493. It is not surprising, Müller argues, “that a broad variety of organized criminal 
activities flourished in post-revolutionary Mexico City due to police protection, frequently 
involving the police chiefs themselves, providing them and their organizations with addi-
tional income”494. As noted in previous chapters, police rackets under the early PRI period 
supported in important ways the policing services of the regime and its ability to repress 
“prodemocracy social movements and protesting students, not to mention squatters, itinerant 
street vendors, and others classified as socially undesirable”495.  
By the late-1980s, the disruption of patronage networks brought about by the (neo)liberali-
sation process and the concurrent collapse of PRI hegemony broadened the scarcity under-
lining the operation of police and expanded, at the same time, the prevalence of banditry. As 
Davis notes: “With the gradual erosion of the PRI regime, the police turned away from the 
same informal practices of patronage and rent seeking that in prior decades had kept them 
loyal to the state […] turning against citizens and criminal gangs for sources of income, add-
ing more impunity and violence”496. Scarcity, amidst a process of structural transformation, 
turned policing into a more socially predatory activity. In contrast to the racketeering of or-
ganised crime under the DFS, which was driven and contained by Cold War dynamics and a 
full-fledged corporativist state, the expansion of federal policing at this hour took place 
amidst political decentralisation and an accelerated collapse of living standards. These were, 
ultimately, the symptoms of a global process in which Mexico was to play a key part: the 
socialisation of neoliberalism in the developing world.  
 
493 Idem [own translation]. 
494 Müller, Markus-Michael. Public security in the negotiated state: policing in Latin America and beyond. Springer, 
2011, p. 84. 
495 Davis, Diane E. “Policing and Regime Transition From Postauthoritarianism to Populism to Neoliberalism.” Violence, 
Coercion, and State-Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico, edited by Wil G. Pansters, Stanford University Press, 2012, 
pp. 68-90, p. 80. 
496 Davis, Diane E. “The Political and Economic Origins of Violence and Insecurity in Contemporary Latin America: Past 
Trajectories and Future Prospects.” Violent Democracies in Latin America, edited by Daniel M. Goldstein, and Enrique 
Desmond Arias, 2010, pp. 35-62, p.50. 
151 
 
Building on access to former PJF and DEA officials who directly witnessed the events noted 
below, the chapter sheds light onto the fabrics, services and exchanges ‘generating’ policing 
during the transitional period that followed the 1982 debt crisis in Mexico and the implemen-
tation of neoliberal policies. Unlike other chapters, here I seek to flesh out the how, rather 
than the why, of high-level entanglements between the Mexican security apparatus and drug 
markets. The chapter will continue to note the extent to which these entanglements involved 
the highest hierarchies of the security institution of the Mexican state. Like drug markets 
under the DFS, systematic and multi-level racketeering obeyed less to the crooked ambition 
of a handful of officials and reflected a more fundamental logic attached to the securitisation 
of capitalist relations in Mexico ––a process leading to increasingly coercive and militarised 
forms of social control partly but significantly reliant on protection rackets in illegal econo-
mies.  
The Policía Judicial Federal and the plaza racket 
The key distinction in Mexico between regular police (policía preventiva) and judicial police 
(policía judicial) is that the former is tasked with preventing crime before it happens, while 
the latter is responsible for investigating a crime after it has happened497. As Davis notes, 
“[p]reventative police regulated the social, commercial, and aesthetic “order” of the city” 
while “the judicial police determined whether a crime had occurred and they alone held the 
power to legally sanction (i.e., arrest), investigate, and try or jail citizens for infractions of 
the law”498. The PRI regime established two forms of judicial police: a local judicial police 
in every state (appointed by the local governor, tasked with investigating non-federal of-
fences) and a federal police (appointed by the Prosecutor General and the President, tasked 
with investigating federal offences). The federal judicial police was called the Policía Judicial 
Federal (PJF).  
 
497 Sam López, Jesus Antonio. La policía judicial en Mexico. Biblioteca Central, UNAM, 1988.  
498 Davis, Diane E. “Policing and Regime Transition From Postauthoritarianism to Populism to Neoliberalism.” Violence, 
Coercion, and State-Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico, edited by Wil G. Pansters, Stanford University Press, 2012, 
pp. 68-90, p. 74. 
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Established in 1919 and dismantled in 2001 because of its extensive involvement in predatory 
criminal activity (it was replaced by the short-lived Agencia Federal de Investigación, or 
AFI, dismantled for similar reasons499), the PJF represented the closest body to a national 
police in Mexico500. Part of the Attorney General Office (PGR), the PJF was tasked with 
investigating, most specifically, drug-related offences. The Director-General of PJF, ap-
pointed by the Attorney General and the President, was responsible for assigning delegates 
or primeros comandantes to head PJF delegations in every state. These, in turn, assigned 
segundos comandantes (along with their teams) to head PJF sub-delegations in important 
cities. Given that drug enforcement represented the most important assignment of the PJF, 
the Bureau for Narcotics, the Bureau for Terrestrial and Aerial Enforcement, and the Bureau 
for Regional Deployment were regarded as key agencies501.  
Until the mid-1980s, the PJF was a relatively small agency, constituted by about 745 mem-
bers (1982)502. It was far smaller than the DFS, which counted over 3,000 agents at the same 
time503. When the DFS was disbanded in 1985 for its involvement in criminal activities, the 
largest share of DFS agents (2774) were simply transferred to federal law enforcement, which 
included both the PJF and its sister agency, the Policía Judicial del Distrito Federal (PJDF). 
The reassignment of agents involved in the ‘regulation’ of the national drug racket expanded, 
of course, the criminogenic tendencies already present in the judiciary’s enforcing arm. In 
contrast to the DFS, which extorted drug markets representing a relatively small size of global 
output, the transnational drug market available to the PJF (now involving the most valuable 
 
499 Libro Blanco: Agencia Federal de Investigación. 2000-2006. Procuraduria General de la República.  
500 According to Davis, the division of labour between preventative and judicial police, while creating considerable ambi-
guity and overlap in police functions, was quite purposeful. “Part of Carranza’s rationale for introducing this reform was 
his concern that many of the existent “preventative” police—those longstanding municipal police employed by the “free” 
municipios, where counterrevolutionary or nonrevolutionary sentiments often prevailed—were politically unsympathetic 
to his administration’s efforts to consolidate the government’s political hegemony. One way to limit renegade police influ-
ence and limit opposition forces from challenging the new state was to establish a separate police corps with legal arrest 
and prosecutorial powers, or the judicial police, who would answer directly to the state and its executive branch” (Davis, 
Diane E. “Policing and Regime Transition From Postauthoritarianism to Populism to Neoliberalism.” Violence, Coercion, 
and State-Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico, edited by Wil G. Pansters, Stanford University Press, 2012, pp. 68-90, p. 
75.) 
501 Interview with PJF-1. 
502 Archivo General de la Nación, DFS. Policía Judicial Federal. October 20, 1982. 
503 Quezada, Sergio A. La charola: una historia de los servicios de inteligencia en México. Editorial Ink, 2014. 
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commodity in global markets, cocaine) was immensely more valuable. The PJF racket al-
lowed the Mexican state to nevertheless establish a remarkable ‘institution of protection’ 
over the drug business lasting until the end of the century and, as noted by the literature504, 
allowing to a large extent for the remarkably pacific nature of drug markets in Mexico until 
recently505. Despite the massive growth of the transnational drug market, violence continued 
to be successfully curtailed under the PJF system506.   
The national, hierarchical management of the drug racket under the PJF came to be referred 
to as the sistema de plaza. PJF comandantes and their teams, appointed to head PJF delega-
tions in cities and states (or plazas) were licensed and expected by the federal government to 
extort the flow of transnational criminal goods taking place in their jurisdictions. According 
to PJF officials, the plaza was expected to: 1) Generate a regular rent for the leading PJF 
comandante in charge of the jurisdiction; 2) Generate a monthly quota that was channelled 
to higher-ranking members of the PJF and the Attorney General’s Office; 3) Generate a per-
manent cash flow in order to support, to a very large extent, PJF operational expenses in the 
jurisdiction; and 4) Establish and enforce acuerdos amongst drug traffickers and between 
drug traffickers and the state in order to keep operations smooth and far from newspaper 
headlines. The plaza system was particularly important at the U.S. border, where illegal com-
modities reached their highest value, as well as in regions associated with the production and 
transport of contraband, migrants and drugs. Plazas such as Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Ojinaga, 
Hermosillo, Culiacán, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Tapachula, Chetumal and Mexico City 
were considered the most relevant. All these processes, of course, represented ancillary 
mechanisms generating ‘security’ for a rapidly transforming ‘neoliberal’ society. 
Poppa underscores how the term plaza in the 1980s meant something different from what it 
means today507. Today, plaza refers to a particular geography where a drug organisation is 
dominant (for example: “the Gulf cartel is in control of the plaza of Matamoros”). In the late-
 
504 Snyder, Richard, and Angélica Durán Martínez. “Drugs, violence, and state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico 
and Colombia.” Colombia Internacional, vol. 70, 2009, pp. 61-91.  
505 Idem.  
506 Idem. 
507 Poppa, Terrence E. Drug lord: The life and death of a Mexican kingpin. Pharos Books, 1990.  
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1980s, however, plaza referred to something else in the law enforcement and criminal jargon: 
it referred to the police actor holding the concession to run the narcotics racket508. Poppa’s 
use of the term ‘racket’ in his description of the plaza system is significant in that it also shifts 
the focus of attention from the drug organisations themselves to the institutional and political 
structures that enabled them. This was a system in which drug traffickers operated under “an 
authority or authorities with sufficient power to ensure that (they) would not be bothered”509. 
As Flores Pérez notes, the system operated above the interests of particular drug trafficking 
groups, and even above the interests of individual law-enforcers510. The drug trafficker under 
the plaza system was a relatively dispensable administrator that could be replaced at any 
time. Replacing narcos was the result of political convenience, public exposure, and U.S. 
pressure. Like the Leopard, the system was constantly changed and tweaked in order to re-
main in place, precisely because of the extent to which this system provided a key support 
for the authoritarian deployment of structural policies in Mexico. The plaza system resem-
bled a system of franchises whereby ‘licenses’ to generate income, while allocated to appen-
dant actors, allowed nevertheless for the operation of the system as a whole. Guillermo Val-
dés, former head of Mexican intelligence, labelled the plaza system as one of participación 
accionaria or ‘shareholding’511. In contrast to the DFS system, where the ‘politics’ driving 
drug markets reflected the national security predicaments of a coherent state, the plaza system 
under the PJF became a much more commoditised form of racketeering market whose pur-
pose was extracting money to support, most particularly, the policing apparatuses of an in-
creasingly neoliberal and de-centralising polity.  
 
508 Idem, pp. 41-42. 
Poppa explains how, to stay in good graces, a plaza holder in those days had a dual obligation: to generate money for its 
protectors and to lend his intelligence gathering activities by fingering the independent operators, those narcotics traffick-
ers and drug growers trying to avoid paying the necessary tribute to the plaza holder (Poppa, Terrence E. Drug lord: The 
life and death of a Mexican kingpin. Pharos Books, 1990, p. 43).  
509 Idem, pp. 41-42. 
510 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. El estado en crisis: crimen organizado y política: desafíos para la consolidación demo-
crática. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2009.  
511 Interview with Guillermo Valdés Castellanos, director of the Centro de Investigaciones en Seguridad Nacional 
(CISEN) from 2006 to 2012.  
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The configuration of a plaza began with the appointment of a state delegado. A down-pay-
ment by this primer comandante to ‘purchase’ a delegación “could reach millions of dol-
lars”512. According to PJF-1, being appointed to head a high-value location in the 1990s often 
involved paying a substantial ‘purchasing’ fee to the Bureau of Regional Deployment. The 
price-tag to purchase a plaza was expensive as it not only enabled the taxing of drug com-
modities, human trafficking and contraband of goods but allowed the license-holder to ‘sell’ 
positions in lower-echelons of the delegación at considerable prices. The plaza system was 
all about appropriating criminal revenues in order to make these investments cost-effective 
and generate agreed quotas. 
The head of the plaza was the PJF delegado, which was re-
ferred to as “El Yankee” (or “El Y”). Under the Yankee, and 
appointed by him, you had the sub delegates, assigned to cities 
and regions. The subdelegados were referred to as “Los Eq-
uises”. Equises often brought with them their own operational 
personnel, people that they knew well and had work with in 
other places. These lower PJF operatives were referred to as 
“Los Zetas”. Zetas were in charge of collecting money from 
narcos, arresting those who didn’t pay, controlling the madri-
nas (informants and extra-judicial enforcers) and making ar-
rests.  
Zetas were the conduit for collecting money from all kinds of 
criminal activities, not only from drug trafficking. This in-
cluded collecting money from the pollos (human traffickers) 
and fayuqueros (contrabandists). These two economic activi-
ties represented immense rackets: a single month of “taxes” 
 
512 Interview with PJF-2. See also: Blancornelas, Jesus. El Cartel. Debolsillo, 2004.  
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over fayuqueros and pollos in a border plaza could easily reach 
a million dollars513. 
Zetas were expected to generate rents to support their livelihood and channel income to their 
superiors514. As López Rivera and Botello note, failing to do so generally leads to being ‘re-
assigned’ to a puesto where the chances of extortion are minimal515. After securing the 
monthly quota, the surplus that Zetas collected from local extortion rackets was theirs to take. 
The monthly rent reported by the Zetas to the higher ranks (the subdelegados and delegados) 
was referred to as “poner la polla”516. The leading Zeta on the ground (referred to as “el 
poste”) collected the polla and delivered it to the subdelegado, who in turn reported a quota 
to the delegado responsible for the plaza. Finally, the delegate, or Yankee, was responsible 
for “sending the ̀ ’infamous´ maleta [suitcase] to the PJF and the Attorney General headquar-
ters in Mexico City” on a regular basis517. Pimentel notes how PJF directors at this hour 
“regularly sent their immediate subordinates in official PGR [Attorney General’s Office] air-
craft to pick up the suitcases filled with money and gifts obtained from the organized crime 
elements by the PGR/PJF “plaza” holders throughout Mexico”518. 
Although in all likelihood the system did not operate as smoothly and regularly as portrayed 
in these testimonies, it involved a considerable degree of routinisation, demands and expec-
tations socialised across the PJF hierarchy and considered “normal” by everyone. The fact 
that, as noted in multiple interviews, PJF officials were left to ‘fend for themselves’ under-
lines that extortion was expected to support the operation of the agency by those in power. 
Zetas on the ground were expected to pay for operational costs (down to the very gasoline of 
 
513 Interview with PJF-2. 
514 The term ‘zeta’ is commonly employed in the Mexican security lingo to denote any law enforcement or army-official 
in possession of a low, operative rank. The term would be used in 2003 by a group of deserters from the Mexican Army to 
brand their paramilitary organisation, Los Zetas. The choice in name noted the former operative army rank of those who 
constituted the original group of the organisation. Los Zetas became the paramilitary arm of the Gulf cartel in 2003, and 
became an autonomous drug trafficking organisation in 2006. The federal government’s effort to eliminate this group trig-
gered the Drug Wars in Mexico in 2007.  
515 Botello, Nelson A., and Adrian López Rivera. Policía y Corrupción. Plaza Y Valdes, 1977.  
516 Interview with PJF-2. 
517 Interview with PJF-2. 
518 Pimentel, Stanley. "Mexico's legacy of corruption." Menace to society: political-criminal collaboration around the 
world, edited by Roy Godson, Routledge, 2017, pp. 175-197, p. 184. 
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their vehicles) by virtue of extortion rackets519. Cars used by PJF officials, for example, were 
often coches chocolate: vehicles stolen in the U.S., legalised clandestinely by the national 
registry and presented as ‘gifts’ by drug traffickers to PJF officials520. “PJF officials were 
particularly fond of Grand Marquises”521. A frequent practise mentioned in the interviews 
was the appropriation (and selling) of drug seizures. This mechanism was particularly attrac-
tive because it represented an extraordinary income for PJF officials as well as a ‘photo-
shoot’ opportunity to show results522. Like racketeering mafiosi, life as a PJF field-officer 
was thus determined by a constant need to obtain and generate money through illegal means 
to make a living and comply with quotas. Interviewed DEA agents who collaborated with 
PJF officials in the 1990s similarly recall how PJF officers were provided “close to zero” 
funds to undertake their responsibilities. PJF officials often accepted to carry out “dirty jobs” 
for DEA field-officers in return for money. Jobs undertaken by DEA agents went from gen-
erating intelligence through brutal means to conducting arbitrary arrests523. DEA-1 noted, for 
example, how he would leak information to PJF officials about drug traffickers knowing that 
the leak would probably result in a killing. Of course, DEA agents knew that  PJF agents 
were involved in drug trafficking, torture and murder, “but we needed to build cases”524. 
DEA agents were well aware, already at this relatively early period, of the existence of a 
large number of mass graves kept secret from the public525.  
Protection to drug traffickers involved different services provided by PJF officials. One was 
to escort drug shipments via land and air. PJF duties were based on the number of kilos 
trafficked. These operations involved coordinating the actions of multiple actors and bureaus.  
The Zetas on the ground stopped vehicles at retenes (check-
points) in key land routes heading to the border. Postes were 
the highest-ranking officers at a particular checkpoint. Postes 
 
519 Interview with PJF-1 and PJF-2. 
520 Idem.  
521 Idem. 
522 Interview with PJF-2 and DEA-2. 
523 Interview with DEA-2. 




were the operational link to the subdelegación; the officers in 
charge of selecting vehicles for inspection. 
Shipments were given a keyword for safe passage in advance. 
During my time in PJF, one such password was, for example, 
‘Jaguar’. Jaguar, in this case, referred to the persona of the PJF 
delegado. Shipments had to be cleared in advance by the del-
egado. Operators lacking protection would be arrested by the 
poste. Protected vehicles were given what we called viada 
(pass)526. 
With the expansion of the cocaine market in Mexico, air shipments became by the late 1980s 
the preferred method for moving drugs from South America. This increased the tactical im-
portance of PJF radar operators, who ran the most sophisticated radar system in the coun-
try527. PJF-1 and PJF-2 recall the constant ‘switching off of radars’ undertaken at the Bureau 
for Terrestrial and Aerial Enforcement at PGR headquarters. Trafficking by air also involved 
a staggering number of clandestine airfields in remote locations protected by PJF officials528. 
PJF-1 noted how, when deemed necessary, PJF comandantes would even close highways in 
order to enable them as temporary landing airfields529. DEA-1 noted how, while operating 
undercover in Ciudad Juarez, he witnessed how PJF comandantes emptied planes loaded with 
cocaine in the city’s airport and shipped money back to Mexico City’s headquarters.530  
Importantly, the plaza system often involved face-to-face interaction between major drug 
traffickers and high-ranking members of the PJF and the Attorney General Office. The un-
ambiguously authoritarian character of the regime explains partly why these bold entangle-
ments remained undisturbed and undisclosed despite remaining in place for so long. PJF-1 
recalls, for example, how he personally escorted an Attorney General to hotels in the early 
 
526 Interview with PJF-1. 
527 Interview with PJF-1 and PJF-2.  
528 Idem.  
529 Interview with PJF-2. 
530 Interview with DEA-1. 
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1990s to meet directly with major drug traffickers. He noted that: "When the General Prose-
cutor had an appointment with a drug trafficker, we performed barridos (sweeps) in order to 
detect cameras and microphones in the hotel room where the meetings took place”531. These 
meetings were used to establish both the terms of operation as well as the terms of exchange. 
PJF-1 notes, for example, how he personally accompanied the head of the PJF (renamed AFI 
at that point), Genaro García Luna, to meet directly with the head of the Beltran Leyva cartel 
in a foreclosed highway in the early 2000s532. As noted in the introduction, García Luna was 
charged in 2019 by the U.S. government for protecting major drug traffickers while heading 
the federal police. Importantly, before heading the AFI, García Luna had directed counterin-
surgency efforts focused on guerrilla activity in Guerrero (in particular, the organisations 
Ejército Popular Revolucionario, Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente and Fuer-
zas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo)533. García Luna was subsequently the chief archi-
tect of President Felipe Calderón’s war on drugs from 2006 to 2012.  
While not every PJF director under the PRI regime partook in these collaborations, “money 
was there for the take”534. It came down to the director to partake or not in these businesses, 
but the racket remained in place with the knowledge of the political elite and regardless of 
the involvement of a particular actor535. When asked if it would have been possible to work 
around these racketeering arrangements and conduct his official obligations with adherence 
to the law, PJF-2 smiled and shook his head. “Llegan con 4,000 dólares – no pesos, dólares” 
[“they come to you with 4,000 dollars – not pesos, dollars”]536. He notes that he was amongst 
those who drew a line and indulged in the strict minimum to be able to carry out his job. But 
he also points out that broad and systemic involvement of PJF officials at every level made 
it impossible for agents to conduct themselves legally. The operational orientation of PJF 
was much more responsive to these deeply rooted informal practices than to the personal 
 
531 Interview with PJF-2. 
532 Idem.  
533 Montemayor, Carlos. "Los movimientos guerrilleros y los servicios de inteligencia (Notas reiteradas y nuevas conclu-
siones)." Seguridad nacional y seguridad interior. Colección: Los grandes problemas de México, edited by Arturo Alva-
rado and Mónica Serrano, 2012, p. 49.  
534 Interview with PJF-2. 
535 Interview with PJF-2. 
536 Idem.  
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agenda of an honest agent or sincere attempts of reform. As Sabet notes, attempts to reform 
the police “do not occur in a vacuum but within a dense network of pre-existing institutional 
rules, including persistent informal rules that […] might contradict reform efforts”537. As 
noted by President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), who also shook his head when asked 
if corruption was avoidable in Mexico’s system of governance538, or President José López 
Portillo (1976-1982), who blatantly confided to a U.S. ambassador that law enforcement and 
drug trafficking were per necessity linked to one another539, PJF and DEA agents interviewed 
for this thesis noted the extent to which racketeering was the system supporting policing 
activity. Whatever honest top-down initiatives were undertaken to target these practices in 
federal law enforcement clashed with pre-existing practices and institutional routines going 
back to the DFS and found more amply entrenched in the Mexican political system. 
Evidence in the 2019 trial in the U.S. against drug-lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán illus-
trates the persistent relationship between PJF delegados (‘Yankees’) and drug traffickers in 
border plazas. Although this particular evidence involves the PJF’s successor, the Agencia 
Federal de Investigación (AFI), it is illustrative of the relationships between federal drug 
enforcement and drug traffickers under the plaza system. In a recorded phone call used as 
evidence in the trial, Guzmán discusses the drug business with his local representative at the 
border-state of Baja California. Guzmán is informed by his lieutenant that a new AFI dele-
gate, or Yankee, has been appointed by Mexico City’s headquarters to oversee the state. 
Guzmán’s representative tells his patron that he was paying a monthly fee of $80,000 dollars 
to the former Yankee. “The Yankee never picks up the money directly”, “the money is col-
lected by the AFI group"540. The representative also notes to Guzmán that AFI field-officers 
 
537 Sabet, Daniel. Police Reform in Mexico: Informal Politics and the Challenge of Institutional Change. Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, p. 40. 
538 Entrevista a Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. Carmen Aristegui, Noticas MVS Radio, 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSnbXr0KZ20.  
539  “From US Embassy to Secretariat, Department of State.” Memorandum, August 25, 1976. When questioned by the 
U.S. ambassador on his choice of Arturo Durazo (a noted racketeer) as head of Mexico police, the president noted “that 
law enforcement and illegal activities frequently intertwine, not only in Mexico but in other countries as well”.   
540 The recorded conversation between Guzmán and the Yankee was made by Frontera Noticias channel, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkJQsfcubss. See also: Belsasso, Bibiana. “Cómo espiaba y era espiado “El Chapo”.” 
La Razón, January 13, 2019. 
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operate in close synchronicity with the cartel. The problem, he tells Guzmán, is that the re-
cently-appointed Yankee, “who is now receiving his monthly fee from us” intends to rotate 
the AFI personnel deployed in the plaza. He explains to Guzmán that the adjustment is in-
convenient because things already run smoothly the way they are. After noting to his repre-
sentative that he has been paying extortion fees to the Policía Federal, which he refers to as 
‘Los Azules’, Guzmán requests to speak directly with the Yankee. The Yankee, who is stand-
ing next to Guzmán ’s representative, is handed over the phone. After exchanging courtesies, 
Guzmán asks the Yankee to please refrain “from removing the AFI operativos that are cur-
rently ‘working’ the plaza”. Guzmán tells him that he has "all his team's support" to keep the 
plaza in peace. The Yankee agrees to retain the AFI Zetas already acquainted with the oper-
ation of the plaza. The episode again illustrates the direct relationship that plaza comandantes 
established all along with major drug trafficking figures as part of a hierarchical protection 
racket endorsed by the country’s top security officials and operated by regional delegates. As 
Serrano notes: “In this regulatory framework, the local and the federal judicial police, not 
criminals, were the key actors controlling the plazas. These were the strategic transit points, 
which served as checkpoints for the collection of bribes, the monitoring of the movements of 
criminal actors, and ultimately the surveillance of the drug market”541. She adds how, “[i]n 
return for “taxes” paid to these agencies, criminal actors were provided with protection and 
their market activities were effectively regulated”542.  
It is important to note that, like the DFS before it, the PJF never enjoyed an absolute monop-
oly on contraband or drug trafficking. One of the most important characteristics of the plaza 
system, especially after the mid-1990s, is that it involved players from different institutions. 
Federal customs, for example, played an important role in racketeering the contraband of 
goods, while the army was better suited to tax the harvesting of cannabis and opium poppies. 
Poppa notes how, for decades, the FBI, DEA, Customs, Border Patrol, INS (Immigration and 
Naturalization Service), ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) and 
 
541 Serrano, Mónica. “States of violence: State-crime relations in Mexico.” Violence, coercion, and state-making in twenti-
eth-century Mexico: The other half of the centaur, edited by Wil G. Pansters, Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 138.  
542 Idem, p. 138. 
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CIA, among other agencies, had compiled intelligence on the implication of Mexican police, 
politicians, bureaucrats, government agencies and the military in organised criminal activi-
ties543. However, PJF’s size and jurisdiction over federal enforcement placed PJF command-
ers and those appointed by them in a central position to ‘regulate’ the extremely profitable 
transnational drug business, especially in valuable border plazas. This involved control over 
the use of federal land routes to ship cargo, aerial corridors, flights, clandestine airports, radar 
systems, border crossings, among other key security infrastructure paradoxically legitimised 
by an alleged ‘war’ on drug trafficking544. The relative but important success of the PJF in 
its handling of the transnational drug market continued to bring stability and peace to an 
unrelentingly expanding drug market. As Snyder and Durán Martínez note, “the relationship 
between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection: if state-sponsored 
protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful”. The breakdown of state-sponsored 
protection rackets is often the direct cause of the increase in violence545.   
Policing neoliberalism 
PJF-1 and PJF-2 noted how, by the middle of the 1990s, extortion under the PJF began to 
change in at least two important ways. First, PJF officials assigned to plazas commenced to 
partner with local politicians in the logistics of transnational drug running. Additional re-
search needs to be undertaken to understand the drivers that led federal police officers to 
liaison with local authorities, but a plausible factor behind the empowerment of local politics 
is the increasingly de-centralised political system in Mexico that followed neoliberal reforms 
and its concomitant alteration of the national political order. According to PJF-1, the agency 
began at this time “to apalancar [gear] its operations at the municipal level […] involving 
and partnering directly with local politicians to run drug markets”546. Akin to tactics em-
ployed by Los Zetas cartel years later, “newly appointed PJF commanders sent vanguard 
 
543 Poppa, Terrence E. Drug lord: The life and death of a Mexican kingpin. Pharos Books, 1990, p. 321. 
544 Interview with PJF-2. 
545 Snyder, Richard, and Angélica Durán Martínez. “Drugs, violence, and state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico 
and Colombia.” Colombia Internacional, vol. 70, 2009, pp. 61-91. 
546 Interview with PJF-2. 
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group [estacas] to their new plazas in order to negotiate terms with municipal authorities”547. 
In other words, according to him, it was the PJF structure in the states (who effectively con-
trolled the drug market at this time) rather than the drug traffickers (who remained subordi-
nate players) who opened the door to local politicians seeking a piece of an expanding drug 
business. In any case, involvement in transnational drug trafficking at the local level, which 
remained limited until this period, began to slowly overflow the regime’s ability to centralise 
extortion.  
Second, by the mid-1990s, extortion rackets operated by the PJF began to diversify beyond 
pollos, fayuqueros and narcos. The political economy of the federal security services at this 
time, expanding into kidnapping, theft and extortion, reflected the increasingly socially pred-
atory orientation of the police. The erosion of the single-party regime, generated less by an 
alleged ‘political opening’ and more by the structural undermining of the ‘irrational’ obsta-
cles to capital accumulation in which the political structure had rested, affected also the pat-
ronage networks that supported the everyday economies of the police548. In addition, the most 
severe economic crisis in the history of Mexico, taking place in 1995, not only brought more 
scarcity to law enforcement but, in parallel, generated effervescent criminality in need of 
protection. As noted earlier, times of crisis and the end of historical cycles like the one that 
Mexico certainly experienced in 1995 tend not only to increase the prevalence of banditry 
(namely because of economic dislocation and state collapse) but also the extent to which the 
emerging regime co-opts bandit economies to support its security apparatus. The mid-1990s 
were marked by an unprecedented ‘crime epidemic’ in kidnapping, armed theft and bank 
 
547 Idem. 
548  Davis, Diane E. “The Political and Economic Origins of Violence and Insecurity in Contemporary Latin America: Past 
Trajectories and Future Prospects.” Violent Democracies in Latin America, edited by Daniel M. Goldstein, and Enrique 
Desmond Arias, 2010, pp. 35-62, p.50. 
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robbery549, vividly remembered by Mexicans today, widely known to have involved protec-
tion networks operated by the regime´s main security body, the PJF and the PJDF550. Percep-
tively, Martínez de Murguía labels these kinds of crimes as ‘police crimes’ for they almost 
invariably require manpower, weapons and a know-how that is pretty much exclusive to the 
police551. Federal law enforcement began to employ auxiliaries, or madrinas, to handle a 
growing criminal portfolio. "Comandantes informally contracted criminals as auxiliaries and 
enforcers who, without receiving any salary, had an open letter to obtain resources illegally, 
almost always through extortion”552. As noted by PJF-2, “until [President] Salinas, major 
crime had been contained by this system of collusion. Thereafter, the PJF began to abaratarse 
[to cheapen]”553. Looking back, Oppenheimer notes how the use of PJF and PGR to ‘regulate’ 
drug markets in the late 1980s had placed these institutions in the course to racketeer new 
activities when necessity and opportunity presented themselves –– a prospect fully material-
ised in the mid-1990s554. Also referring to the deeper historical roots of this process, a former 
DFS agent (close to DFS director Francisco Gutierrez Barrios) reminded journalist Humberto 
Padgett that the DFS officials incorporated into the PJF after 1985 were technical experts in 
extra-judicial executions, trafficking of drugs and desapariciones555. The difference between 
kidnapping under the DFS and kidnapping under the PJF, the agent explained, “is that, while 
the first sought to generate intelligence, the second simply sought to generate money”556. 
This observation points to an idea noted earlier, which argued that an important difference 
between the DFS and the PJF racket in the drug business, especially after 1995, was the 
national security mandate that contained and gave ‘purpose’ to the first and the much more 
 
549 See: Alvarado, Arturo et al. “Respuestas vecinales a la inseguridad pública en la ciudad de México.” Diálogo Interna-
cional para la Reforma Policial en México, El Colegio de México, July 22-23, 2004. The rise of crime is also analysed in 
Pansters, Wil G., and Héctor Castillo Berthier. "Violencia e inseguridad en la ciudad de México: entre la fragmentación y 
la politización." Foro Internacional, 2007, pp. 577-615. Pansters and Castillo note the strong association between the eco-
nomic crisis of Salinismo and the explosion in crime rates in Mexico City.  
550 The extent to which these crimes operated under the protection of the PJF and the PJF-DF has been amply documented 
in Padgett, Humberto. Jauría: la verdadera historia del secuestro en México. Grijalbo, 2011.  
551 Martínez de Murguía, Beatriz. La policía en México: ¿Orden social o criminalidad? Mexico City, Planeta, 1999.  
552 Padgett, Humberto. “Cuando los tigres del narco se soltaron.” Sin Embargo, September 4, 2013 [own translation]. 
553 Interview with PJF-2. 
554 Oppenheimer, Andres. Bordering on chaos: Mexico's roller-coaster journey toward prosperity. Little, Brown and 
Company, 1998. 
555 Idem. 
556 Padgett, Humberto. “Cuando los tigres del narco se soltaron.” Sin Embargo, September 4, 2013 [own translation]. 
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commoditised ethos that characterised the policing ethos of the second. These different ori-
entations are partly explicable by the contrasting historical contexts and policing mechanisms 
belonging to each period.  
The PJF was becoming, at this point, the nucleus of what would later become Mexico’s na-
tional police. It represented the institutional launching-pad for the expansion of law enforce-
ment that followed thereafter, as well as the institutional basis for the subsequent militarisa-
tion of law enforcement more generally. A white paper by the Mexican government in 2007 
found that more than half of the 3,500 agents of the Agencia Federal de Investigación (suc-
cessor to PJF) were involved in organised crime557. Likewise, after dozens of interviews with 
federal judiciales (judicial agents in the Federal District), Azaola found that joining the judi-
cial police involved often an automatic admittance to some form of racketeering: “The ma-
jority of judiciales recognized that, had they not entered the police, they wouldn’t [have] had 
become involved in organized crime”558. Azaola notes that at least half of the judicial officers 
interviewed became involved in crime following direct orders from their superiors559. Simi-
larly, most individuals who joined the judicial police did so with the chief purpose of accu-
mulating wealth560. 
Interviews with judiciales in the Federal District by Murguía also underline the structural 
reasons, particularly at lower levels, making predatory rackets a key component to ‘policing’: 
“We are only given 42 pesos a day to buy gas and expected to patrol non-stop for 12 hours”. 
“There are no computers... we have to pay for stationary equipment ourselves... we have been 
asking 3 years for new tires”. He added: “Colleagues [...] steal because the bosses will not 
support us nor lend us any money when we need it. That is why we behave as criminals”. 
“We extort money from criminals because, otherwise, where will the money come from?”561. 
Unsurprisingly, this every-day proximity in which judiciales spent most of their working 
 
557 Libro Blanco: Agencia Federal de Investigación. 2000-2006. Procuraduria General de la República. 
558  Ruiz T., Miguel Angel, and Elena G. Azaola. “The experience in prison of ex police officials sentenced for kidnapping 
in Mexico.” International Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, July-December 2012, pp. 139-169, p.148. 
559 Idem. 
560 Idem. 
561Martínez de Murguía, Beatriz. La policía en México: ¿Orden social o criminalidad? Planeta, 1999. 
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hours looking for money (very much like mafiosi collecting pizo) made them notably brutal. 
Torturing, forcing confessions, extorting civilians and ‘fixing’ crimes were common prac-
tices in the PJF, turning the very word ‘judicial’ into a synonym of ‘extorter’ in the every-
day language of Mexico. Involvement in drug markets often translated into drug use. Ac-
cording to PJF-2, cocaine use was very common amongst PJF comandantes. He recalled how 
PJF officials regularly indulged in cocaine and generous parties attended by prostitutes562. 
He also remembers ‘rituals of initiation’ whereby new members of the PJF would scratch la 
bola (a cocaine stone) and indulge as part of their admission into the realities of drug en-
forcement. Conflicts within the institution were basically oriented to securing rents. Of 
course, the extensive corruption taking place at higher levels of the judicial police reduced 
the availability of resources for street judiciales. Public prosecutors often declined to process 
small-scale criminals not because of law enforcement priorities but because of the limited 
money that could be extorted from them563. Racketeering crime thus became a crucial com-
ponent in the operation of Mexico’s security systems and judiciary operation.  
The collusions taking place at this point between the highest levels of the regime´s security 
services and the transnational drug business reflect historical patterns that, as noted in previ-
ous chapters, go back to the establishment of the PRI state. From Carlos Serrano to Miguel 
Nazar, from Arturo Durazo to Mario A. Chaparro, from Carlos Aguilar to Genaro García 
Luna, a systematic tendency to racketeer criminal markets provided a key supporting econ-
omy for the operation of internal security in Mexico. Mounting evidence of the enduring 
‘collaboration’ at the highest level provides important data calling for a re-examination of 
the history of the criminal and its relationship with the Mexican state, in particular the history 
of its policing institutions and, in turn, the input of the bandit into the capitalist process and 
the making (and unmaking) of a relatively centralised and coherent organisation of the means 
of violence. From the regime’s perspective, the endorsement that these practices enjoyed 
seems warranted given the extent to which protection rackets supported federal security as a 
process tied to accumulation. From top to bottom, illegal economies paved in systematic 
 
562 Interview with PJF-2. 
563 Idem.  
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ways the state´s means of violence at key moments in the history of modern Mexico. Rurales 
in the 19th century tapped into bandit economies to support the wider process of political and 
economic liberalisation that followed the collapse of the patrimonial order and the dislocation 
of millions of peasants. After the revolution, the DFS, in turn, exploited ‘bandits’ to support 
a covert war against social antagonisms generated by an authoritarian, markedly corrupt, and 
intensely capitalist regime cloaking behind a nationalist, populist and revolutionary narrative. 
Something similar can be said about the ‘instrumentalisation’ of drug markets (and, particu-
larly, cocaine) by the PJF during Mexico´s transition to neoliberalism, a transition marked 
by a mass and unprecedented generalisation of banditry. This distinct periods of Mexican 
policing involved highly contrasting historical conditions, and by noting these regularities 
the thesis does not aim to gloss down the markedly different contexts in which these activities 
took place. Rather, the objective is to underline how incorporated ‘banditry’ became entan-
gled in important ways to a changing deployment of capitalist relations and political author-
itarianism in Mexico. The following chapter will document the role of the cocaine racket, 
still operated by the PJF, in the politics of neoliberal change and political decentralisation in 
Mexico. The chapter centres in the most important region in the history of transnational or-
ganised crime in Mexico: Tamaulipas. Echoing broader dynamics in the history of the PRI 
regime, the historical entanglements between crime and power in Tamaulipas (both in local 
and supralocal levels) reflected key aspects of the PRI regime as a whole.  
Conclusions 
This chapter documented how the Mexican government – particularly its security services – 
continued to exercise top-to-down control over the transnational drug business in the decade 
that followed the dismantlement of the DFS. The plaza system allowed the Mexican state to 
‘regulate’ the drug business. While this so-called ‘regulation’ allowed the state to curtail the 
kind of violence most commonly associated with competition in criminal markets, it also 
enabled a less visible economy whereby state security, echoing dynamics rooted in the es-
tablishment of the DFS and expanded after Operación Condor, continued to be supported in 
important ways by protection rackets in criminal economies. After the dismantlement of the 
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DFS, the relationship between drug trafficking markets and the state changed in a qualitative 
way. From a protection racket contained by a national security agenda associated with PRI 
hegemony and Cold War dynamics, the racket subsequently operated by the PJF “began to 
abaratarse” (to cheapen) in a context framed by a radical liberalisation process. It now began 
to resemble a system of franchises aimed solely at generating rent in a context of ever-in-
creasing austerity, social alienation and state collapse. The racket at this hour took the form 
of a (still) relatively centralised and coordinated corporation with regional offices, or plazas, 
appointed by the PJF national hierarchy and endorsed by the political system. On top of each 
plaza, the Yankee was the PJF authority in possession of a centrally appointed license to 
extort drug, contraband and human trafficking markets on behalf of the entire ‘corporation’. 
Underlining this bolder orientation towards the extraction of rents, appointments to head pla-
zas were now purchased and sold as a commodity. The price for an appointment to head a 
PJF delegación, according to interviews and other sources, could reach millions of dollars 
duly paid to PJF directors and those in charge of key bureaus such as Aerial Enforcement 
and Regional Deployment. Yankees not only expected to make a profit from their investment 
but were obliged to produce a regular flow of cash going back to headquarters. Even more 
important, rackets were expected to generate money to cover the operational costs of the PJF, 
a dependency that tightened extortion rackets and the ‘securitisation’ process under neolib-
eralism closely together. At the highest echelons, the plaza system involved face-to-face in-
teractions between drug traffickers and the highest-ranking actors of the institution. PJF of-
ficials interviewed for this thesis note how they personally escorted PJF directors and attor-
ney generals to meet with top drug traffickers and formalise high-level acuerdos. Money was 
there for the take, and the system was in place independently of the moral standards of indi-
vidual actors or efforts to reform the security sector in Mexico. According to first-hand wit-
nesses, sending suitcases to PJF directors and attorney generals was a regular practice during 
these years. Money, according to interviewees, was even counted at the “tables” of PJF head-
quarters. In return, traffickers were provided with secure federal land routes, aerial corridors, 
airports, clandestine airfields, border crossings, radar operators, roadblocks, security, intelli-
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gence and other services that only high-level, coordinated PJF officials were able to guaran-
tee. The orientation of the drug market in Mexico was, during this period, top-to-down. Under 
this particular form of integration, the police, not traffickers, held the most important cards.   
Building on previous scholarly work, the chapter underlined the importance of high-level 
institutional involvement in drug enforcement. Grasping how far-up these corrupt practices 
went (and how regular they became) makes one wonder how such a conspiratorial system 
was able to remain secret and in place for so long. On the one hand, the authoritarian character 
of the PRI regime helps explain why entanglements at these levels were able to operate with 
such impunity and removed from the public´s view. An official narcotraficante narrative, 
equivocally separating the ‘police’ from the ‘bandit’, informed public views of the operation 
of the drug trade. This ability to continuously break the law with little public knowledge and 
systematic impunity underlines, once again, the strong authoritarian capacities of the PRI 
system of governance. On the other hand, the extent to which the federal security services 
continued to rely on levies extracted from criminals helps explain why it was so difficult to 
act against these practices. Racketeering, as a PJF agent told me, was the system. In this 
regard, the chapter noted how zetas on the ground devoted most of their working hours to the 
extraction of rents to pay operational expenses, meet quotas demanded by their superiors and 
provide themselves with a living. The daily routines of PJF officials resembled mafiosi agents 
collecting pizo on behalf of a much larger organisation aimed at regulating criminal activity 
by virtue of extorting it. Finally, the chapter also noted how protection rackets established 
under the plaza system involved, at first, taxing contraband, drug and human trafficking 
flows. The political and economic crisis of the mid-1990s augmented nevertheless the need 
of protection money as a compensatory mechanism for the operation of security services, 
opening a much more predatory form of political economy supporting the securitisation pro-
cess at a time of economic liberalisation. The historic and sudden expansion of kidnapping, 
theft and extortion that followed Mexico´s gargantuan economic crisis in 1995 did not only 
result from generalised economic precarity but also from policing services lacking patronage 
opportunities and operational funds. The chapter emphasised the paradox represented by a 
securitisation process largely supported by protection rackets.   
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Chapter 5 - Tamaulipas and the end of a centralised drug racket 
The following chapter documents the entanglements between drug markets and the political 
system in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It focuses on a region of unparalleled economic 
importance for drug trafficking and contraband in the history of 20th century Mexico: the 
northeastern state of Tamaulipas. The first section of the chapter provides some historical 
background to note how border rackets in the aftermath of the revolution were ancillary to 
the autonomy of regional caciques. Following Alemanismo, however, transnational criminal 
markets began to encourage centripetal tendencies and a more comprehensive articulation of 
national power embodied by a powerful executive branch. Supported by the notable Guerra 
Organisation (arguably the most successful contraband organisation in the 20th century, based 
in Tamaulipas), the PRI regime established thereafter a 50-year racketeering continuum in 
the most important corridor for criminal activity in the country. By the late 1980s, this corri-
dor dealing mostly in contraband capitalised on the new gem of global commodity markets: 
cocaine. The Guerra Organisation was, thereafter, referred to as the Gulf Cartel.  
The second section, focused on this latter period, explores the emergence of the cocaine 
economy in Tamaulipas in the early 1980s and its entanglements with a political, economic 
and social context marked by unprecedented transformation. Triggered by the 1982 Debt 
Crisis (a key event in the history of the post-colonial world, prompted by Mexico’s default), 
neoliberal reform changed the political and social landscape in Mexico like no other event in 
its modern history. Akin to Alemanismo in the 1940s, the administration of Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari (1988-1994) embarked on a historic attempt to swiftly and profoundly capitalise 
class relations in the country by making away with the ‘irrational’ obstacles to capital accu-
mulation that have geared the clientelar relationships of the PRI regime during the Cold War. 
Bringing this new order about, like the one successfully established by Alemanismo after 
WW II, required concentrating power, purging antagonistic caciques and charros, dismissing 
an unprecedented number of governors, distributing rents to a new oligarchy, employing le-
thal violence against leftist and social leaders, and enabling ‘political economies’ for the daily 
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operations of the federal security agencies attached to the executive branch. Tamaulipas, rep-
resenting the key ‘bandit’ borderland, would play a key role in the ‘dark’ side of a political 
transformation implicating the whole of Mexico.   
 
Map 1: Tamaulipas. Source: GoogleMaps  
The interest in looking more closely at Tamaulipas also obeys to its pivotal importance in the 
drug conflict that later engulfed the country. The violence originating in Tamaulipas in the 
early 2000s (which quickly spread all across Mexico) did not only result from its strategic 
position at the U.S. border or the collapse of central power, but also from the particularly 
brutal neoliberal transformation of social and economic life in Tamaulipas and the rest of the 
Mexico-U.S. border. The border became at this hour an industrial periphery rife with aliena-
tion, poverty and anomie. Manufacturing at the border was meant to capture the human exo-
dus fleeing a liberalised agricultural world and, by doing so, provide a competitive edge to 
U.S. manufacturing firms. Embodied in particular by the infamous maquilas (sweat shops), 
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the capitalist transformation of the border came to represent what Charles Bowden aptly de-
fined as “laboratories of our future”.564 Increasingly assertive bandits, capitalising on the op-
portunities provided by the collapse of central authority, opened in the Tamaulipecan waste-
lands a new chapter in the country’s history: a new form of civil war.  
The third section of the chapter notes how the decentralisation and political liberalisation that 
followed the collapsed Salinas regime (marking the end of a single-party regime in Mexico) 
made the prospect of establishing a new centralised protection racket in the national drug 
business a particularly challenging one. The section shows how the end of a centralised pro-
tection racket opened the door for the emergence of paramilitary non-state actors with a 
growing voice in the security processes of Tamaulipas and, subsequently, other regions in 
Mexico. These criminal organisations, compelled to generate themselves the operational se-
curity that the post-PRI state was no longer in a position to provide, began at this hour to 
expand their own security capabilities. Transnational drug markets provided these increas-
ingly detached paramilitary actors with a source of income that, until this hour, had nurtured 
in a very fundamental sense the policing capabilities of the PRI state.  
State reconfiguration of drug markets 
Research on the history of criminal rackets in Tamaulipas is extremely limited. Surprisingly, 
despite embodying the most obvious precedent to the Mexican drug wars, the consolidation 
of the Gulf organisation is only tangentially discussed in academic literature. Most works 
about drug trafficking in the Northeast are focused on the Gulf´s paramilitary successor, Los 
Zetas565. The only exception in the near-total absence of literature on the Gulf organisation 
is the landmark work by Carlos Flores Pérez566. Flores Pérez documents (via archives) the 
 
564 Bowden, Charles. Juárez: The laboratory of our future. Aperture, 1998. 
565 For a discussion about Los Zetas as a military organisation, see: Campbell, Lisa J. “Los Zetas: operational assessment.” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2010, pp. 55-80. A very good account on the extreme violence of Los Zetas, 
involving mass executions and forced disappearances, is: Aguayo, Sergio, ed. En el desamparo: Los Zetas, el Estado, la 
sociedad y las víctimas de San Fernando, Tamaulipas (2010), y Allende, Coahuila (2011). El Colegio de México AC, 
2017. See also: Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe. Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal corporations, energy, and civil war in Mexico. Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 2017. 
566 In particular, Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el 
estado de Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. Also: Flores Pérez, 
Carlos Antonio. “Political protection and the origins of the Gulf Cartel.” Crime, law and social change, vol. 61, no. 5, 
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historical evolution of contraband and (later) drug trafficking economies in Tamaulipas, not-
ing, in particular, the entanglements of criminal markets and local and national hierarchies 
belonging to the PRI party. His work is unrivalled in documenting the role that illegality 
played, in particular, at two pivotal ‘macro’ historical junctures of the PRI regime (two mo-
ments also of key importance to this work): the establishment of the PRI regime under pres-
ident Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) and its conclusion under president Carlos Salinas (1988-
1994). These two periods, as noted before, represented two foundational moments in the his-
tory of state-making and capitalist development in 20th century Mexico. These were, like-
wise, two critical transitions where the political process and illegal economies (contraband 
in the case of the former, cocaine trafficking in the latter) became noticeably intertwined. 
The first moment, analysed in chapter two, involved the establishment of the pro-capitalist, 
pro-U.S., charrista and notably authoritarian political system established at the beginning of 
the Cold War. As noted before, the Alemanista regime was instrumental in establishing the 
post-WW II directives that framed the operation of the single-party regime in Mexico for its 
entire history. Similarly, it was particularly under Alemanismo where the appropriation of 
the rule of law for rent-seeking purposes became the PRI’s central mechanism to consolidate 
power and articulate a national hierarchy567. If racketeering the rule of law was the ‘operating 
system’ of the PRI state, then this system was put in place under Alemanismo568. This in-
cluded not only the distribution of ‘formal’ rackets to be abused for personal and political 
advancement (caciquismo, charrismo, etc.) but taking over regional powers by strengthening, 
too, the input of the centre into how illegal business in the north (and particularly in the 
Tamaulipas corridor) were to be conducted.  
The subsequent ‘structural’ transformation of the PRI state took place under Salinismo and 
ran parallel to the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new global order predicated in 
neoliberalism. With the Cold War over, and the PRI regime lacking an existential raison 
 
2013, pp. 517-539; Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. “Hegemonic power networks and institutional configuration for illicit 
purposes.” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, vol. 3, no. 4, 2018, pp. 513-531. 
567 The classic reference for the role that corruption played in the consolidation of the PRI party during Alemanismo is: 
Niblo, Stephen R. Mexico in the 1940s: modernity, politics, and corruption. Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.   
568 Niblo, Stephen R. Mexico in the 1940s: modernity, politics, and corruption. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 
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d’être from the U.S. perspective, Mexico was the obvious candidate to serve as the pivotal 
country in which the post-Cold War order was to be implemented first. Strengthened by the 
1982 debt crisis, Salinista ‘hegemony’ was to be responsible for introducing the neoliberal 
consensus in Mexico. Crucial directives in U.S. foreign policy, pursued in a particularly ag-
gressive manner569, overshadowed the corruption, graft and criminality associated with those 
responsible for their implementation.  
Akin to the ‘capitalisation’ process of Alemanismo, Salinismo also involved extinguishing 
labour and peasant rights by means of co-opting, replacing or eliminating social leaders; lib-
eralising land property and abolishing peasant subsidies to serve the interests of a new class 
of hacendados (a transnational form of agroindustry, dominated by U.S. interests); trans-
forming the labour market into (arguably) the most deregulated labour market in the world; 
opening almost the entire public sector to private investors, as well as lubricating the whole 
process with spoils from a privatisation programme surpassed in scale, swiftness and corrup-
tion only by that simultaneously taking place in Russia. The authoritarian character of the 
regime helped, of course, to socialise economic reforms that in other countries would, in 
actual praxis, meet much fiercer resistance. Salinas called this top-to-down ability to alter 
Mexico’s structure “one of the greatest assets of the PRI system of rule”570.  
Nevertheless, to overcome the obstacles involved in this swift, all-pervasive ‘reorientation’ 
of a political and economic system in place for more than half a century, Salinismo required, 
like Alemanismo, centralising political power in the hands of a grupo compacto571. In this, 
Salinismo succeeded admirably. Salinas became the president who forcefully removed the 
 
569 A review of diplomatic memos shows how the Reagan and Bush administrations used the 1982 economic crisis in 
Mexico to coerce the country into implementing vast and swift neoliberal reform. Cables note how this pressure was par-
ticularly intense in Republican Party political circles.   
570  Krauze, Enrique. "Carlos Salinas de Gortari. El hombre que quiso ser rey.” [video material] Serie México Siglo XX, 
colección Sexenio, 1998 [own translation]. 
571 The importance of centralising power under a grupo compacto as a requirement to undertake a profound political trans-
formation is highlighted by Manuel Camacho, Salinas´s closest political advisor. Anticipating Salinismo, Camacho under-
lines the necessity to centralise power in what he describes as a grupo compacto in: Solís, Manuel Camacho. "El poder: 
estado o feudos políticos." Foro Internacional, vol. 14, no. 3, 1974, pp. 331-351. 
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second-highest number of governors in Mexico in order to appoint allies in their place (sec-
ond only to Miguel Alemán)572. Also like Alemanismo, Salinismo was strengthened, in ad-
dition, by bringing social expenditure into the president´s hands, hence reducing the broker-
ing power that governors and mayors had enjoyed under the old system of mediated patron-
age. A municipal president commented about this process: “Salinas wants to become the 
presidente municipal of all of Mexico”573. In parallel, Salinismo undertook a generalised 
purge aimed at removing political actors and union leaders belonging to the left. These actors 
were replaced by equally shady figures of unquestionable loyalty to the president. These new 
charros were not only tasked with keeping labour in check during the liberalisation process 
but, more fundamentally, containing the social earthquake that liberalisation was to bring 
about. When co-optation was not enough, Salinismo went further and directly eliminated 
social leaders and political opponents. Inevitably, like Alemanismo, laying down a new eco-
nomic structure came to involve a mutually constructive relationship between the state and 
the bandit economy, a bandit economy embodied, in particular, by the cocaine corridors of 
Tamaulipas. The notable role of instrumentalised banditry during Alemanismo and Salinismo 
underlines the historical importance of banditry in times of profound political and economic 
transformation.  
In effect, the unprecedented and vast transformation of the country´s political and economic 
system coincided with another development that, becoming entangled into this process, 
would weigh like few others in the subsequent history of the country: the establishment of 
Mexico as the transnational corridor for cocaine shipments to the U.S. The incorporation of 
Mexico into global cocaine markets was a derivative of U.S. selective drug enforcement in 
the Caribbean. Aimed primarily at overthrowing the Medellín cartel, the result of this task 
force, directed by vice-president George H.W. Bush, was the empowerment of the Cali cartel 
in Colombia (which enjoyed much closer relationships to the Colombian government, as 
noted by Colombia’s judicial process, Proceso 8000) and driving cocaine shipments from the 
 
572 Rodríguez, Rogelio H. El centro dividido: la nueva autonomía de los gobernadores. El Colegio de México, Centro de 
Estudios Internacionales, 2008. 
573 Krauze, Enrique. "Carlos Salinas de Gortari. El hombre que quiso ser rey.” [video material] Serie México Siglo XX, 
colección Sexenio, 1998 [own translation]. 
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Florida Bay to northeastern Mexico. Violence, accordingly, relocated from the streets of Mi-
ami to the Mexican borderlands. The rise of Mexico as the most important drug corridor on 
the planet, and the particularly sensitive political context in which this process took place, 
affected in important ways the interaction of state and drug markets in the country. As I note 
below, rackets established under Salinismo, aimed at bringing the cocaine corridors of the 
Northeast under state control, collapsed along with the implosion of the Salinas government, 
encouraging the violent centrifugal pull that, before any other state, Tamaulipas first exhib-
ited.  
Borrowing from a typology originally developed by Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca et.al.574, 
Flores Pérez notes how the drug racket in Mexico, after Salinismo, transitioned from what 
he describes as a centralised-hierarchical racket (framed by a strong, authoritarian state) to 
an atomised-multidirectional one (framed by a weak, democratic polity)575. According to 
Flores Pérez, ‘strong’ and ‘democratic’ states are the most successful in suppressing criminal 
markets. ‘Strong’ but ‘authoritarian’ states (like the PRI) tend, in contrast, to integrate 
them576. Weak, authoritarian states (resembling Mexico under Salinismo) often employ their 
institutions to opportunistically advance factional interests through criminal activity ––what 
Garay Salamanca calls ‘reconfiguración coooptada del estado’577. Finally, states that are 
weak, but democratic (like the one that followed Salinismo) often see their institutions taken 
over by criminal interests –– what Garay Salamanca calls “captura del estado”578. As Mar-
celo Fabian Sain notes, “[P]rotective [state] intervention aims to allow some criminality 
through a manifest pact with members of criminal groups whereby the “how” and “when” of 
criminal activities is either decided with or imposed to criminal organisations. In other words, 
the state decides how much crime is to be tolerated […] without ever questioning the material 
 
574 Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay, Salcedo-Albarán, Eduardo, De León-Beltrán, Isaac, & Guerrero, Bernado. La captura y 
reconfiguración cooptada del Estado en Colombia. Avina, 2008.  
575 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013.  
576 Idem. 
577 Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay, et al. La captura y reconfiguración cooptada del Estado en Colombia. Avina, 2008, p. 
10. 
578 Idem, p. 10. 
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and symbolic domain of the police in the space of regulation”579. Building from Barnes´580 
and Flores Pérez’ models, Mexico can be said to have transitioned at this time from a model 
of vertical integration of drug markets (where the state holds the upper hand, especially be-
cause power has been considerably centralised in state institutions) to a horizontal form of 
collaboration (whereby a more decentralised political system interacts with criminals on 
more even terms and through multidirectional contacts).  
As these interpretative frameworks suggest, the analysis of the historic ‘entanglements’ be-
tween state and drug traffickers in Mexico has focused, in particular, on networks, groups 
and structures. What these frameworks tend to underline are the connections between crimi-
nals and state actors at multiple levels working collaboratively to achieve financial and po-
litical ends. Building on these contributions, the aim here is to ponder the kind of historical 
processes set in motion by these entanglements at a time when unprecedented change (re)vis-
ited Mexico. The findings presented in this chapter are based on archival evidence collected 
at the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City, interviews with former PJF and DEA 
officials, and a limited input of reputed newspaper and magazine sources.  
Politics and contraband rackets in Tamaulipas 
No other region in Mexico has commanded more importance in the historical evolution of 
transnational criminal markets than the northeastern state of Tamaulipas. Tamaulipas repre-
sents the closest link between the U.S. East Coast and Mexico’s heartland. The early devel-
opment of cities in the region, including Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa largely 
resulted from opportunities opened by the smuggling economy of the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies581. The enormous wealth associated with contraband made contraband rackets crucial 
in the austere politics of post-revolutionary Mexico. Providing protection to contraband mar-
kets represented at this time a relatively straightforward avenue to tap into what (arguably) 
 
579 Sain, Marcelo Fabián. "La regulación policial del narcotráfico en la Provincia de Buenos Aires." Seminar ‘What Hap-
pens When Governments Negotiate with Organized Crime’, 2013, p. 14. 
580 Barnes, Nicholas. "Criminal politics: An integrated approach to the study of organized crime, politics, and violence." 
Perspectives on Politics, vol. 15, no. 4, 2017, pp. 967-987. 
581 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013, pp. 69-91. 
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represented the border’s most important cash economy. Unsurprisingly, political consolida-
tion at the national level during the centralising period of Alemanismo involved displacing 
caciques in control of these rackets and enabling allies and relatives of Alemán in their place. 
As Flores Pérez notes, a “reconfiguration” of illicit economies was a notable aspect in the 
process of national state formation, particularly at the borderlands582.   
This ‘centralisation of abuse’ was a particularly notable strategy deployed in Tamaulipas, 
where the consolidation of Alemanismo in the late 1940s involved deposing the region’s 
cacique, Emilio Portes Gil. As noted in Chapter 2, Portes Gil had served as one of the early 
post-revolutionary presidents in the pre-Cárdenas era (1928-1930) and held sway over the 
Tamaulipecan region. In contrast to all notable cacicazgos in the early post-revolutionary 
period, the regional power of Portes Gil was established on a political machine incorporating 
peasant and workers organisations. This political machine, the Partido Socialista de la Fron-
tera, would subsequently serve as an inspiration for the PRI party and its formidable corpo-
rative system. As noted by Arturo Alvarado, the peculiarity of portesgilismo lay, above all, 
in this particular form of corporate representation allowing for workers and peasants to mo-
bilise social demands. By segmenting the workers and peasant organisations into different 
bodies, portesgilismo was able to limit the potential of mass organisation and empower the 
interests of national and foreign economic actors583. Portesgilismo had a strong presence in 
the Tamaulipecan countryside: the machine distributed lands, granted credits, promoted co-
operative agriculture and carried out a (limited) agrarian redistribution programme584. Its 
merit, according to Alvarado, lay in integrating a short-lived but differentiated regional struc-
ture of political representation established on social forces. In this respect, “Portes Gil was, 
like many local leaders, a transitional figure in the period in which Mexican corporatism and 
Mexican presidentialism became constituted”585. This geographically differentiated structure 
was displaced in the 1940s by the PRI party, but the local embeddedness that the PRI party 
 
582 Idem.  
583 Mendoza, Arturo Alvarado. El portesgilismo en Tamaulipas: estudio sobre la constitución de la autoridad pública en 





consolidated in the region was only possible by structuring new alliances with local political 
powers and social forces586. When Portes Gil came to realise the inevitability of the PRI 
party, he noted how this new structure “devoured men, and the time has come to accept my 
fate with the same openness by which I accepted my (old) position. This is simply the last 
step in a route that was drawn from the beginning”587.      
Portes Gil had tapped into transborder contraband during his cacicazgo. According to Jesús 
Lemus, he capitalised on prohibition in the U.S. and provided political protection to large 
operations running liquor across the border588. He had a close relationship with leading smug-
glers, particularly in the vicinity of Ciudad Victoria589. The Alemanista penetration of Ta-
maulipas involved severing these rackets from portesgilista actors and enabling allies of the 
president in their place. As noted by Flores Pérez, Alemanista associates such as Tiburcio 
Garza Zamora, Bonifacio Salinas Leal590, Raúl Zarate Legleu and Francisco Castellanos 
Tuexi came to directly or indirectly control both protection rackets and regional politics, a 
process that shows how control over illegal markets often ran hand-in-hand with political 




588 Lemus, J. Jesús. El último infierno (Los Malditos 2): Más historias negras desde Puente Grande. Grijalbo, 2016.  
589 Solorio Martínez, J. Á. Grupos de gobierno. Tamaulipas 1929–1992, n.d., p. 360. 
590 General Bonifacio Salinas Leal is a paradigmatic example of the relationship between political power and contraband 
in the Northeast, as well as the changes that Alemanismo began to introduce in this convergence. As noted by Rath, Sa-
linas Leal, whose military career went back to the revolution, became in 1939 governor of neighboring Nuevo León. Also 
according to Rath, Salinas Leal established an independent political base in Nuevo León and was able to impose an ally as 
his successor in 1943 despite resistance by the central government. Salinas was subsequently appointed, in 1946, regional 
military commander of Tamaulipas, where he became involved in contraband activities in partnership with a local strong 
man, Tiburcio Garza Zamora. According to Rath, the Alemanista appointment of Raúl Gárate Legleu as governor of Ta-
maulipas sought not only to displace portesgilismo from Tamaulipas, but to counter the influence of Salinas. In this re-
spect, Flores Pérez notes that Salinas became incorporated into the ‘camarilla’ política of Alemán at this hour, which led 
to enormous opportunities for embezzlement in return for loyalty. He writes: “General Bonifacio Salinas Leal amassed a 
fortune and, according to an official document, was the actual owner of Maseca Company, one of the most important 
agro-industrial business in the country”. The case of Salinas Leal exemplifies broader developments in the politics gov-
erning the relationship between the PRI regime and military in the 1940s and early 1950s. One of these developments, 
Rath notes, was that opposing the national government risked political repression and economic reprisals, but it also 
showed that, in exchange for national loyalty, officers could expect to enjoy some political entrepreneurial autonomy 
within the PRI system. See: Rath, Thomas. Myths of Demilitarization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920-1960. UNC 
Press Books, 2013; Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. "Contrabando, tráfico de drogas y la configuración de circuitos institu-
cionales para su protección en México." RESI: Revista de estudios en seguridad internacional, vol. 5, no. 1, 2019, pp. 37-
58. 
591 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
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notable strategy to integrate the borderland regions into a new national hierarchy. In the 
words of one of these Alemanista caciques, “contraband was easier to control than to 
tackle”592. Displacement also involved appointing friends and relatives of Alemán to direct 
the key custom offices in Tamaulipas. As Flores Pérez notes, “during the presidency of Mi-
guel Alemán, the appointment of family relatives and members of the Alemanista circle to 
head custom offices at the border was a recurrent practice”593. Tamaulipas “would be a par-
adigmatic case in this regard, but the practice spread throughout the borderland economy”594. 
The consolidation of Alemanismo in Tamaulipas, and Alemán’s direct and indirect involve-
ment in ‘capturing’ the contraband economy of the Northeast, represents a key precedent to 
understand the political entanglements that organically developed when trafficking in goods, 
forty years later, morphed into trafficking in cocaine.    
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, contraband operations in the Tamaulipecan 
border were operated by Mexico’s most notable bandit, Juan N. Guerra. His organisation can 
be arguably described as the most successful contraband organisation in the 20th century. A 
confidential memo by the DGIPS noted, by the 1940s, how Guerra embodied “the largest 
contraband operator in the smuggling of arms, commercial items and drugs in the northern 
border”595. Based in the Tamaulipecan border town of Matamoros, Juan N. Guerra started his 
criminal career in bootlegging operations at the U.S. border (late 1920s). His organisation 
was known originally as Los Tequileros596. In the 1930s, Guerra was appointed agent in the 
judicial police of Jojutla, Morelos. In that capacity, he was charged with theft and attempted 
murder, but somehow the charges were dropped597. In 1943, he was reappointed as a judicial 
police officer by Mexico City’s Attorney General, Francisco Castellanos598. Castellanos, a 
 
592 Archivo General de la Nación. 266.7 (721.1), 1938, f. 32. S 
593 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013, p. 135. 
594 Idem.  
595 AGN. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Roberto Guerra Cardenas, legajo único, f. 12. 
596 Figueroa, Yolanda. El capo del Golfo: Vida y captura de Juan García Ábrego. Grijalbo, 1996.  
597 “Fue procesado en Jojutla el uxoricida Juan N. Guerra”. Noticiero, September 16, 1947; Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. 
Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de Tamaulipas. Centro de Investiga-
ciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
598 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013, p. 140 
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close ally of Alemán, had been governor of Tamaulipas in the early 1930s and had developed 
close ties with Guerra599. The relationship between Castellanos and Guerra was indeed very 
close: the former governor personally accompanied Guerra to court hearings in which Guerra 
was charged with murder600. Guerra’s relationship with the political elite allowed him to 
navigate the vast collection of crimes (including multiple homicides) that he directly and 
indirectly committed. His success as the country´s most prominent trafficker, extending at 
least over four decades, owed less to his mythical ‘bandit’ abilities and much more to the 
level of political protection he enjoyed from authorities. A federal attorney that investigated 
an early murder committed by Guerra (that of his own wife) said in the 1940s that the traf-
ficker managed to evade justice by virtue of “his powerful influences with local politicians 
[…] cultivated with the enormous money he has given to them”601. Thirty years later, confi-
dential memos continued to note that: “Mr. Guerra is part of a very large family that has 
always been involved in bloody crimes” with "several of its members having been prosecuted 
for murder”602. The Guerra family, another report of the time notes, “has a reputation as 
‘bandits’, being feared throughout the state”603.  
DFS memos note that Guerra (and most particularly, his brother, Roberto) cultivated ties with 
Tamaulipecan governors Praxedis Balboa604 (1963–1969) and Emilio Martínez Manatou 
(1981–1987)605. Guerra is noted, for example, as a generous contributor to the electoral cam-
paign of the latter. Guerra’s political acceptance was so conspicuous that a street was named 
after him by Tamaulipas governor Egidio Torre Cantú (2011-2016). The relationship be-
tween Tamaulipecan governors and the Guerra organisation echoed the ‘informal networks’ 
 
599 Archivo General de la Nación, DFS, Versión Pública de Roberto Guerra Cárdenas; Archivo General de la Nación, 
DFS, Versión Pública de Emilio Martinez Manatou (the Emilio Martinez Manatou file is referenced by Flores Pérez). 
600 “Juan N. Guerra expresa sus deseos de respetar la ley. Acudió hoy ante los militares de la Presidencia.” Noticiero Dia-
rio de la Tarde, September 20, 1960, pp. 1, 3; cited in Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis 
y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antro-
pología Social, 2013. 
601 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Roberto Guerra Cárdenas, legajo único. 
602 AGN. DFS-IPS 1734 – C, Expediente 16. Marzo 1973 – Diciembre 1978, f. 35. 
603  Idem.  
604 AGN. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Juan N. Guerra Cárdenas, legajo único. 
605 Ricardo Condelle a Luis de la Barrera, AGN, DFS, versión pública del expediente de Lino González Pérez, legajo 
único, 2017, f. 9-10; cited in Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de 
drogas en el estado de Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
182 
 
and ‘grey areas’ that, in a similar fashion, exploited drug economies in states like Sinaloa, 
Baja California and Michoacán throughout the PRI regime. The relationship between Guerra 
and the local political establishment fitted neatly into these landscapes. However, the long-
term operation and impunity that Guerra enjoyed, lasting for the entire PRI period, gravitated 
beyond local politics and involved protection from political heavyweights and institutions of 
much greater scope. As Anton Blok notes, the success of the bandit is contingent on his 
connections with the key political actors.  
Guerra´s proximity to regional and national politics extended to other kin members of his 
family. DFS memos note that Guerra´s brother, Roberto, was one of the most powerful po-
litical brokers in Tamaulipas for many decades606. Roberto is noted in confidential cables as 
a key financial backer of multiple governors of Tamaulipas607. According to his widow, he 
was particularly close to governors Norberto Treviño Zapata (1957-1963) and Enrique Cár-
denas (1975-1981)608. He was appointed director of customs in Tamaulipas in the 1960s609. 
A DFS memo notes that, in addition to receiving multiple government contracts, he was the 
owner of 500 liquor stores610. DGIPS and DFS memos note that Roberto was personally 
responsible for several murders, including that of a Matamoros mayor, Ernesto Elizondo 
(1949-1951)611. Another memo notes how he ordered the assassination of Jesus Ramirez, a 
local official in Matamoros, whose father told a confidential agent “that he would not de-
nounce Roberto because he owns all the authorities and because doing so would lead to his 
own death”612. Roberto´s son, Roberto Guerra Velasco, ran for mayor of Matamoros in the 
mid-1980s under the banner of the PRI party, an electoral contest that, under a single-party 
regime, he obviously won. His cousin was Juan Garcia Abrego, the man who took over the 
Guerra organisation when contraband in goods switched to contraband in cocaine.  
 
606 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Roberto Guerra Cárdenas, legajo único. 
607 According to DFS memos, for example, Roberto Guerra was the key supporter in Praxedis campaign for governor in 
1963. He is also noted for being a key financial backer of Emilio Martinez Manatou in the 1980s. Guerra was also the 
head of the local chapter of PRI’s CNR in the 1960s.  
608 Cited in: Solorio Martinez, Jose Ángel. Grupos de gobierno. Tamaulipas. 1929-1992. Amacalli Editores, 1997. 
609 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Roberto Guerra Cárdenas, legajo único. 
610 Idem. 
611 Idem. 
612 Idem.   
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The political connections that enabled Guerra’s operations in Tamaulipas (as well as his di-
rect participation in local politics) transcended state politics and involved key political heav-
yweights of the PRI regime. Amongst the most powerful enablers of Guerra was Raúl Salinas 
Lozano, a political heavyweight from the Northeast who commanded the conservative, pro-
business, pro-U.S. faction of the PRI party in the decades that followed Alemanismo. His 
political group in the PRI party, educated in U.S. universities and hosted in the Finance Sec-
retariat, was commonly referred to as the ‘technocratic’ wing of the PRI. Salinas Lozano’s 
power in the 1960s was notorious: the powerful secretary of Commerce and Customs of the 
Mexican ‘miracle’ nearly became the PRI´s presidential candidate in 1964. If Salinas Lozano 
did not make it to the presidency, his son, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, eventually would. The 
relationship between Salinas Lozano and Guerra was public613. According to the 1992 testi-
mony of his private secretary, FBI protected witness Magdalena Ruiz Pelayo, Salinas Lozano 
was directly involved in contraband and narcotics operations in partnership with the Guerra 
organisation. Ruiz testified how she personally handled drug money destined for her boss on 
multiple occasions614. She had been apprehended in 1992 at the U.S. border when attempting 
to smuggle millions of dollars from the cocaine business into Southern California615. An in-
telligence report by the Centro de Inteligencia Antinarcóticos in Mexico noted that the rela-
tionship between Salinas Lozano and Guerra involved both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises616. According to Flores Pérez, the Guerras were also close to Salinas Lozano’s brother, 
Carlos, a powerful figure in neighbouring Monterrey617. As confirmed in interviews with 
cabinet-level politicians active in the 1990s, Salinas Lozano (educated at Harvard) was one 
of the Mexican politicians enjoying greatest access to U.S. intelligence circles during the PRI 
 
613 Kenny, Paul, and Monica Serrano. “The Mexican State and Organized Crime: An Unending Story.” Mexico's Security 
Failure Collapse into Criminal Violence, edited by Kenny, Paul, Monica Serrano and Arturo C. Sotomayor, Taylor and 
Francis, 2013, p. 44. 
614 Dillon, Sam. “Secretary to Mexican Patriarch Discloses Links to Drug Barons.” New York Times, February 26, 1997; 
Fineman, Mark. “Smuggler May Shed Light on Level of Corruption.” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1997. 
615 Fineman, Mark. “Smuggler May Shed Light on Level of Corruption.” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1997. 
616 Cited in: Boyer, Jean-François. La guerre perdue contre la drogue. La Découverte, 2013; and Flores Pérez, Carlos An-
tonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de Tamaulipas. Centro de Inves-
tigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
617 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. “Contrabando, tráfico de drogas y la configuración de circuitos institucionales para su 
protección en México.” Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, vol. 5, no. 1, 2019, pp. 37-58. 
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regime. In this regard, his relationship with George H.W. Bush was not only close but par-
ticularly important in the ‘opening’ of Mexico undertaken under the presidency of his son618. 
In any case, the social acceptance and political partnerships that Guerra enjoyed amongst the 
most powerful political figures who inherited the Alemanista agenda explains the remarkable 
success of his criminal organisation. But what this suggests is that the protection that Guerra 
enjoyed obeyed not only to the level of ‘integration’ of his organisation and key actors of the 
Mexican state but also to the functional role of these ‘bandits’ in adapting Mexican policy to 
U.S. strategic interests.  
Rather than a single, coherent, and tightly integrated operation, the state-supported rackets 
extorting contraband and drugs at the border were systemic, pervasive and fully integrated 
into the regular operation of the agencies tasked with suppressing them. While the DFS and 
the PJF played a key role in the racketeering of the contraband business, no single state 
agency had a monopoly over the smuggling racket. Opportunities were instead systematically 
exploited by institutional and political actors occupying positions of relevant authority, ex-
pected to racketeer and push tributes back into the system. While those at lower levels made 
a living from racketeering, those above –the familia revolucionaria – made fortunes. In this 
regard, the transformation of public authority into a privatised, rent-seeking racket in the 
border region makes explicit the underlying dynamics of governance under the PRI party: a 
system largely established over the systematic abuse of ‘regulatory’ opportunities for per-
sonal and political advancement619. A large collection of confidential memos and newspaper 
clips at the Archivo General de la Nación portrays the pervasiveness of official involvement 
in contraband in Tamaulipas and the extent to which political and bureaucratic posts consti-
tuted, in practice, licenses to racketeer. A newspaper report from 1976 notes, for example, 
how a “former director of Tamaulipas customs owned an aerial fleet consisting of at least 10 
 
618 See: Whalen, R. Christopher. Inflated: how money and debt built the American dream. John Wiley & Sons, 2010, p. 
312. According to a former cabinet member of the Ernesto Zedillo administration interviewed for this work, the relation-
ship between Salinas Lozano and Bush went beyond friendship and extended to business, particularly in the oil sector. 
According to Raúl Salinas de Gortari’s wife, Jeb Bush (son to George H. W. Bush) was hosted multiple times at the Sa-
linas family ranch in Puebla. See: Zarembo, Alan. “Bush Family Ties.” Newsweek, February 25, 2001.  
619 Knight, Alan. “Narco-violence and the state in modern Mexico.” Violence, coercion, and state-making in twentieth-
century Mexico: The other half of the centaur, edited by Pansters, Wil G., Stanford University Press, 2012. 
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small aircrafts in which tons of contraband (are) shipped on a regular basis”620. A confidential 
DGIPS report notes how “PJF agents in Reynosa [Tamaulipas] charged a weekly quota of 
3,000 pesos to contraband organizations”621. A smuggler in Nuevo Laredo [Tamaulipas] tes-
tified in court how he paid the local PJF delegado a monthly rate of 2,000 pesos “to facilitate 
the introduction of contraband” into the interior of Mexico622. In Piedras Negras [in the neigh-
bouring state of Coahuila], the director of state customs, who had “intimate links to contra-
bandists and drug runners”, was reportedly selling posts at the border for a fee “ranging from 
60,000 to 500,000 pesos”623. The governor of Coahuila himself is noted in DGIPS confiden-
tial memos as protecting contraband of heavy machinery and sending judiciales armed with 
machine guns to protect cargos624. In 1978, Proceso magazine summarised: “The Tamaulipas 
panorama is bleak: generalized judicial venality, official protection to drug trafficking and 
smuggling, institutionalised and universal arbitrariness, porrismo (parapolicing), nepotism, 
inefficiency and graft”625. Newspapers report again and again how tons of contraband items 
were shipped every week across the Tamaulipecan-Texan border en route to the great fayuca 
markets in Mexico. One report estimated the value of contraband in the mid-1970s at 3 billion 
dollars (about $140 billion today)626. Peter Lupsha notes that anywhere from 20 to 30% of 
all economic activity along the border at this time was illegal contraband627. Where did all 
this massive amount of money go? How was it laundered? Channelled into what banks, shell 
companies and tax havens? The contraband rackets in Mexico constitute a key (and highly 
overlooked) political economy of the PRI regime that merits further research.  
 
620 De Anda, Jose Luis. “El ex jefe de la aduana de Matamoros tenía una flotilla aerea de contrabando.” Ultimas Noticias, 
March 11, 1976, in Archivo General de la Nación, IPS, 1734-C [own translation]. 
621 Archivo General de la Nación, 1734-C.  
622 Idem.  
623 Medina, Rafael. “Los jefes aduanales de Piedras Negras venden plazas y solapan a narcotraficantes”. Ultimas Noticias, 
May 31, 1977, in Archivo General de la Nación, DGIPS, 1734-C [own translation]. 
624 Archivo General de la Nación, DGIPS, 1734-C, p. 29. 
625 "Sólo sus chicharrones truenan." Proceso, January 14, 1978 [own translation]. 
626 Saucedo, Miguel. “3 mil millones de dólares de contrabando.” El Universal, April 18, 1977, in Archivo General de la 
Nación, 1734-C.  
627 Lupsha, Peter, and Kip Schlegel. “The Political Economy of Drug Trafficking: The Herrera Organization (Mexico and 
the United States).” Latin American and Iberian Institute, Working paper, 1980. 
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Importantly, although contraband rackets in Tamaulipas orbited around the political network 
originally enabled under the Alemanista presidency, the exploitation of contraband opportu-
nities in the Northeast involved other political actors. A notable example in this regard is the 
involvement of relatives of the revered leftist president Lazaro Cárdenas in contraband ac-
tivities. Two DGIPS confidential reports from 1971 note that the brother of Cárdenas, 
Damaso, sent large shipments of contraband to Guadalajara on a regular basis while serving 
as head of customs in the Tamaulipecan city of Reynosa. A DGIPS report notes how notable 
members of the Cárdenas family “participate in a smuggling business that circulates products 
inclusive of whiskey, air conditioning devices, office furniture”, among others, “sold in the 
city of Guadalajara”628. The report notes how Cárdenas´s close family, including “Alberto 
Cárdenas, Damaso Cárdenas, Napoleon Cárdenas and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, are involved 
in shipping contraband” from several points in the U.S. using “lorry trucks, small aircraft, 
planes and sea vessels”629. The involvement of leading members of the Cárdenas dynasty in 
contraband rackets in Tamaulipas underscores the extent to which political power in the PRI 
regime went hand in hand with exerting some kind of direct or indirect control over the key 
economies represented by transnational organised crime ––irrespective of political orienta-
tions. As later transpired in the Cardenista state of Michoacán, where the inheritors of the 
Lazaro Cárdenas dynasty became entangled with drug markets in the 2000s, racketeering 
organised crime in contexts of limited wealth is not only important in that it provides finan-
cial clout (often, though not always, invested directly or indirectly in security capabilities) 
but also in that exerting control over these economies deprives all-too-willing adversaries of 
using them to their advantage. This is the inexorable dilemma bringing realistic and deter-
mined politicians, seeking to advance their political agenda, domestically and abroad, to in-
strumentalise the bandit.       
  
 
628 Archivo General de la Nación, DGIPS, 1734-B (62-70). 
629 Idem [own translation]. 
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Salinismo and protection rackets 
As noted in previous chapters, drug trafficking in Mexico after Operación Condor (1977) 
became further ‘integrated’ into the DFS via a protection racket established in Guadalajara. 
According to former DEA intelligence chief Phil Jordan630, the DFS/Guadalajara Cartel was 
able to secure the largest share of heroin and cannabis exported to U.S. markets from the 
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. The dismantlement in 1986 of this ‘’integrated’ structure 
(DFS-Guadalajara) opened a period in which an expanded federal policing apparatus (which 
incorporated a large number of former DFS agents) continued to racketeer geographical ju-
risdictions, or plazas, taxing drugs, contraband, immigrants and, most importantly, cocaine.  
The new drug traffickers at the border plazas were all organically connected to the former 
Guadalajara/DFS organisation, a common origin that facilitated understandings and commu-
nication between increasingly differentiated corporations. By the mid-1980s, however, the 
Guerra organisation, which did not enjoy any kinship to Sinaloan lieutenants, had begun to 
switch from the smuggling of fayuca to capitalising on cocaine, hence joining the drug mar-
ket as the only drug trafficking organisation not belonging to the original Sinaloan stock. The 
emergence of a cocaine corridor in Tamaulipas led to a pronounced divide in the drug busi-
ness that would have important consequences for the country´s future. Juan García Ábrego, 
a nephew of Juan N. Guerra, assumed control of the organisation in the mid-1980s with the 
blessing of his ageing uncle. The Guerra organisation was thereafter referred to as the ‘Gulf 
Cartel’. 
According to DFS reports, the consolidation of a cocaine corridor in Tamaulipas enjoyed the 
support of Tamaulipas governor Emilio Martinez Manatou (1981-1987), a figure close to 
 
630 Interview with DEA-1. 
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Salinas Lozano631, noted in DGIPS files as having a close relationship with the Guerra fam-
ily632. Martinez Manatou was a prominent PRI politician with a reputation for graft633. He 
had been senator for Tamaulipas (1959-1964) as well as personal secretary to President Gus-
tavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970). According to DFS reports, Guerra was the most important 
contributor in Manatou´s campaign for governor634. A DFS report notes that Augusto Cárde-
nas, Manatou’s brother in law, partnered in the smuggling business with the Guerras635. Con-
fidential memos also note how Manatou belonged to a faction in the PRI party deeply asso-
ciated with illegal economies. DFS reports note how this political ‘network’, which backed 
Manatou’s failed presidential bid in 1970, included PRI dinosaurios such as Sinaloan gover-
nor Leopoldo Sánchez Celis (entangled with drug traffickers in Sinaloa636); Carlos Hank 
Gonzalez (a cacique figure from the Estado de Mexico, noted for indulging in unprecedented 
levels of graft, and whose family would facilitate money laundering operations for the Ti-
juana cartel), Oscar Flores Sánchez (head of the Attorney General Office during Operación 
Condor and noted in confidential reports as condoning drug trafficking activities during his 
tenure as governor of Chihuahua637), as well as the already noted heavyweight politician Raúl 
Salinas Lozano638. At the local level, the consolidation of the Gulf Cartel took place in a 
period when the Guerra family directly controlled the political ‘siege’ of the organisation’s 
clout: the city of Matamoros. Roberto Guerra Velasco, nephew of Juan N. Guerra and son to 
his brother, Roberto, was mayor of Matamoros from 1984 to 1987.  
 
631 Payan, Tony, Kathleen Staudt, and Z. Anthony Kruszewski, eds. A war that can’t be won: Binational perspectives on 
the war on drugs. University of Arizona Press, 2013, p. 143. 
632 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Juan Nepomuceno Guerra Cárdenas, legajo 
único. 
633 The graft that characterised the administration of Manatou is well-documented. People close to Manatou, with direct 
knowledge of his administration, confirmed the extent to which the governor was extensively involved in graft, particu-
larly in the allocation of public contracts. See, for example, “Cárdenas González, Martínez Manautou, Américo Villarreal 
y Cavazos Lerma prohijaron corrupción y delincuencia.” Proceso, October 8, 1994.      
634 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Juan Nepomuceno Guerra Cárdenas, legajo 
único. 
635Archivo General de la Nación. DFS, “Estudio económico, social y político del Estado de Tamaulipas”. 
636 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Leopoldo Sánchez Celis, legajo único. 
637 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Juan Nepomuceno Guerra Cárdenas, legajo 
único. 
638 Archivo General de la Nación. DFS-IPS, Versión pública del expediente de Raúl Mendiolea Cerecero, legajo único, 
cited in: Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado 
de Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
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The consolidation of the Gulf Cartel under Governor Manatou and Mayor Guerra639 was 
perhaps the first case in which local politicians in Mexico became directly involved in a 
political economy of unprecedented value: cocaine. It is also at this time when a relatively 
new practice became established in Mexico: the assassination of journalists following polit-
ical leads into the drug trade. The killing of journalists, radiating from Tamaulipas, began 
with the assassination of journalists Ernesto Flores Torrijos, Norma Alicia Moreno Figueroa 
and Jorge Brenes Araya, all in 1986. Their killings, echoing the 1985 assassination of Mex-
ico´s leading reporter, Manuel Buendía, for allegedly disclosing the link between the DFS 
and the Guadalajara Cartel640, were among the first killings in a deadly spiral that would 
eventually make of Mexico the most dangerous country for investigative reporters anywhere 
in the world641. The killing of journalist Flores Torrijos was emblematic in this respect. He 
was noted for being amongst the few who wrote about the obvious connections between the 
Guerras and the political system in Tamaulipas. His widow declared to the press that behind 
the murder of her husband was Roberto Guerra Velasco, mayor of Matamoros and cousin to 
the leader of the Gulf Cartel, Juan García Ábrego. The widow of the victim also pointed out 
that organised crime was playing a growing role in the ownership of the local media642, a 
phenomenon labelled as narco-periodismo643. The reputed Proceso magazine asserted that 
the murder of Flores Torrijos was an act of La Familia, referring to the Guerra family644. 
Soon the practice extended elsewhere. In 1988, the director of the renowned Zeta magazine, 
Hector Felix Miranda, was assassinated in Tijuana after disclosing the relationship between 
the powerful Salinista Hank clan and the drug world. The assassins of Miranda were body-
guards of the Hank family. After publishing a book documenting the ties between the Guerra 
 
639 "En los pasados seis años, el Cártel del Golfo introdujo cerca de 750 toneladas de cocaína pura a Estados Unidos." Pro-
ceso, January 20, 1996. 
640 Bartley, Russell H., and Sylvia Erickson Bartley. Eclipse of the Assassins: The CIA, Imperial Politics, and the Slaying 
of Mexican Journalist Manuel Buendía. University of Wisconsin Pres, 2015. 
641 See: Bartley, Russell H., and Sylvia Erickson Bartley. Eclipse of the Assassins: The CIA, Imperial Politics, and the 
Slaying of Mexican Journalist Manuel Buendía. University of Wisconsin Press, 2015. 
642 A prominent owner of newspapers in Tamaulipas was the former PJF director for Operación Condor, Carlos Aguilar 
Garza (see Chapter three). He owned the newspapers La Tarde, El Punto, El Popular and El Aguila. 
643 Valle, Eduardo. El segundo disparo: la narcodemocracia mexicana. Océano, 1995. 
644 “En Matamoros todos conocen a los asesinos, pero se esfumaron”. Proceso, August 2, 1986.  
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family and the Gulf Cartel, journalist Yolanda Figueroa was also murdered in Mexico City 
in 1996.  
By the mid-1980s, Juan García Ábrego was successfully turning his ageing uncle’s contra-
band organisation into an enterprise dealing in cocaine. Tended by his uncle in car-theft and 
contraband operations, Ábrego´s operations became less focused on contraband (no longer 
very profitable given the increasingly relaxed tariff restrictions at the border) and invested 
instead in the new ‘gem’ of global markets. Ábrego had started his ‘bandit’ career shipping 
marijuana in Cessna aeroplanes from the U.S. West Coast to the Tamaulipecan border in the 
mid-1970s. In the early 1980s, seeking to incursion in cocaine markets, he established a prof-
itable alliance with the Cali Cartel in Colombia at a time when U.S. drug enforcement was 
focused on Cali’s rival, Medellin. Cali planes landed in Ábrego’s ranches in Tamaulipas (in 
regions like San Fernando and Soto La Marina) as well as in Ábrego’s properties in Tabasco 
and the Yucatán Peninsula645. From Ábrego’s ranches (Dos Hermanos, La Herradura, El 
Centenario, among others), pilots ferried the cocaine to other locations owned by Ábrego 
along the Matamoros/Brownsville border. According to court records, low-ranking govern-
ment employees at U.S. customs were on Ábrego’s payroll646. According to an American 
intelligence report, the consolidation of Ábrego’s cocaine corridos in Tamaulipas obeyed to 
two crucial factors, the first being “his alliance with Colombia's Cali cartel”, and the other 
"the political clout of his uncle, Juan N. Guerra."647.  
The ‘political clout’ of Ábrego became manifest in his particularly strong relationship with 
President Salinas’ PJF. The consolidation of the Gulf Cartel began with the arrest of 33 of its 
competitors in 1988, one of the first major actions undertaken by the PJF during Salinismo648. 
In addition, at the national level, the predominance of Ábrego’s organisation in cocaine mar-
kets was enhanced by the arrest or extrajudicial execution by the PJF of drug trafficking 
 
645 United States of America v. Juan García Ábrego, CR. NO. H-93-167-SS. Appendix A. 
646 Idem.  
647 Cited in: Dillon, Sam. "Matamoros Journal; Canaries Sing in Mexico, but Uncle Juan Will Not." New York Times, Fe-
bruary 9, 1996. 
648 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
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actors associated with the old guard of the Guadalajara cartel, in particular the arrest of Mi-
guel Ángel Felix Gallardo (1989) and the execution of Pablo Acosta (1987). This top-to-
down ‘reconfiguration’ of drug trafficking markets was tasked, in particular, to the man ap-
pointed by President Salinas to head drug enforcement in the country, the Tamaulipecan 
Guillermo Gonzalez Calderoni. Agent Calderoni was a PJF commander with strong ties to 
Ábrego. Ábrego referred to Calderoni as ‘his brother’ and both knew each other since child-
hood649. Agent Calderoni admitted in an interview that he was a close friend of Ábrego650. 
Both Calderoni and Ábrego inhabited a world in which the distinction between state and 
bandit was totally blurred.  
Before Ábrego, more limited transnational cocaine operations in Tamaulipas had gravitated 
around a Medellín-affiliated drug trafficker called Oliverio Chávez. Chávez was appre-
hended in 1989 but persisted in handling cocaine operations from Tamaulipas state prison. 
After a failed assassination attempt in 1989 likely ordered by Ábrego651, Chávez and his gang 
barricaded and took control of the penitentiary. The stand-by received attention from the 
national and international press. Chávez was able to smuggle a letter to the New York Times 
in which he explained that he refused to surrender because of what he described as “extensive 
links between my rivals [Garcia Ábrego] and agents of Mexico’s federal anti-narcotics police 
[PJF]”652. Chávez offered the New York Times detailed information about agents of the PJF 
supporting Ábrego. The New York Times added that: “In recent months [...] members of Mr. 
Chávez's gang who were taken from the prison for deportation were abducted from Mexican 
immigration offices in Matamoros by armed officials and later found handcuffed and slayed 
in Brownsville, Tex., just across the border. American drug enforcement officials say they 
believe agents of the Federal Judicial Police were responsible for those killings”653. The 
standoff underscored the close affinity between a PJF tasked with capturing the cocaine busi-
ness and Ábrego´s emerging position in that market. The situation in the state penitentiary 
 
649 Cited in “Plática de narcos grabada por el FBI, revela nexos de González Calderoni.” Proceso, February 5, 2003. Also: 
Moreno, Mary. “Calderoni's twisted legacy has tragic end.” The Brownsville Herald, February 9, 2003. 
650  Frontline. Drugwars. Interview with Guillermo Gonzalez Calderoni. PBS. 
651  “El control de la plaza, origen de la matanza en el Cereso." Proceso, May 25, 1991. 




came to an end when Chávez accepted to being transferred to a prison in Mexico City, where 
his influence fully declined.  
 
The Gulf Cartel rose to become the leading cocaine organisation during Salinismo. Whereas 
cocaine trafficking under the Guadalajara/DFS racket had been limited to crossing minor 
cocaine shipments for Medellín drug traffickers in return for a smuggler´s fee, the Gulf Cartel 
pioneered in retaining instead a substantial percentage of cocaine from every shipment sent 
by Cali (30 to 50%)654. This innovation by Ábrego multiplied the value of the cocaine racket 
to a level far beyond what previous drug traffickers had ever accomplished, allowing him, in 
addition, to tap for the first time into retail cocaine markets in U.S. cities. Ábrego thus pio-
neered the vertical integration of the cocaine market, expanding in an unprecedented scale 
what until then had represented a limited transnational drug business dealing mostly in can-
nabis, heroin and small amounts of cocaine. As court records of the U.S. trial against Juan 
García Ábrego show, the Gulf Cartel managed to incorporate retail markets in cities like 
Chicago, New Jersey and New York655. Members of the Ábrego organisation sold cocaine in 
the streets of Houston for between $17,000 and $23,000 per kilogram, and in Los Angeles 
 
654 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan García Ábrego, Defendant-Appellant, No. 97-20130. 
655 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan García Ábrego, Defendant-Appellant, No. 97-20130. With the 
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and New York for between $23,000 and $25,000656. This was an important development 
because, as Barnett Rubin notes, super-profits in the global drug market derive especially 
“from the risk premium of marketing an illegal commodity in wealthy societies. Producers 
and marketers of the raw material share in these profits only if they develop vertical integra-
tion through to the retail markets”657.  
Mexico´s share of the global cocaine market was rising in both relative and absolute terms. 
This was a moment in which annual consumption of cocaine in the United States averaged a 
massive 400 tons per year, generating a yearly retail value of 74 billion dollars according to 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Half of the total amount of cocaine 
consumed in the United States during the late 1980s and early 1990s was introduced via 
Mexico658. The largest share of these shipments was handled, during Salinismo, by the Gulf 
Cartel. Between 1989 and 1993, U.S. law enforcement officials seized at least thirteen tons 
of cocaine belonging to Ábrego659. According to prosecutors, Ábrego’s operation grew to a 
point at which he was making $2 billion a year (about $4 billion today)660.  
Ábrego laundered his money through exchange houses, U.S. banks (based in New York and 
Texas), tax havens like Switzerland and the Cayman Islands, and extensive real estate pur-
chases661. Importantly, a key figure in the laundering process of Ábrego’s money was Anto-
nio Giraldi, a banker at Banker’s Trust and American Express Bank International. Giraldi 
was convicted in a federal court in Brownsville in 1994 for laundering money for Ábrego. In 
parallel, Giraldi also laundered money for Raúl Salinas de Gortari, the president’s brother, in 
a case involving 114 million dollars seized by Switzerland’s Prosecutor General and at-
tributed to drug trafficking662. According to court records in the U.S., Ábrego´s laundering 
 
656 Idem.   
657 Rubin, Barnett R. “The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan.” World Development, vol. 28, no. 10, 
2000, pp. 1789-1803, p. 1796. 
658 United States of America v. Juan García Ábrego, CR. NO. H-93-167-SS. Appendix A. 
659 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan García Ábrego, Defendant-Appellant, No. 97-20130. 
660 Cited in: Thorpe, Helen. "Anatomy of a Drug Cartel." Texas Monthly, January, 1998. 
661 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Juan García Ábrego, Defendant-Appellant, No. 97-20130. 
662 “Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged Money Laundering.” Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Sub-




operations in Mexico were handled by the financial ‘brain’ of Ábrego, Luis Esteban García 
Villalón663. García was at the time director of the Bureau for National Coordination at the 
General Attorney Office.   
The PJF and Salinismo 
Declassified memos reviewed at the National Security Archive (George Washington Univer-
sity) underline that the empowerment of PJF actors in the drug business was further enhanced 
by Salinas´s decision to isolate the Mexican Army from drug enforcement operations – es-
pecially those sectors in the army which had not supported his technocratic ‘coup’ in the 
1988 elections, which were considerable664. According to CIA memos, this created enormous 
animosity against Salinas within the armed forces. CIA reports note that Salinas’s choice to 
head the Defence Ministry, General Antonio Rivielo Almazán, lacked popularity within the 
armed forces and obeyed to his alleged docile personality665. Another memo underlines the 
rent-seeking orientation of inter-institutional disputes between the army and the PJF noting 
how sectors within the armed forces wanted to become involved not only in eradication but 
in the interdiction of drug markets as well, a prospect that Salinas resisted666.  A notable 
example of the tensions generated between the PJF and the army in their respective bids to 
tap into an expansive transnational drug economy was the massacre of nine PJF officers in 
 
663 United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan GARCÍA ÁBREGO, Defendant-Appellant, No. 97-20130. 
664 “Follow-Up on President Salinas' Demonstration of Support to Mexican Army.” United States Embassy, Mexico, De-
fense Attaché [Classification Excised], Cable, December 23, 1991: 5 pp. Colección de DNSA: Mexico-United States 
Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013. 
665  “Senior Army Leadership Upset with Secretary of Defense's Performance.” United States Embassy, Mexico, Defense 
Attaché, Confidential Cable, November 28, 1991: 3 pp. Colección de DNSA: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Pol-
icy, 1969-2013. Also: “Follow-Up on President Salinas' Demonstration of Support to Mexican Army.” United States Em-
bassy, Mexico, Defense Attaché [Classification Excised], Cable, December 23, 1991: 5 pp. Colección de DNSA: Mexico-
United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013. 
666 “Impact of the November 7 Veracruz Incident and the Mexican Human Rights Commission Recommendation: An As-
sessment.” [Excised Versions Appended] United States Embassy, Mexico, Confidential Cable, January 3, 1992: 25 pp. 
Colección de DNSA: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013. 
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Veracruz in 1993, a mass execution undertaken by a contingent of the Mexican army pro-
tecting drug shipments667. As noted in declassified CIA memos, the event aggravated ten-
sions between the Salinas administration (strongly attached to the PJF) and the army668. In 
any case, the event exemplified early examples of inter-institutional violence aimed at cap-
turing, rather than undoing, the drug economy in Mexico.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the racketeering of the cocaine economy became embedded 
into the very operation of the PJF, particularly at the border. Racketeering became at this 
hour institutionally ‘embedded’ in the sense that the operation of federal law enforcement 
was contingent on: 1) generating a rent in order to support, to a very large extent, federal 
policing routines, 2) generate income for the PJF ‘purchasers’ of the plaza, eager to recuper-
ate its investment, and 3) generate a monthly quota that was channelled to higher-ranking 
members of the PJF and the PGR. In this respect, three well-known PJF/PGR figures ap-
pointed by Salinas to head the apex of national drug enforcement embodied the ‘bandit’ ac-
tors employed to ‘generate’ security processes leading to state formation: Adrian Carrera 
Fuentes (appointed national director of the PJF669), Guillermo Gonzalez Calderoni (national 
director for drug enforcement) and Mario Ruiz Massieu (deputy-director at the Attorney Gen-
eral Office and head of narcotics investigations).  
Adrian Carrera Fuentes started his career as an agent in Mexico City´s police in the 1970s 
working directly for chief Arturo Durazo (already noted for his extensive involvement in 
drug markets as well as his leading participation in the guerra sucia in Mexico City). Under 
Durazo, Carrera was tasked with extorting the infamous Tepito market, the main destiny for 
contraband goods in Mexico City670. After the fallout of Durazo in the early 1980s, Carrera 
was put in charge of the semi-clandestine Mexico City police organisation Jaguares – the 
 
667 “Chronological Events on Veracruz Incident.” [Differently Excised Version Appended] United States Embassy, Mex-
ico, Defense Attaché, Confidential Cable, December 17, 1991: 15 pp. Colección de DNSA: Mexico-United States Coun-
ternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013. 
668 On this tensión, see: Guzmán, Jorge Luis Sierra. El enemigo interno: contrainsurgencia y fuerzas armadas en México. 
Plaza y Valdés, 2003, p. 199. The issue is also briefly addressed by: Lindau, Juan D. "El narcotráfico y las relaciones Mé-
xico-Estados Unidos." México-Estados Unidos-Canadá: 1997-1998, edited by Bernardo Mabire, Colegio de Mexico, 
2000, pp. 179-214, p. 199.    
669  Adrian Carrera Fuentes replaced Rodolfo Leon Aragon as head of the PJF in 1993.  
670 Figueroa, Yolanda. El capo del Golfo: Vida y captura de Juan García Ábrego. Grijalbo, 1996. 
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body that succeeded the counter-insurgent Dirección General de Investigaciones para la Pre-
vención de la Delincuencia, established by Durazo. Carrera is also reported for renting an 
entire hotel in the Doctores district in Mexico City transforming it into a clandestine detention 
centre in which brutal interrogations and confinements took place671.  
By the mid-1980s, Carrera was reassigned as head of security in Mexico City’s central pen-
itentiary, the infamous Reclusorio Norte (chief destination for major drug traffickers and a 
major extortion racket operated by its directors). In 1993, after a major scandal involving 
drug trafficking and the PJF (the assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo), the 
president appointed Carrera to head the PJF. Carrera at this moment became one of the key 
channels to articulate acuerdos [agreements] and collect duties from drug traffickers at the 
national level. Carrera appointed Alcides Ramon Magaña as his head of drug enforcement. 
Magaña´s multiple duties included coordinating the multi-ton cocaine shipments that began 
to plague the Yucatán Peninsula during Salinismo672. Magaña was later sentenced to 47 years 
on drug trafficking charges673. In 1998, Carrera admitted to the charge of taking millions of 
dollars from drug traffickers while heading the PJF674. He was also convicted for money 
laundering and torture675. He served as a witness in a drug trafficking case in the U.S. where 
he testified that he had collected millions in drug bribes between 1993 and 1994 from the 
Gulf cartel (as well as the emerging Juarez organisation)676. He also admitted to having 
served as a liaison for several meetings between top militaries and drug traffickers during the 
Salinas administration677.  
The closest figure to a national drug-tsar during Salinismo was PJF/PGR commander 
Guillermo Gonzalez Calderoni, the ‘top cop’ of the Salinas administration. Calderoni was 
 
671 López, José. "Tepito: de la popularidad a la degradación." Vocero, February 19, 2018. 
672 “International narcotics control strategy report.” Prepared by Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Dept. of State, 
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676  De Cordoba, José. "Ex-Lawman May Hold Key To Mexican Drug Scandals." The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1997. 
677 “Trial against Francisco Quiroz Hermosillo and Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro.” Indagatoria SC/003/99/E, Procuradu-
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from Tamaulipas. He had joined the PJF as a group leader in 1983 and was subsequently 
appointed delegado in the ‘high-value’ PJF plazas of Jalisco, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Ta-
maulipas and Chiapas. During this period, he developed close ties with the leading members 
of the Guadalajara Cartel678. Subsequently appointed director for Aerial, Naval and Terres-
trial Interdiction at the Attorney General Office, Calderoni became another key channel in 
the ‘regulation’ of drug markets, tasked with neutralising, precisely, his former ‘narco’ ac-
quaintances in the befallen Guadalajara cartel. Calderoni headed the police raid that killed 
Pablo Acosta in 1987 (Chihuahua), arrested Jaime Herrera in 1987 (Durango), and personally 
apprehended Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, head the Guadalajara Cartel, in 1989. Calderoni 
was also implicated in the 1991 torture and murder of the Quijano brothers (former DFS 
agents with links to the Guadalajara Cartel)679. Masquerading what in reality constituted a 
reconfiguration of the drug racket, the arrest or killing of these Guadalajara actors served to 
promote a narrative in which the government was ‘getting serious’ about drug enforcement. 
According to Calderoni´s own account, himself and García Ábrego had been close friends 
since childhood680. In FBI wiretaps recorded by an undercover agent, García Ábrego told one 
of his enforcers: “Consider Guillermo [Caledoni] as if he were my brother”681. Testimonies 
in the 2019 U.S. trial against Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán continued to underline the rela-
tionship between Calderoni and the drug world during Salinismo. Witnesses recalled how 
the country’s chief anti-narcotics agent collected millions of dollars from traffickers on be-
half of the PGR and PJF in return for providing them with protection. One witness in the 
trial, Miguel Ángel Martínez, told the jury that Calderoni sold drug traffickers “secret infor-
mation on an almost daily basis, including an invaluable tip in the early 1990s that the United 
States government had built a radar installation on the Yucatán Peninsula to track drug flights 
from Colombia”682. In 1993, under a new Attorney General, an arrest warrant was issued 
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679 “González Calderoni, hilo de la maraña narcopolítica.” Proceso, February 5, 2003. 
680 "Revela Gonzalez Calderoni ser amigo de Juan García Ábrego." El Universal, August 22, 2001. 
681 De Cordoba, José. "Ex-Lawman May Hold Key To Mexican Drug Scandals." The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1997. 
682 Feuer, Alan. “El Chapo Trial Shows That Mexico’s Corruption Is Even Worse Than You Think.” The New York Times, 
December 28, 2019.  
198 
 
against Calderoni. He fled to the U.S. and became a protected witness of the FBI. He was 
assassinated in 2003 in McAllen, Texas. 
Importantly, Calderoni was not only one of the regime´s key vehicles in the ‘regulation’ of 
drug markets, but also as a key operator behind the clandestine operations against political 
and social antagonists of the technocratic elite embodied in Salinismo. Astorga notes how 
Calderoni was put in charge of running the espionage system directed against political oppo-
sition to Salinas´s neoliberal reforms683. Moreover, according to Calderoni´s own account, "I 
was the one who was in charge of investigating politicians since 1988”684. Calderoni noted 
that “the information was delivered to [the president’s brother] Raúl Salinas”685. Calderoni 
was tasked with spying on political opposition during the contested 1988 elections that 
brought Salinas to power, as well as subsequently responsible for operations against promi-
nent labour leaders and political rivals, including the chief antagonist to Salinas in the labour 
movement, Joaquin Hernández Galicia686. Calderoni later declared that the Salinas admin-
istration had, in fact, resorted to Garcia Ábrego to assassinate key members of the opposition, 
including leading anti-Salinista activists Francisco Javier Ovando and Roman Gil Hernan-
dez687. In any case, Calderoni´s dual role as a regime´s key enforcer in the political as well 
as the drug trafficking world underlines an important aspect of Mexico´s intelligence services 
dating back to Alemanismo: the persistence of a ‘deep state’ aligning criminal rackets with 
the regime´s most sensitive security interests. The role of Calderoni continued to echo the 
logic behind the actions of a ‘racketeering continuum’ embodied by many before him.  
A product of criminal conspiracies taking place at the heart of the state, these practices fitted 
well in a political system established on racketeering principles and whose security apparatus, 
at all levels, remained structurally attached to extorting illegal economies. Racketeering 
tendencies in the security services, instrumentalised by a political elite employing them to 
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secure its ‘hegemony’, trickled down the hierarchy to become a fundamental political econ-
omy of the securitisation process as a whole. In a revealing interview shortly before his as-
sassination, Calderoni pointed to the more fundamental realities and predicaments that turned 
drug trafficking into a political economy688. When asked how police commissioners make 
money in the Mexican system, he replied:  
“They don't only pay to get appointed. They also pay to get a 
job, or to get a certain geographical territory. People will pay 
a lot of money to get appointed to the border. If they don't have 
the money to pay for the appointment, then they will have to 
borrow it. But they are counting on making it back. For a bor-
der region, people will pay a lot of money […]. For a border 
appointment you could get charged $1 million. And then you 
would have to pay $200,000 or $300,000 per month to your 
bosses in Mexico City in order to remain in that position”689.  
When asked, why are so many Mexican police commanders corrupt?, Calderoni pointed to 
the extent to which the political economy of law enforcement depended, paradoxically, on 
criminal ‘rackets’ in order to function.  
What did you do to turn [police] into real police officers? Did 
you give them sufficient budget? Did you give them gas for 
the trucks? Did you give them the weapons, trucks, vehicles, 
intelligence, information, technology, that the traffickers en-
joyed? If you didn't give them any of this…really…what did 
 




you give to them? You sent them off to become what they be-
came - to take money from drug traffickers in order to fight 
them690.  
Another important actor in drug enforcement under Salinismo was Mario Ruiz Massieu, Dep-
uty-Attorney General, tasked with drug investigations at the Attorney General’s office. Ruiz 
Massieu was arrested in the U.S. after attempting to import in 1994 an undeclared amount of 
10 million dollars691. The U.S. Justice Department arrested Ruiz Massieu and charged him 
with drug trafficking charges. A jury and a court of appeals found Ruiz Massieu guilty of 
possessing $9,041,598 dollars obtained by “facilitating the transport” of drugs692. A key tes-
timony in his trial was that of Magdalena Ruiz Pelayo, private secretary of Raúl Salinas 
Lozano (father to President Salinas), who had become an FBI cooperating witness after being 
convicted for smuggling drug money to California. Pelayo testified how she delivered drug 
money to Ruiz Massieu on multiple occasions on behalf of the Salinas family693. The Mexi-
can government also accused Ruiz Massieu of drug trafficking. He committed suicide in 1999 
while in custody in the U.S.694.  His brother, former brother-in-law of President Salinas (and 
head of the PRI party during the Salinas administration) was assassinated in 1994 by a Ta-
maulipecan squad.    
  
 
690 Idem. During this period, the pervasive involvement of PJF in the regulation of the drug market trickled down its insti-
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Drug markets and global transformation 
Echoing little visible aspects of the centralisation process undertaken during Alemanismo, a 
key and analogous development taking place in Salinismo was the regime´s attempt to bring 
protection rackets under the control of an emergent ‘hegemony’ embodying a capitalist pro-
cess and reflecting global stakes. These ‘entanglements’, however, represented something 
qualitatively distinct from the market that, before it, was embodied by the DFS. Since the 
end of Alemanismo, presidents had ‘endorsed’ the racketeering activities of the DFS (and the 
PJF) as a compromise to support processes associated with the security of the regime as a 
whole. Previous chapters abounded on the logic behind entanglements aimed at preserving, 
rather than altering, the status quo. This logic, however, abruptly came to an end when the 
Salinas administration, seeking to capture national power and drive the country in a very 
different direction, reached out to seize and exploit these economies by filling key positions 
in the racket with direct and indirect supporters. Akin to Alemanismo, but unlike the entire 
history of the PRI regime, this represented a much more direct and intensely sectarian ex-
ploitation of the transnational criminal element, sectarian in the sense that it supported ne-
oliberal hegemony amongst other political possibilities represented in antagonistic factions 
within the PRI party. Evidence collected from multiple sources seems to indicate that the vast 
drug money made available by cocaine markets at this hour, particularly in the Gulf region, 
broke the institutional barriers that had safeguarded the executive office from exploiting 
drug-tainted money for political and economic advantage. With important consequences for 
the country´s future, a much more intimate relationship between cocaine markets and the 
state became established at this moment.  
In 1994, Switzerland’s Prosecutor General, Carla del Ponte, initiated the most comprehensive 
judicial investigation undertaken to this date on Mexico´s drug trafficking rackets. Del 
Ponte´s credentials included having worked as Giovani Falcone´s Swiss counterpart in the 
Maxiproceso in Sicily, as well as having presided over two United Nations international 
criminal tribunals. The investigation was triggered by an attempt by Salinas´s brother, Raúl, 
to withdraw (via his wife) about $100 million from a bank account in Geneva (about $200 
million today). In the following days, the Swiss Attorney General located 17 bank accounts 
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belonging to the president's brother under false aliases. The Swiss authorities began a long 
investigation to determine the origin of the president’s brother’s money. The Del Ponte report 
was elaborated with the testimonies of 90 drug traffickers from Mexico, the U.S. and Colom-
bia695. It documented the grand-scale involvement of the president’s brother in extorting fees 
from Mexican and Colombian cocaine traffickers (especially from the Gulf and Cali organi-
sations) during his brother´s presidency. It estimated that Raúl had extorted more than half a 
billion dollars in this fashion (around $867 million today)696. The investigation documented 
in detail the vast money laundering network that Raúl used to hide this money in tax havens 
in Europe and the Caribbean. The accountant-in-chief of the Cali Cartel, Guillermo Pallo-
mari, testified to del Ponte how he personally paid millions of dollars to Raúl in exchange of 
securing cocaine shipments crossing Mexico. Pallomari noted that the money was deposited 
in front companies or paid through Bolivian intermediaries697. Pallomari was also one of the 
key witnesses in Proceso 8000, the judicial investigation in Colombia that documented how 
money from the Cali Cartel had been channelled in the 1994 presidential elections in Colom-
bia to a large number of candidates of the Liberal Party, including the elected president, Ern-
esto Samper698.  
The del Ponte report found that money from the Gulf Cartel had also made its way to Sa-
linas´s presidential campaign. According to del Ponte´s findings, “[w]hen Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari became President of Mexico in 1988, Raúl Salinas de Gortari assumed control over 
practically all drug shipments through Mexico”. “Through his influence and bribes paid with 
drug money, officials of the army and the police supported and protected the flourishing drug 
business”699. Similarly, a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that 
the banker that laundered money for the Gulf Cartel, Amy Eliot, was also responsible for 
laundering tens of millions for the president´s brother700. Eliot´s subordinate at the American 
 
695 Golden, Tim. “Swiss Recount Key Drug Role Of Salinas Kin.” The New York Times, September 19, 1998. 
696 Idem. 
697 Golden, Tim. “Tracing Money, Swiss outdo U.S: on Mexico Drug Corruption Case.” New York Times, August 4, 1998. 
698 Dugas, John C. “Drugs, Lies, and Audiotape: The Samper Crisis in Colombia.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 
36, no. 2, pp. 157-174. 
699 Golden, Tim. “Swiss Recount Key Drug Role Of Salinas Kin.” The New York Times, September 19, 1998. 
700 “Raúl Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged Money Laundering.” Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO, October 1998. 
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Express Bank, Antonio Giraldi, was found guilty in the U.S. and sentenced to 10 years for 
laundering $30 million for García Ábrego701. The del Ponte report placed emphasis on the 
long history behind the entanglements between the Salinas administration and the Gulf Car-
tel, noting how the president´s brother inherited a network forged decades before by his fa-
ther, Salinas Lozano, and Juan N. Guerra, in Tamaulipas702. Enrique Cervantes de Gortari, 
cousin to the Salinas, was convicted in a U.S. court for selling protection to cocaine traffick-
ers703. As Boyer points out: 
Two of the president´s direct advisers, two of his ministers, 
several governors, his three top drug enforcers, his two direc-
tors of the judiciary police, and an unknown number of gener-
als, have been at some point subject to investigations under-
taken by the most important drug agencies on the planet for 
their involvement in drug trafficking. This represents a unique 
system of collusion in the history of drug trafficking704. 
The Salinista gamble to ‘reconfigure’ the drug market didn’t work out. When Salinas´ project 
to centralise political power was brought down in 1994 by an unprecedented economic crisis 
and a series of high-level political assassinations seemingly involving drug interests (trigger-
ing a massive political crisis at the end of his administration), the state´s political ability to 
exert centralised restraint of drug markets, by this time strongly dependent on the success of 
the Salinista project, was irreparably broken. As Snyder and Durán-Martínez note, for “state-
sponsored protection rackets to emerge and endure, the time horizons of public officials need 
 
701 Idem. Eliot had been introduced to Raúl by Carlos Hank, son to the founder of the Hank clan, already noted for his 
family’s extensive links with drug traffickers in Tijuana. 
702 Golden, Tim. “Swiss Recount Key Drug Role Of Salinas Kin.” The New York Times, September 19, 1998. 
703 In 1992, Carlos Enrique Cervantes de Gortari, a nephew of Salinas Lozano and cousin to the Salinas, was convicted 
under cocaine trafficking charges by a U.S. court. Court documents show that “Cervantes de Gortari--a Mexican army 
officer--and his associates used DC-6 aircraft, mini-submarines and widespread Mexican police corruption in Baja Cali-
fornia to import vast quantities of cocaine destined for Southern California and the rest of the United States”. Cervantes de 
Gortari received a 15-year prison sentence. DEA agent Frank Fernandez, who posed as a cocaine buyer to Cervantes de 
Gortari, testified in that trial “Magdalena Ruiz Pelayo [secretary to Raúl Salinas Lozano] had made us aware that, because 
of his relation to the Mexican president, [Cervantes de Gortari] was in a position to obtain import permits and also obtain 
[Mexican] military and police protection for shipments of cocaine that were going to be imported into Mexico.” (Fineman, 
Mark. “U.S. Trial Foretold Depth of Mexico Drug Corruption.” Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1997.) 
704 Boyer, Jean-François. La guerre perdue contre la drogue. La Découvert, 2001, p. 149 [own translation]. 
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to be long. If officials are constantly rotated or purged, then stable deals with criminal organ-
izations are hard to cut”705. Viridiana Ríos notes that, in addition, the political decentralisa-
tion that followed Salinismo benefited protectors at levels of government that had not taken 
part in protection rackets before, especially at municipal levels706. The PRI´s ‘one protector, 
one organisation’ model in which the lack of competition between drug trafficking organisa-
tions and protectors was able to keep violence at a minimum was collapsing along with the 
last presidency of the single-party regime. At the national level, the collapse of the racket led 
to a progressive return to regional and factional forms of ‘integration’ between political ac-
tors and drug traffickers. In Tamaulipas, the political entanglements between a now orphaned 
drug organisation – the Gulf Cartel – and local political elites became increasingly horizontal 
under subsequent governors, as I note below. Moreover, the loss of political patrons at the 
highest levels led the Gulf Cartel to divert its income into expanding its own security capa-
bilities. The result would be the metamorphosis of the Gulf Cartel into Los Zetas, a develop-
ment that triggered a decade later the most virulent internal conflict of the 21st century.   
Back to the bandit 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a changing political landscape and a redefinition of centre-
periphery relations. A growing push for democratisation, generated in particular by the 1982 
fraudulent elections that paved the way for Salinismo, mined the consensus embodied by the 
PRI party and marked the end of its ‘uncontested’ electoral hegemony. The attempt by Neo-
Cardenismo – a schism from the PRI party – to displace the technocratic elite and reverse the 
neoliberal processes mobilised by the 1982 Debt Crisis would be successfully neutralised by 
Salinas’ pragmatic alliances with right wing parties (namely, Partido Acción Nacional). This 
process would entail a highly selective ‘democratic’ opening that reflected much less the 
social demands embodied by the neo-Cardenista movement but rather the interests incorpo-
rated by the selective political opening (concertaseción) initiated by the Salinas government. 
 
705 Snyder, Richard, and Angelica Durán Martínez. "Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored 
protection rackets." Crime, law and social change, vol. 52, no. 3, 2009, pp. 253-273, p. 256. 
706 Ríos Contreras, Viridiana. How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug 
War. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 2013. 
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Whereas Salinismo would integrate ‘outsider’ political groups invested in structural transfor-
mation (hence mining the political hegemony of the PRI party) leftist political bodies and 
social movements opposing its reforms would become the prime object of state repression. 
As Salinas boldly put it with regards to left-wing actors opposed to structural transformation: 
“A esos ni los oigo ni los veo”. In a similar fashion to Alemanismo half a century before, 
Salinismo would again purge the political system from actors opposed to the swift capitali-
sation of economic relations, weakening the very pillars in which PRI authority had rested, 
and empowering a new breed of charros in the corporative PRI system now committed to 
Salinista reforms. The president rightly stressed the importance of the top-to-down orienta-
tion of the corporative system, noting its instrumental role in discouraging the enormous so-
cial turbulence experienced in other geographies implementing neoliberal policies. Reflect-
ing the limited social input into a political transition managed by technocratic elites, the Sa-
linas and subsequent governments in Mexico would be able to deploy a neoliberal pro-
gramme (arguably) without parallel in global history.   
Salinismo began to wreck PRI hegemony at the national level, but by doing so it was able to 
lay down nonetheless a political configuration that enabled the transformation of Mexico’s 
socioeconomic structure. Political opening would lead, in the following decade, to a plural 
form of democracy characterised, however, by its inability to slow down the neoliberal pro-
cess.  When the PRI regime was finally ready to cash out in the year 2000, the technocratic 
elite in control of the party had successfully rolled back the limited ‘fetters’ to capitalist ac-
cumulation on which PRI governance had formerly rested, taking in addition a massive por-
tion of the crony income generated by the privatisation process and leading to the formation 
of a business oligarchy that would come to include some of the richest men in the world. In 
the view of this work, the end of the PRI party and the selective political ‘opening’ that 
triggered it resulted less from pressures emanating from grass-root levels but was rather the 
result of a transformation that changed not only the economic structure in Mexico but the 
‘superstructure’ formerly embodied by the PRI party. This transformation, taking place in 
parallel with the end of communism, mined the limited ‘fetters to free enterprise’ that had 
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generated the ‘modicum’ of legitimacy and social consent embodied by the PRI party. Like-
wise, the liquidation of PRI political hegemony, starting at the municipal level in the mid-
1980s, escalating to the state level in the early 1990s, and culminating in the loss of the 
presidency in 2000, triggered a much more diverse mosaic of power relations whereby gov-
ernors and regional actors, belonging now to a growing pool of political parties (referred in 
Mexico as la partidocracia), were able to deepen their political autonomy. In this new land-
scape, power at the regional level came to reflect once again the kaleidoscope of disperse 
power relations that characterised the whole history of Mexico before the consolidation of 
the PRI party. Unsurprisingly, drug and other illicit economies became increasingly reliant 
on local political processes, no longer reflecting its coherent orientation under the PRI. The 
massive surge in violence that followed later reflected not only the growing paramilitary 
capabilities of non-state actors but was largely driven by the clash between political and in-
stitutional enablers formerly contained by the single party regime. The increasingly violent 
nature of the country came to reflect a drug market no longer checked by an able, centralised 
state, but by highly contingent, changing, and diagonal connections between drug markets 
and a decentralising body politic.  
The relationship between drug traffickers and governors in Tamaulipas after Salinismo be-
came, as elsewhere in the country, increasingly horizontal. Like in the past, drug traffickers 
continued to provide bribes and electoral contributions to governors and politicians. By the 
early 2000s, however, extortion payments began to earn them the right not only to traffic 
drugs under the tutelage of the state but, increasingly, to directly intervene in political affairs. 
This began to include, for example, the right of ‘bandits’ to appoint their own enforcers to 
head and staff municipal and state police agencies ––a development unimaginable under the 
previous system. In the following decade, most municipal and state police forces in high-
value plazas would become directly or indirectly controlled by drug organisations, as studies 
have shown. According to one of them, the percentage of municipalities penetrated by or-
ganised crime in Mexico went from around a third in 2001 to almost three quarters by 
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2011707. In addition, drug traffickers at this point also came to possess a much greater voice 
in the nomination process of candidates for local office, deciding along with the local politi-
cal establishment who was to be nominated to govern a locality. In the most extreme in-
stances, such as Tamaulipas, drug traffickers also began to provide governors and local au-
thorities with armed commandos as personal bodyguards. The enormous wealth generated 
by the drug business allowed drug traffickers to expand their security capabilities via para-
militarisation in ways that state actors, no longer in control of the drug economy, could no 
longer afford. In other words, the much more horizontal drug markets that followed Sali-
nismo was accompanied by an important change in the security dynamics in Mexico: in mul-
tiple regions, a drug economy formerly reliant on security provided by a centralised state 
now directly controlled the decentralising state security. The literature often refers to this 
kind of process as a captura del estado or ‘state capture’708. 
In Tamaulipas, the relationship between the Gulf Cartel and politicians continued, of course, 
unabated. Salinista governor Manuel Cavazos Lerma (1993-1999) had been a close friend of 
Juan N. Guerra. Cavazos went as far as inaugurating a street in Matamoros under the name 
‘Juan Nepomuceno Guerra’ to honour the nation´s most successful contrabandist. According 
to slayed journalist Yolanda Figueroa, it was a ‘common sight’ to see Cavazos and Juan N. 
Guerra together in Matamoros709. Cavazos´s connections with the drug trade involved several 
of his relatives. His cousin, Gilberto Lerma, was arrested in McAllen in 2012 for drug con-
spiracy and convicted to 12 years in prison710. He had operated as a comandante in Tamauli-
pas´s police, appointed by his cousin. Another cousin of Cavazos, Miguel Ángel Lerma, op-
erated as the governor’s enlace with the Gulf cartel711. He had been appointed by the gover-
nor to head internal affairs at the state judicial police.  
 
707 Cited in: Bustillos, Juan Carlos Núñez, et al. México se cimbra a mitad del sexenio. ITESO, 2016. 
708 Salamanca, Luis Jorge Garay, et al. La captura y reconfiguración cooptada del Estado en Colombia. Avina, 2008. 
709 Figueroa, Yolanda. El capo del golfo: Vida y captura de Juan García Ábrego. Grijalbo, 1996. 
710 “Vinculan con narco a sobrino de ex-gobernador”. Reforma, July 25, 1999.  
711 Cited in: Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el 
estado de Tamaulipas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. 
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The proximity between local politics and the Gulf organisation continued under Cavazos’ 
successor, Tomas Yarrington Ruvalcaba (1999-2005). Like Cavazos, Yarrington´s career had 
been amply supported by Salinas712. Yarrington served as mayor of Matamoros from 1993 
to 1996. He then became minister of finance under Cavazos. He was subsequently elected 
governor. In 2013, the DEA accused Yarrington of racketeering, drug smuggling, money 
laundering and bank fraud713. In the U.S. trial against Antonio Peña-Argüelles (a high-rank-
ing member of the Gulf Cartel) the accused testified that Yarrington held "a direct personal 
relationship with Zeta cartel leaders".714 According to the indictment, beginning in approxi-
mately 1998, Yarrington received large bribes from the Gulf Cartel in eleven separate pay-
ments to finance his campaign for governor. According to the DEA, Yarrington was also 
involved in the smuggling of large amounts of cocaine from the port of Veracruz to the United 
States715. Pointing to the changing symmetry between state power and increasingly milita-
rised drug trafficking organisations in Tamaulipas, a protected witness testified in the U.S. 
trial against Yarrington how the governor´s security team was provided by the Gulf Cartel. 
Underlining important changes in the operation of plazas, the witness also testified that pay-
offs by drug traffickers began to purchase the right to directly appoint cartel enforcers at the 
judicial police. According to court records in Mexico, Yarrington ‘ticked’ potential candi-
dates to mayorships in collaboration with the drug lords716. A Mexican judge ordered the 
arrest of Yarrington in 2012. He fled the country and was arrested in Italy under an assumed 
alias and false passport. He was extradited to the U.S. and is currently in detention in Texas 
facing an 11-account indictment for conspiring to “distribute narcotics, money laundering 
and bank fraud”717. Mexican authorities also accused Yarrington of money laundering718. 
Court records show that, by this time, practically all local mayors in Tamaulipas were on the 
payroll of the cartel719. Yarrington’s successor, Governor Eugenio Fernandez Flores (2005-
 
712 Idem. Flores Pérez notes how Salinas even paid the tuition fees of Yarrington’s postgraduate studies (idem, p. 252). 
713 DEA. "Former Mexican Governor Extradited To The Southern District Of Texas." Press Release, April 20, 2018. 
714  United States of America v. Antonio Peña Arguelles. Case 5:12-mj-00120-NSN. 
715 DEA. "Former Mexican Governor Extradited To The Southern District Of Texas." Press Release, April 20, 2018. 
716 Averiguación Previa, PGR/SIEDO/UEIDC5/240/2012. 
717 United States of America v. Tomas Yarrington Ruvalcaba. Criminal docket No B-12-435-S1, Brownsville Division. 
718 Averiguación Previa, PGR/SIEDO/UEIDC5/240/2012. 
719 Idem.   
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2011) was indicted on charges of money laundering by the United States Department of Jus-
tice. Fernandez remained at large for two years. He was apprehended by Mexican authorities 
and is currently awaiting the outcome of his extradition trial.  
Lacking political patrons, Ábrego was detained one year after the end of the Salinas admin-
istration. His detention, however, did not immediately cause a wave of violence in Tamauli-
pas. As Flores Pérez notes, having lost its political supporters at the national level had left 
the Gulf cartel in a state of weakness720. Two years later, however, the organisation´s new 
leaders began to compensate for their lack of political contacts in federal institutions by in-
vesting in paramilitary power. The Gulf Cartel’s new bosses Salvador Gómez (a former agent 
in the state´s judicial police and ‘madrina’ of the PJF) and Osiel Cárdenas (a former hit-man) 
began to recruit deserters from elite bodies in the Mexican Armed Forces and demobilised 
Guatemalan kaibiles to furnish the organisation with protection. The military arm of the Gulf 
Cartel began to be referred to as Los Zetas – a reference to the operational rank of their 
members. Their extortion rackets all across Tamaulipas turned them into a more ‘stationary’ 
form of bandit generating antagonistic security process vis-à-vis a weakened state.  
By the mid-2000s, after the assassination of Gómez and the arrest of Cárdenas, Los Zetas 
splintered from the Gulf Cartel. Lacking the international connections that the Gulf Cartel 
enjoyed in the transnational cocaine business, Los Zetas turned Tamaulipas into a massive 
extortion racket enforced with military brutality to reproduce its own security721. Their eco-
nomic success allowed them to expand their clout to the western coast of the country, namely 
the state of Michoacán, controlled by Sinaloan associates. After eliminating their local rivals 
(Los Valencia), Los Zetas established in Michoacán an appendant organisation known as La 
Familia Michoacana –– equally predatory and brutal. The organisation gained control of the 
local drug business and implemented, like in Tamaulipas, extortion rackets across all sectors 
of the local economy –– from the production of avocados and lemons to the operations of 
 
720 Flores Pérez, Carlos A. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de Tamauli-
pas. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2013. Between 1995 and 1996, homicides 
in Tamaulipas did not exceed 69, and only 13% were attributed to drug trafficking.  
721 Aguayo, Sergio, ed. En el desamparo: Los Zetas, el Estado, la sociedad y las víctimas de San Fernando, Tamaulipas 
(2010), y Allende, Coahuila (2011). El Colegio de México AC, 2017.  
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taxi drivers and street vendors. Their brutality generated an equally paramilitarised social 
reaction (‘community policing’) supported, likewise, by rackets in the drug economy. 
In 2007, the Mexican government declared ‘war’ on Los Zetas. President Felipe Calderon 
(2006-2012) deployed thousands of soldiers in Tamaulipas and Michoacán. The total number 
of soldiers committed to fighting the cartels reached 45,000. In 2008, the death toll jumped 
from 9,000 to almost 15,000. In 2009, it leapt to 21,000. In 2010, it reached 27,000. After 
almost a decade and a half, the figure stands today at a yearly 33,000, and growing722. This 
excludes the vast number of desaparecidos, many of them lying in an extensive number of 
fosas comunes [mass graves], estimated by the government to host 60,000 bodies. These 
numbers represent the epilogue to a history framed by security compromises, or ‘integration’, 
to secure broader political interests.   
Conclusions 
The collaboration between the Salinas administration and drug markets did not represent an 
entirely new phenomenon in Mexico. It simply replicated a strategy of rule used intensely in 
the history of the Mexican state to support, at a fundamental level, a security processes in-
vested in altering the socio-economic orientation of a national geography. Notwithstanding 
the enormous differences separating both periods, mechanisms employed by the liberal state 
in the 19th century, whereby the consolidation and hegemony of liberal elites was supported 
by the instrumentalisation of banditry, was again ancillary to the construction of a security 
apparatus invested in generating a ‘neo’ liberal social order fitting global capitalist require-
ments and enforcing the unequal relationship between the ‘core’ (the U.S.) and its ‘periphery’ 
(Mexico). Co-opted banditry, then and today, allowed for the structuring of national hierar-
chy and helped secure the reproduction of a liberal order.  
In the 1940s, a similar process aimed at paving the way for a decisively capitalist orientation 
of Mexican society, now under Alemanismo, witnessed again the co-optation of contraband 
 




and drug economies to support the consolidation of national governance. Banditry at this 
hour was used once again to support the construction of a centralised security body, the DFS, 
aimed at suppressing social and political opposition to the new regime and its ‘crony’ but 
markedly harsh pro-capitalist agenda. The role of co-opted banditry in the security arrange-
ments of the PRI state expanded further when, in the 1970s, the drug economy provided 
spoils and cash to state actors in charge of suppressing peaking insurgency activity. Enjoying 
the full support of the political establishment, these state operatives used drug and contraband 
economies to fund operations against those opposing the regime´s authoritarian rule. As 
noted, the covert use of dirty money (obtained from transnational contraband and drug traf-
ficking) to fund national security activity in Mexico echoed a mechanism deployed more 
generally in theatres of the Cold War serving the security interests of America. This mecha-
nism proved highly successful in suppressing the ‘internal enemy’ at a low expense.  
From a U.S. perspective, the culmination of the Cold War removed the PRI regime´s exis-
tential raison d’être. The liberalisation process forced upon Mexico aimed at transforming 
the Mexican economy in accordance with a new set of U.S. interests or, echoing Mark Neo-
cleous, transforming labour in accordance with capitalist requirements723. A new ‘structural’ 
reorientation of the PRI regime required, like the one under Alemanismo, a centralisation 
process embodied by the president and established on a political purge, rent-seeking oppor-
tunities for allies (generated by the privatisation process) and a (re)centralised security appa-
ratus attached to the executive branch. Also akin to Alemanismo, protection rackets in trans-
national criminal economies, under Salinismo, were aligned to support capitalist objectives. 
Growing organically from contraband rackets established under Miguel Alemán, the Gulf 
Cartel in Tamaulipas became the main vehicle for a new top-to-down ‘reconfiguration’. Like 
the DFS before it, centrally appointed comandantes of the PJF were provided with licenses 
to racketeer the novel, low-barrier opportunities brought about by the expansion of the co-
caine market in Mexico. The leading drug enforcers at PGR and PJF, as noted in the last two 
 
723 Neocleous, Mark. The fabrication of social order: A critical theory of police power. Pluto Press, 2000. 
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chapters, were tasked with implementing what Flores Pérez describes as a top-to-down ‘re-
configuration’ generated by selective targeting and protection. Importantly, these security 
networks, particularly at PJF, were also employed by the Salinas regime to intimidate, spy 
on and eliminate opponents to its liberalisation programme. Finally, according to the most 
comprehensive official investigation of drug markets in Mexico undertaken to this date (the 
del Ponte report), the drug racket under Salinismo broke institutional barriers and became 
subservient to a process embodied no longer by the party as a whole but the particular faction 
tasked with transforming Mexico under post-Cold War directives. Large cocaine shipments 
were directly brokered by the president’s brother, Raúl. More generally, key supporters of 
Salinismo were placed by the executive in key positions from which to racketeer these op-
portunities at political and institutional locations.   
After the implementation of the (arguably) most extensive neoliberal reform undertaken in 
the world, the collapse of Salinismo, the end of the single-party rule in 1994 and the Peso 
Crisis wrecked the conditions that had allowed for the existence of a centralised, and rela-
tively peaceful, protection racket in the transnational drug business. 
Beginning in Tamaulipas, the collapse of the ‘one protector, one organisation’ model led to 
a fundamental alteration of the security dynamics, first of this crucial region, then in the entire 
country. The drug economy, which had supported until this moment parapolitical and para-
military bodies working for the state, began to support instead the security capabilities of 
non-state actors. These actors began to have a louder voice in the political process of a de-
centralising political geography, expressed in their growing control of formal and informal 
subnational security apparatuses. Amidst an increasingly deteriorating socio-economic situ-
ation, banditry became generalised. In 2011, the former governor of the state of Nuevo León, 
Sócrates Rizo, told the press: “Somehow, the old regime managed to solve the problem of 
drug trafficking. There was control. There was a strong state, a strong president, a strong 
attorney general, a strong army. […] Somehow, drug traffickers were told: ‘You can use this 
strip, you can use that other strip, don’t touch here and there’”724. The aim of the previous 
 
724 Vega, Aurora. “PGR cita a Sócrates Rizzo por narcopactos en gobiernos del PRI.” Excelsior, November 17, 2011. 
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three chapters has been not only to better understand the mechanisms that allowed the Mex-
ican state to somehow control the drug business but to produce a historical synthesis of the 
processes generated by this symbiosis. The findings presented in the last three chapters sup-
port the thesis of Luis Astorga, the leading historian of drug trafficking in Mexico, who noted 
three decades ago the ‘mythological’ nature of narco narratives that think of drug trafficking 
as something exterior, or even in opposition, to the state. As the murdered journalist from 
Tamaulipas, Yolanda Figueroa, wrote shortly before her death: “The Mexican drug lords 
experienced a different process from that of the Colombian drug barons, who in a different 
process were forced to rely on the services of Israeli, British and American war veterans. […] 
On the contrary, their peers in Mexico used the police and government officials to obtain 
protection and impunity, precisely because of their close relationship with the spheres of 
political power”725. Finally, the chapter also built on the landmark work of Carlos Flores 
Pérez726, whose research on Tamaulipas underscores the entanglements between national and 
local levels in the second half of the 20th century and, more importantly, its attachment to the 
distinct and transformative political projects of Alemanismo and Salinismo. The contribution 
in these chapters, hopefully, has been to show that these historical structures composed by 
bandits and state actors were, concurrently, key processes enabling a particular form of order.  
  
 
725 Figueroa, Yolanda. El capo del golfo: Vida y captura de Juan García Ábrego. Grijalbo, 1996. 
726 Flores Pérez, Carlos Antonio. Historias de polvo y sangre: génesis y evolución del tráfico de drogas en el estado de 
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Conclusions and discussion 
On December 9, 2019, the architect of the War on Drugs in Mexico, Genaro García Luna, 
was detained in Dallas on charges of taking millions from the drug cartels. His arrest repre-
sented an earthquake in Mexico. After all, it had been García Luna –– the top figure in Mex-
ico’s security apparatus for more than a decade – who masterminded the war that came to 
define the country’s recent history, arguably the bloodiest internal conflict since the end of 
the Cold War. García Luna’s power over law enforcement and security institutions in Mex-
ico, extending from 2000 to 2012, had been immense. More than anyone else, he embodied 
the federal government’s narrative of guerra total on the cartels. Had the Mexican govern-
ment been unaware of the connections of the country’s most powerful figure, second only to 
the president, to the drug business? It also seemed almost inconceivable that the FBI was 
pressing drug trafficking charges against him, given the extremely close relationship and 
partnership that García Luna and U.S. law/drug enforcement held for more than a decade. 
Had the U.S. government, once again, been unaware of the connections between drug traf-
fickers and those at the very top of the security apparatus in Mexico? What processes lay 
beneath this seeming contradiction? What ends have been historically served? García Luna’s 
detention represented a cognitive puzzle in the minds of the public, scholars and specialists: 
a reminder of how much work remains to be done in order to grasp the historical implications 
of drug markets in the political process in Mexico.  
As noted in this thesis, the involvement of García Luna in the drug market, if true, would 
merely echo a historical pattern rooted in the history of security and policing in Mexico. The 
extent to which the highest hierarchies in the Mexican state have involved themselves in 
extorting the drug business, as this thesis has assisted in documenting, has been tremendous 
and goes back a very long time. This involvement, however, is seen here as a ‘paradoxical’ 
process whereby the security generating capitalist order is produced by the fusion of the ‘po-
lice’ and the ‘bandit’. Despite a copious body of evidence, academic literature has neverthe-
less devoted little attention to the embeddedness of criminal economies and the political pro-
cess in Mexico. By tending to disregard, in particular, the centrality of federal security insti-
tutions, national actors, global elites, and macroeconomic processes in the making of modern 
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Mexico, we have ignored key components that, I argue, render the logic, aims and contradic-
tions of drug enforcement in Mexico somewhat less obscure. What we are missing, in addi-
tion, is what a more complete account of this particular history can potentially reveal about 
the inner workings of the state, in particular the ‘dark’ processes that underpinned national 
and transnational security under the PRI party, and the possibility to draw from these histor-
ical lessons to make better sense of the daunting prospects for the country today.     
Seeking to better unpack the logic of banditry in historical praxis, the thesis laid down a 
framework to grasp the historical embeddedness of policing and organised crime or to un-
derstand a little better why states and crime so often intermingle. What kind of processes do 
these historical entanglements generate, apart from the obvious acts of corruption that they 
embody? Hinting that more is to be said about the role of crime in the making of modern 
Mexico, the thesis looked at the problem from a perspective that compared and connected 
Mexico to global history, invested not only in drawing from transnational experience to shed 
light on the Mexican case but also to note how these ‘dark’ processes have been important 
mechanisms generating the global hierarchies and unequal relations informing Mexican re-
ality. To address this puzzle, the thesis made use of theoretical insights into the dynamics 
that make state-making and organised crime fundamental ‘look-alikes’. This seems to be a 
good place to begin unpacking the role of banditry in the political process and the making of 
centre-periphery relations. As the conclusions presented below will hopefully show, a more 
‘macro’ perspective, sensitive to global experiences, and nested in a theory that accommo-
dates well the idea of states as ‘organised crime’, can shed new light onto what makes cases 
like García Luna such a formidable pattern in the history of Mexico.   
Predators, criminals, and the state-making process 
To better grasp why the thread of the political process so often leads to ‘criminals’, the thesis 
first analysed what makes state and crime so fundamentally alike. As argued in Chapter One, 
the ‘primordial’ form of state looks much like a predator. Predators represent a primordial 
‘phase’ in the state-making process because this particular activity is the most fundamentally 
dependant on the means of violence to generate rents, invested in turn on expanding security 
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capabilities to generate more revenue. Robbing, raiding, looting (the ‘easiest’ and lowest-
barrier economies available) represent the ‘currency’ that reproduces the ‘primordial’ secu-
rity apparatuses generating order in an internal and external sense. The economies of robbing 
and looting thus generate seminal ‘state-like’ characteristics that transcend the mere articu-
lation of violence and are able instead to affect society in social, cultural and political ways. 
Criminals (in the more modern sense) are also contingent on supporting and developing the 
means of violence to tap into the easiest, swiftest, lowest-barrier currency available to them 
(economies that criminalisation makes particularly valuable). What I wish to underline here 
is the paradoxical role of activities seemingly contrary to ‘state-making’ in the state-making 
process. As Olson notes, preying is the most direct way to set in motion the wheels of the 
state-making process727. Hence the most ‘rudimentary’ form of ‘state’ is a predator, a bandit.  
In the long term, preying is bad business for a security apparatus. It prevents capital from 
reproducing, and thus lessens the revenues available for the apparatus to expand its internal 
and external social grip. A security apparatus begins to look more like a ‘state’ once it shifts 
its political economy from the preying of victims to the protection of clients. At this stage, 
the success of the security apparatus will depend on its ability to retain part of the surplus 
generated by key economic activities. The success of a warlord in East Africa hence depends 
on his ability to protect the key commodity represented in diamonds; the success of a gang in 
the urban periphery depends on its ability to protect the retail market of drugs, and the pro-
spects for a warring faction in a country like Afghanistan are contingent on its ability to 
protect opium and contraband flows. Income generated by protection rackets established on 
key economies will, in turn, be invested, almost to its full extent, in purchasing further secu-
rity capabilities (weapons, ammunition, soldiers, etc.) needed to access or remain in power. 
The surplus collected by the earliest forms of ‘protection rackets’ in history, enabled when 
agriculture rendered the existence of a security apparatus both necessary and materially pos-
sible, was thereafter invested almost entirely in expanding the security capabilities of chief-
tains. Racketeering made social organisation less consensual and more hierarchical, giving 
 




birth to the distinct form of social organisation embodied by the state. Tilly notes how most 
rulers in the history of Europe invested until very recently the largest share of tributes in 
supporting and expanding security capabilities728. The more we look into increasingly ‘pri-
mordial’ or ‘austere’ instances of ‘state-making’, the more obvious it becomes that the es-
sence of the political process lies in the dialectics of protection (or on how security apparat-
uses and capital are tied up together). What I wish to highlight here is the crucial association 
between protection rackets over key economies and the ability to rule, securitise and police.  
Controlling low-barrier, key economies has crucial importance in the state-making process. 
Key economies include criminal markets because of their relative worth in deprived social 
contexts and low barriers to access. The literature on criminal governance has been able to 
better grasp the process that allows for the construction of a relative monopoly of violence 
by virtue of exerting control, in particular, of drug economies, making it possible for power-
ful actors to transcend the sole purpose of regulating violence and affect cultural, normative, 
economic and social life in significant ways. Hence criminals exhibit, as noted by Denyer 
Willis in relation to the favelas of São Paolo, or by Pansters with regards to narco-cacicazgos 
in Mexico, state-like characteristics729. Controlling the key economy represented by drugs 
allows local actors to control the available means violence because the latter, in contexts of 
austerity, is contingent on the former. The findings in this body of literature have provided a 
form of ‘anthropological’ lenses into the criminal drivers in the ‘early’ phases of the state-
making process. The literature has also proven that structures other than ‘states’ affect the 
regulation of life, provide social guidance, affect culture, and even decide on the deserved-
ness of killing.  
And yet, as this body of literature readily admits, even these seemingly autonomous criminals 
cannot escape being affected or coming into contact with a powerful actor: the state. The 
interaction between criminals and state can take multiple forms (integration, collaboration, 
confrontation) and involve different state actors (local police, regional politicians, federal 
 
728 Tilly, Charles. "Cities and states in Europe, 1000–1800." Theory and Society, vol. 18, no. 5, 1989, pp. 563-584. 
729 Willis, Graham Denyer. The killing consensus: police, organized crime, and the regulation of life and death in urban 
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institutions, etc.). However, unless a criminal economy develops security capacities of its 
own, it is very likely that a racket operated by a security institution is providing it with pro-
tection and hence expanding its own security capabilities. As Blok observed: the more suc-
cessful the bandit, the more likely it receives state protection. As I have argued in this thesis, 
state protection rackets in the criminal economy tend to translate into the expansion of the 
actual security capabilities of the state that enables these activities ––an often overlooked 
form of ‘revenue’ driving in important ways the ‘securitisation’ and ‘policing’ processes 
shaping the social order in contexts of austerity. The obscured, grey, deep, dual, parallel, 
informal, hidden nature of state rackets in criminal economies has tended to discourage aca-
demic research. This deficiency in knowledge, as well as the lack of a theoretical framework 
to render it intelligible, is particularly noticeable as we leave the local and social spheres and 
draw closer to the central gradients embodied by security institutions. In other words, 
whereas a lot of progress has been made in furthering our empirical and theoretical under-
standing of how criminal economies enable the regulation of social life at local levels, we 
have studied much less the role that criminal economies have played in more ‘macro’ histor-
ical events generating national and transnational hierarchies. Using Mexico as a case study, 
and building on a framework that updates and expands the discussion of “banditry” as a key 
actor in the political and security process, this thesis has hopefully contributed to partially 
filling this gap by rendering more visible the ‘macro’ logic that drives, in particular, the cap-
italist state to instrumentalise criminals in more recent historical periods.    
The logic of co-opted banditry in the state-making process 
As noted by Tilly, robbing, looting, raping, and similar ‘crimes’ were a trademark in the war 
economy of the feudal and early modern periods because they represented ‘easy’ currency 
for the cash-pressed rulers seeking to expand and centralise political geographies in Eu-
rope730. This thesis has shown that the instrumentalisation of predators and criminals contin-
ued to weigh heavily when the orientation of security apparatuses shifted inwardly. In this 
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respect, the thesis took a step back to look more closely into the role of banditry in the ag-
gregated security dynamics of emergent liberal states. It argued that the unprecedented in-
tensification of banditry in the 18th and 19th centuries–– amply recorded in the literature –– 
was often (although not always) closely related to the liberalisation of economic relations 
and the collapse of premodern governance resting on ‘irrational’ fetters to capitalist accumu-
lation. In effect, as noted by Hobsbawm, banditry as a social phenomenon tends to become 
acute at the end of ‘long’ socio-economic cycles because of the economic disruption that 
underlines these transitions… hence its connection with the rationalisation of economic re-
lations driving the rise of nation-states731. What Hobsbawm underestimated, however, was 
the historical role of banditry – generated by economic dislocation brought about by the lib-
eralisation cycle – in the logic of re-building a body politic able to command substantial 
authority over the means of violence. Rather than a ‘social’ rebel challenging capitalist trans-
formation, successful bandits were successful when servicing the capitalist process, a key 
observation put forward by the revisionist ‘bandit’ literature initiated by Anton Blok. The 
only way in which the emerging and feeble liberal state could police an alienated economic 
landscape was by co-opting some of the preying actors it had itself generated. Multiple rea-
sons, all predicated on austerity, rendered co-opted banditry the prototypical security appa-
ratus for emerging liberal elites. Bandits, as noted in this thesis, were often the seminal police 
bodies generating through violent means a capitalist social order.  
The importance of co-opted banditry in a liberalisation process reflects the security chal-
lenges intrinsical to any process that rests on social dispossession. First, the liberalisation of 
economic relations (in land and labour) sets in motion unprecedented economic turmoil, driv-
ing swarms of dislocated lumpen into the ‘easy life’ of banditry. The collapse of the old order, 
and the anarchic conditions that follow, mean that no authority is available to secure from 
these predators the property and capital now in the hands of a new ‘liberal’ class. The mem-
bers of this class have little option but to resort to bandit groups in order to confront the 
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security challenges (including the prevalence of banditry itself) that mark this transition. A 
key thing to note here is that, because co-opted bandits continue to prey under the protection 
of their capitalist masters, they represent a particularly attractive form to generate formal and 
informal security apparatuses from the point of view of their enablers: securitisation on the 
cheap. Banditry in the 18th and 19th centuries was used by emerging elites for a multiplicity 
of purposes, aimed often at ‘pacifying’ or ‘policing’ the interests of the social group inherit-
ing power from the old system.  
The uses given to co-opted bandit gangs were diverse and contingent on the particular and 
heterogeneous social conditions where, often, capitalisation generated them. These included, 
for example, using bandits as bodies to eliminate the residues of the old regime, or to guard 
the wealth and property inherited by the capitalist class, or to form early national policing 
systems, or to target separatism and ethnic nationalism, or to enforce work relations, secure 
borders, rig elections, etc. Co-opted bandits, incorporated as policing bodies, embodied often 
the emerging state’s ‘shook-troops’ to repress the antagonisms generated by the ‘enclosures’ 
deployed in the countryside. When the liberal class reinvented itself as the industrial class, 
bandits, often behind blue uniforms, became instruments to contain a labour movement trig-
gered, in turn, by the liberalisation of working conditions. At every turn, banditry represented 
a security apparatus tapping into predatory economies to police increasingly capitalist forms 
of economic relations in a context of limited state capacity (austerity). While the noted pur-
poses that led liberal states to co-opt bandits were diverse and contingent on context, a key 
contribution advanced in this work has been to show that the historical aim behind the co-
optation of banditry allows for historical synthesis and extends, in similarly varied forms, to 
the policing and securitisation dynamics of the contemporary world.   
The general ‘logic’ underlined in this framework pertaining to state-making and state theory 
sought to make better sense of the determinants and aims behind the co-optation of bandits 
and their predatory economies in global history. These historical cases and theoretical points 
of reference help to anticipate the logic behind forms of paramilitarism and parapolicing sup-
ported by state protection rackets in transnational drug economies a century later. A contri-
bution of this thesis has been to assert the poorly noticed global input that these ‘bandit’ 
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economies continued to enjoy in the global expansion of U.S. security interests, an instru-
mentalisation that echoes the role of brigands and filibusters in the logistics of former em-
pires. Akin to all economies associated with preying, banditry and crime, the reasons that 
gave transnational drug markets their key importance were that they represented the swiftest, 
richest, lowest-barrier alternative to expand the security capabilities of those who happened 
to protect them. Resembling in key ways the logic of co-opted banditry in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, the main aim behind the co-optation of transnational drug markets during the Cold 
War was, likewise, to develop security capabilities ultimately deployed to contain the alien-
ation implicated by a more ‘global’ period of social dispossession.   
Transnational drug markets and the state-making process 
A useful angle from which to approach the key importance of transnational drug markets in 
the ‘macro’ political dynamics of the 20th century is to step back and grasp just how central 
the narcotics economy has been in the logistics of empire all along. In addition to its une-
qualled importance in generating favourable trade balances for British imperialism, opium 
monopolies represented the most important source of revenue in most European colonies in 
Asia throughout the 19th century. This key commodity alone was the second source of reve-
nue in the British Empire in India. It represented 60% of taxes in the Straits Settlements, 40% 
in British Malaysia, 40 to 60% in French Indochina and 70% in Dutch Java732. The im-
portance of narcotics as a low-barrier economy to fund the administration of empire is re-
markable. Moreover, its key role in the logistics of imperialism underlines the unmatched, 
intrinsic value that vice possesses as a political economy in ‘macro’ political configurations, 
rendering more intelligible the role that, a century later, transnational drug markets would 
play, for example, in the clandestine economies of ‘colonial’ counterinsurgency.  
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In this regard, no other work has been more influential in advancing a new paradigm to study 
the macro-political implications of the transnational drug market than Alfred McCoy´s doc-
toral thesis “The politics of heroin”733. The findings reported by McCoy gave foot to a grow-
ing body of literature aimed at making sense of the links between drug markets and U.S. 
security during the Cold War period. McCoy´s key original contribution lies in documenting 
the extent to which protection rackets in the global drug trade after WW II supported in direct 
and indirect ways the global reach of the U.S. security apparatus. Covert exploitation of pro-
tection rackets in the transnational drug trade represented a mechanism that, first deployed 
in French Indochina to combat nationalist guerrillas, adapted the more transparent exploita-
tion of vice economies in the service of old colonialism. Justified by the global threat of 
communism, this more recent instrumentalisation of banditry was deployed in multiple the-
atres in South East Asia, South America, Central America and Central Asia, in order to cope 
less with communism than with the social antagonisms generated by the expansion of U.S. 
capital. A key thing to note in this regard is that the establishment of protection rackets in the 
interconnected geographies of the global narcotics business aligned the most important ‘ban-
dit’ economy of the period with the interests of the U.S. security establishment. Handled 
more directly by appendant security bodies, including state and non-state actors, this instru-
mentalisation translated as ever into weapons, ammunition, soldiers, as well as intelligence 
capabilities, counterinsurgency infrastructure and parapolicing bodies generating a global or-
der reflecting U.S. interests. The instrumentalisation of ‘bandit’ economies during the Cold 
War expanded in less visible ways the ability of hosts to repress political opposition, militant 
unions, communist and socialist parties, guerrilla movements and other manifestations of 
social antagonisms. The direct and indirect use that the U.S. national security apparatus made 
of transnational criminal economies was so regular that it drove to a considerable extent the 
shifting geography of the global trade in the second half of the 20th century.  
The instrumentalisation of criminals to advance the interests of capital points, more gener-
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ally, to the hidden contradictions involved in the construction of liberal hegemony. The in-
strumentalisation of banditry noted in this work embodies a legal ambiguity enabling an ‘ex-
ception’ to break the rule of law (in dictatorships this question is irrelevant) to promote a 
range of national security interests in a political order purportedly guided by the positivity of 
the rule of law. These contradictions surface most often, as the cases that I have analysed 
tend to suggest, from clashes between the security apparatus and the justice system, for as 
Hannah Arendt suggests, “the principle of separation of power […] actually provides a kind 
of mechanism, built into the very heart of government, through which new power is con-
stantly generated”734. What this shows is that the power of these ‘deep’ structures in the se-
curity apparatuses of liberal states is not absolute but can be challenged because, and only 
because, of the separation of powers that liberalism, paradoxically, entails. It was, after all, 
the division between the executive branch and the justice system in the U.S. system that 
allowed outsiders to grasp the ‘exceptional’ mechanisms embodied, for example, in the ex-
ploitation of contraband markets by the DFS to fund counterinsurgency activity (triggered 
by a ‘loose’ FBI indictment), or the involvement of the DFS in drug markets (generated by 
the DEA’s investigation of the murder of Enrique Camarena), or the use of cocaine markets 
to fund the Nicaraguan Contra (revealed by a major congressional investigation by the U.S. 
Senate) or the puzzling arrest of Genaro García Luna (indicted by the FBI). In other words, 
the tensions between the rule of law and the security apparatus render, at times, aspects and 
traces of these ‘exceptional’ entanglements ––their underlying logic, and their intimate con-
nection with economic liberalism–– a bit less ‘deep’. As Schneider and Schneider noted with 
regards to the light that the Maxiproceso brought into Cosa Nostra’s input into the political 
system in Italy (leading to the collapse of the First Italian Republic in 1992), “[i]t is precisely 
at historical moments of transparency when it is possible to see the weaving-together of ille-
gality and legality occurring amongst states and societies. It is then that the state as a power 
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system shows its other, more covert end”735. Importantly, although these ‘moments of trans-
parency’ uncover some aspects of what makes the ‘exception’ (i.e. enabling crime) both pos-
sible and permissible, they also underline how the ‘exception’ is a key security process sup-
porting policing and securitisation at local, national and transnational levels involved in cap-
italist transformation.  
The analysis hopefully rendered more visible the predicaments that drive the historical pro-
cess, often inevitably, to instrumentalise criminals. The fact that the state-making process 
and organised crime share the exact same root –– bud from the same plant –– explains why 
they look so alike at so many levels. The contribution here has been to make better sense of 
the historical logic driving more contemporary forms of co-opted organised crime in the 
making of Mexican modernity. Building on these global patters, the thesis looked at the role 
that criminal economies played in the state-making process in modern Mexico. To do so, it 
made use of ‘historical moments of transparency’ (declassified archives, unsealed judicial 
records, FBI investigations, DEA testimonies, PJF conversations) to make better sense of the 
relationship between transnational organised crime and the state-making process under the 
PRI regime. 
The PRI and the political economy of crime 
Taking a step back, chapter two noted that co-opted banditry in Mexico played a notable role 
in the securitisation process that followed the breakdown of the colonial order and the rise of 
the liberal state in the mid-19th century. State collapse, budgetary austerity and social anarchy 
led emerging Mexican liberal elites to instrumentalise some of the very preying generated by 
the economic process that enabled their ascent to generate capabilities to pacify the antago-
nisms attached to this new order. Once again, the structural ‘rebooting’ of the state-making 
process enhanced the importance of preying as a political economy deployed to secure this 
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transformation. By protecting and allowing bandits to ‘prey’ in more targeted ways, the lib-
eral state brought down the costs of securing tense social relations. Half-bandit, half-police, 
the first federal police in Mexico, Los Rurales, was not only the body deployed to secure new 
property relations but, more concretely, the state’s arm to repress class antagonisms gener-
ated by the liberalisation of land and labour. The social antagonisms created by the liberali-
sation process in Mexico, generated in particular by the swift and brutal (U.S.-led) capitali-
sation of the rural economy (as Alan Knight and John Mason Hart have observed) were suc-
cessfully dealt with through co-opted banditry for a number of decades. The bandit continued 
to prey by virtue of the services it provided to the dominant class, and the position of this 
class rested on services provided by the bandits. The extreme liberalisation of economic re-
lations in the 19th century became, nevertheless, too grand to be contained. The result was 
the 20th century´s first major social eruption, the Mexican Revolution.  
Once the violent period of the revolution had ended, the coalition of surviving military cau-
dillos began to lay down, one by one, the foundations of a national state. Political centralisa-
tion in the early decades after the revolution was stimulated by two fundamental processes: 
mass incorporation to state-controlled organisations and the federalisation of taxation. Re-
garding mass incorporation, Chapter 2 noted how the populist program of Cardenismo, giv-
ing land to peasants and benefits to labour in return for affiliation to the state, laid down the 
early infrastructure of social governance under the PRI party. By reversing in notable ways 
the capitalist process that triggered the Mexican revolution, Cardenismo brought social sta-
bility to the country. In other words, Cardenismo represented a period in which the emerging 
PRI state mitigated labour and peasant demands namely by supporting them. This allowed 
the regime to establish, nevertheless, the basis of a corporative system that could be used, 
rather than to enable, to curb and mitigate social demands. With regards to the federalisation 
of levies, the regional dispersion of the revenue system began to be reversed by a progressive 
centralisation of taxation powers, a transfer pretty much complete by the end of the 1940s. 
State revenue and the origin of patronage began to orbit closer to the federal state, discour-
aging centrifugal tendencies and encouraging the ‘centralisation of abuse’ embodied by the 
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president and the familia revolucionaria. Centralisation of taxation made states and muni-
cipios more reliant on the federal government, strengthening executive power and laying 
down channels to intervene in regional politics. This made formal and informal intermediary 
bodies (like caciques and charros) more dependent on the party elite than on their social 
bases ––hence inclining the decision-making process in a more top-to-down direction. Simi-
larly, the federal government’s more assertive role in criminal economies, particularly in the 
border region, did not displace but certainly undermined the power of regional powers by 
bringing this ‘key’ economy (critical in regions like Tamaulipas, Baja California, Sonora and 
Sinaloa) to support the party hierarchy.    
Once the populist policies under Cardenismo had laid down the foundations of the corpora-
tive structure, the structure turned decisively to the right, enabling the perdurable capitalist 
orientation that characterised the single-party regime thereafter. After the administration of 
Cárdenas, the PRI state made itself much more available to the interests of capital, especially 
after the presidency that opened in Mexico the Cold War period, the administration of Miguel 
Alemán. Alemanismo gave the PRI state its intense pro-capitalist orientation with two im-
portant long-term consequences. On the one hand, the merging of the PRI elite and big busi-
ness hampered in important ways (especially because of massive tax breaks) the state’s abil-
ity to generate revenue (Mexico was one of the worst-performing fiscal economies in Latin 
America for decades). This fiscal pit, in turn, generated the very austerity that made rent-
seeking such a salient pillar in generating the PRI national structure. In other words, by se-
verely hampering the state’s ability to generate revenue, Alemanismo drove the state appa-
ratus to support itself through systematic abuse of authority. This entailed the identification 
of public office with a tool expected to generate personal rents, often even reporting a portion 
of these rents back into the system. The extent to which these predatory and extortionist 
practices supported the reproduction of power in modern Mexico represented, thereafter, a 
form of global trademark characteristical of the PRI regime.  
On the other hand, the resumption of capitalist accumulation (a process that the Mexican 
revolution had halted) called for an expansion of the repressive capabilities of the state. The 
creation of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad, which partly filled this gap, aimed at two 
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goals. In the short term, it created the repressive capabilities necessary to neutralise the ob-
stacles opposing the political reorientation brought under Alemanismo (social movements 
like Cardenismo, Henriquismo, the Railroad Union, the Communist Party, etc.). In the long 
run, it laid down the ability to anticipate and address more chirurgically the tensions and 
antagonisms that the pro-capitalist agenda of the PRI was to bring about. The expansion of 
security capabilities to deal proactively and reactively with social protest was the logic be-
hind the creation of the DFS and would continue to embody its core mandate for the entire 
Cold War period.  
Like the PRI system in general, the DFS economy became supported by predatory activities. 
Protecting or directly running ‘bandit’ economies, particularly in contraband and transna-
tional drug trafficking, represented the initial capital that brought the DFS into existence. The 
state, once again, had ‘integrated’ the bandit to advance a particular form of socioeconomic 
order in a more extended geography. In this regard, Chapter 2 noted how the very establish-
ment of the DFS was predicated on the creation of a protection racket in the drug and con-
traband business operated by DFS agents. Carlos Serrano, the power figure in the early DFS 
–– a career bandit who had worked with Alemán since his early rise in the state of Veracruz 
–– not only used his position and credentials to assert the position of the DFS in criminal 
markets but led an assault on social leaders that, as McCormick points out, may very well 
represent the true beginning of the Guerra Sucia in Mexico736. Criminal rackets in contra-
band, drug trafficking, and other illegal domains represented a key income supporting the 
life of a fiscally deprived security apparatus. The use of these activities was known, endorsed 
and enabled by a U.S. security apparatus in the process of building a regional security bu-
reaucracy guided by American interests. In this regard, the instrumentalisation of banditry to 
advance its Cold War agenda in Mexico would replicate mechanisms deployed elsewhere.  
Despite being factually situated above the law, an apparatus that legalizes the illegal or ena-
bles the exception can clash with the very mandate of law enforcement. Tensions between 
 
736 McCormick, Gladys. "The last door: Political prisoners and the use of torture in Mexico's Dirty War." The Americas, 
vol. 74, no. 1, 2017, pp. 57-81. 
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institutions can lead to ‘historical moments of transparency’, but this is only possible where 
a functional division between the executive and the judiciary exists. This makes the logic of 
criminal entanglements and other notable aspects in the history of the state in Mexico – a 
state defined precisely by its unparalleled lack of division of powers – incredibly difficult to 
document. To narrow this gap, the thesis began drawing on ‘moments of transparency’, ren-
dered by the U.S. justice system, to make better sense of who, in praxis, enjoyed the ability 
to enable banditry in Mexico, a focus that challenged the equivocal division of police and 
bandit that informs public views. A unique window into these ‘purposely obscured’ depths 
was, as noted by Chapter 3, the tensions generated by the clash between the justice system 
and the national security apparatus in the Nazar Haro case, concerning grand-scale contra-
band at the U.S. border. The director of the DFS, Miguel Nazar, was indicted by the FBI for 
heading a major contraband ring at the U.S.-Mexico border, a racket dating back to at least 
the mid-1970s. Using official memorandums obtained through Freedom of Information re-
quests at the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., the thesis was able to document 
not only Nazar´s leading position in these transnational rackets but, even more importantly, 
the effective mobilisation and intervention of the U.S. security apparatus to protect its client 
from U.S. law enforcement. Triggered by an ‘exception’ turned legitimate in the national 
interest, the episode underlined the direct or indirect use that the U.S. security apparatus made 
of criminal economies to fund appendant security bodies abroad. It also illustrated how the 
U.S. security establishment, much more than the DFS or Nazar himself, represented the ulti-
mate keystone that supported protection rackets aimed at containing and repressing social 
discontent in its sphere of influence. The cost of protecting Nazar from law enforcement, 
although politically high, was proportional to the role that Nazar played for two decades as 
the leading Mexican partner of the U.S. security establishment and main architect of repres-
sion during the dirty wars. Chapter 3 noted that Nazar, trained in counterinsurgency at the 
School of the Americas, created and headed the Brigada Especial Antiguerrillas. Under mul-
tiple names, BEA represented from 1965 to 1982 the regime’s central vehicle in its war 
against rural and urban guerrilla and its ‘social bases of support’. Like the DFS more gener-
ally, BEA supported its activities by protecting or tapping directly into the ‘exception’ em-
bodied by the instrumental bandit. For example, Col. Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro, BEA´s 
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leading field operator (trained in counterinsurgency at Fort Bragg) used the drug business to 
support paramilitary activity in the guerrilla-dense sierra of the state of Guerrero. According 
to declassified documents from the Archivo General de la Nación, and corroborated by first-
hand testimonies, Acosta established an aerial drug-trafficking corridor from Guerrero to the 
U.S. border. The operation made use of military planes employed, concurrently, for counter-
insurgency operations. Moreover, declassified documents also note that, by tapping into the 
key economy of opium production in Guerrero, Acosta was able to run paramilitary squads 
(such as the little-known Grupo Sangre) to suppress insurgency in the most impoverished 
sierras in Mexico. The chapter also showed how the highest-ranking members in BEA (Fran-
cisco Sahagun Baca, Francisco H. Quiroz Hermosillo, Arturo Durazo Moreno, among others) 
were concurrently tasked by the PRI party with running extensive protection rackets in crim-
inal economies and deploying the state’s repressive agenda. These actors headed Mexico’s 
secret police until the early 1980s.  
While official involvement in drug and contraband markets is well-established, the connec-
tion between the ‘taxes’ generated by these rackets and the actual activities that these rackets 
enabled has been missing in the historical analysis. The contribution of this thesis has been 
not only to document these obscured episodes more thoroughly but to show how they repli-
cated and connected with patterns in parapolicing and counterinsurgency employed to target 
the ‘internal enemy’ elsewhere. Notwithstanding the vast differences separating these multi-
ple social contexts, what these global patterns suggest is that state involvement in the drug 
business, rather than explicable through a localised, self-contained logic, points to broader 
geographies of power, reflects global hierarchies, and facilitates profound structural transfor-
mations. As the evidence presented in this thesis shows, behind the co-optation of bandit 
economies lied a high degree of elite agency, embodying a state of exception, to harness 
repressive capabilities by tapping into organised crime. Like co-opted banditry before it, 
these capabilities contained and suppressed, on the cheap, the very tensions associated with 
a top-to-down capitalisation process gravitating American hegemony. But even more so than 
‘America’, what surfaces again and again when analysing historical co-opted banditry as a 




Narcotics production in Mexico, limited until the 1970s, gravitated around local political 
networks, state-level law enforcement agencies and other political brokers serving as the lo-
cal synapses of the regime. Underlining the ancillary input of these markets in supporting 
federal security agencies after Alemanismo does not mean to suggest that the entire drug 
commodity chain came under the agencies' direct control. What is argued instead, as the cases 
analysed above tend to suggest, is that the creation of the DFS under Alemanismo, estab-
lished along its central involvement in transnational drug circuits, gave the federal govern-
ment an unprecedented platform to intervene in these markets, generating in turn security 
processes rooted in criminal markets as repeatedly demonstrated at the key historical junc-
tures noted in this text. As Astorga suggests, the transnational drug market under the PRI, 
unlike drug markets in other geographies, was manufactured and regulated at the heart of the 
Mexican state. Carlos Serrano, founder of the DFS, is noted in intelligence cables as the 
decisive actor in the transnational drug business, and his central involvement in the drug trade 
would be replicated by other DFS directors enjoying an unrivalled capacity to consolidate, 
for instance, nation-wide drug trafficking organisations operating under direct DFS tutelage. 
Penetrating the national drug network during Alemanismo provided the DFS not only with 
an unrivalled capacity to serve as a central regulator of the drug trade, but to exploit this 
economy in accordance with the security mandate it embodied. This ability would also gear 
the subsequent capacity of the PJF to regulate the transnational business in a relatively cen-
tralised fashion, providing it with key operational income and allowing for drug violence to 
remain formidably low. The state, as a whole, ‘integrated’ drug markets, but the ability to 
oversee these markets, echoing global experiences, lay especially in the prominent position 
occupied by federal agencies attached to the executive within a national landscape composed 
of a mosaic of social, political and economic actors involved in the trade. Admittedly, further 
research is needed to understand the nature and extent of DFS involvement in the drug and 
contraband trade, especially in between the mid 1950s and the mid 1970s. Future insights 
generated by ‘moments of transparency’ will hopefully shed light onto the nature of DFS 
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involvement in the period in-between Alemanismo and Operación Condor. The latter, repre-
senting a moment in which DFS involvement in the drug trade edged the ‘integration’ phase 
suggested by Barnes, demonstrated nevertheless the rooted capacity of the DFS to effectively 
shape drug markets in accordance with the interests of the regime as a whole. As Snyder 
suggests, the consolidated protection racket embodied by the PRI party required a relatively 
centralised ‘institution of protection’ argued here to rest, in particular, on the shoulders of the 
DFS. What the DFS did enjoy after Alemanismo, and what regional actors lacked, was a 
nation-wide network of drug actors and informants, connections with international brokers, 
and an attachment to a U.S. security apparatus with a noted capacity to intervene global drug 
flows. An important point noted here is that the DFS did not merely ‘regulate’ drug and 
contraband rackets, but that its operational activities, like the PJF subsequently, were sup-
ported to a large extent by its ability to extort the drug and contraband business along a mul-
tiplicity of actors at subnational levels. The limited output of the drug market until the 1970s, 
in combination with other criminal activities (such as contraband, car theft rings, among oth-
ers) enabled key economies supporting the operational activities and routines of the DFS 
network. The multiple inputs of the drug economy into the political process of the PRI regime 
should be seen as part of a process noted by harmony rather than contradiction. Despite its 
limited input until the 1970s, extorting drug activities, along with many other forms of crim-
inality, geared to an important extent the security capabilities of the PRI regime to address, 
in particular, the pacification of social antagonisms. In other words, the point is that drug 
markets, despite its limited global output until the early 1970s, where nevertheless ancillary 
to DFS operations, along with a much greater pool of criminal activity. As noted by Snyder, 
the consolidated protection racket of the PRI regime and the ability to regulate its key nodes 
allowed for the remarkably peaceful nature of the drug business until the downfall of the PRI 
regime and its key security agency. Rather than arguing that drug markets were fully con-
trolled by DFS actors, what is argued here is that the agency’s capacity to extort transnational 
flows (and, in the 1970s, even drug production) contributed in a decisive way to deploying 
the peculiar but decisively capitalist order embodied by the PRI regime. DFS involvement in 
the drug, contraband and other criminal economies not only grew in accordance with the size 
of the drug market (leading to the DFS being labelled the actual cartel) but also in accordance 
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with the growing social antagonisms it was called to repress. Often portrayed as antagonistic 
actors, criminal economies were ancillary to state security processes, a development that ech-
oes the more general role that ‘bandits’ attached to a ruling elite have historically played to 
consolidate its political clout and ability to affect social outcomes in historically significant 
ways.     
Securitisation under the ‘War on Drugs’ 
Rather than aiming at a ‘guerra total’ on drug trafficking, I have argued that the ‘War on 
Drugs’ expands and deepens the global reach of the U.S. state security apparatus, aimed first 
and foremost at supporting, like past instances of co-opted banditry, capital’s dissemination 
in society. Focused on more recent developments (namely Plan Colombia) a similar conclu-
sion has been advanced by Dawn Paley, who argues that the “war on drugs” has never aimed 
at making Prohibition effective but rather deployed as “a war strategy that ensures transna-
tional corporations access to resources through dispossession and terror.737” For Paley, the 
war on drugs has enabled state terror on indigenous peoples, peasants, and the poor, to pave 
the way for transnational commercial interests and extractive industries. In addition to cloak-
ing paramilitary and counterinsurgency campaigns to advance the interest of transnational 
capital, this thesis has shown the key and covert role of drug economies to support the secu-
rity apparatuses deploying this agenda. In other words, drug enforcement has not only 
cloaked state repression but represented a crucial economy supporting repressive activities.  
A recurrent mechanism for the expansion of U.S. global influence has lied in expanding the 
host’s security capabilities to address these antagonisms and embed American interests into 
domestic political processes. Chapters 2 and 3 noted that investments in the host’s security 
apparatus (military equipment, instruction, intelligence, policing systems) date back to the 
formation of America’s early regional empire. As McCoy has noted, the chief outcome of 
U.S. assistance to local policing has been to make security apparatuses less the result of com-
 
737 Paley, Dawn. Drug war capitalism. AK Press, 2014. (E-book) 
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promises generated between local elites and the local population and more the result of com-
promises between local elites and the U.S. state738. Martha Knisely has made the crucial ob-
servation that this type of interventionism is qualitatively different from previous ones in 
that, whereas earlier forms of intervention were irregular events coming from ‘outside’, the 
new form of intervention, deployed especially after WW2, embedded and rooted itself 
‘within’ the security structures of the host state739. This not only gave the U.S. leverage to 
affect a crucial ladder to political power in regions like the Caribbean and Central America 
(national guards, constabularies, intelligence agencies) but made the local political elites sup-
ported by these security structures much more receptive to U.S. demands. 
From this perspective, Chapter 3 noted the overlooked but crucial importance of Operación 
Trizo/Condor in Mexico: the pivotal U.S.-led operation that shifted a securitisation process 
legitimised by the threat of communism to the threat posed by drug markets. A key contribu-
tion of this work has been to note how the security infrastructure transferred to Mexico under 
the Condor programme aimed at expanding the limited abilities of Mexico to address en-
trenched peasant revolt in the sierras. A declassified memo laid down this covert agenda in 
very explicit terms, noting how the aim of U.S. transfers under Condor was to make available 
equipment to suppress peasant uprisings. As journalist Craig Pyes noted in his reports, “Mex-
ico’s acceptance of the program had more to do with acquiring police hardware to suppress 
peasant insurgency movements than drug-enforcement”740. Confidential U.S. memos cited 
in Chapter 3 show how American security actors were concerned at this hour with the Mex-
ican government’s inability to tackle its guerilla challenges. Amply documented in declassi-
fied memos held at the Archivo General de la Nación, the extent to which those in charge of 
Condor brutalised peasants in Sinaloa was, except for counterinsurgency campaigns in the 
state of Guerrero, unprecedented in post-revolutionary Mexico. It comes as no surprise that 
those commanding the army contingents assigned to Condor were also implicated in the stu-
dent massacres of Tlatelolco and Jueves de Corpus –– crucial social demonstrations against 
 
738 McCoy, Alfred W. Policing America’s empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the surveillance 
state. University of Wisconsin Press, 2009. 
739 Huggins, Martha Knisely. Political Policing: The United States and Latin America. Duke University Press, 1998. 
740 Pyes, Craig. “Legal Murders.” The Village Voice, June 4, 1979. 
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the PRI regime. Underlining again the logic behind the guerra total narrative and its subse-
quent global mobilisation, those heading Condor not only brutalised communities suspected 
of guerrilla activity but established, in parallel, protection rackets in the narcotics economy 
that, as explained in Chapter 3, consolidated the ideal ‘integration’ type of historical control 
of drug markets under the PRI regime. After its successful deployment in Mexico (the his-
torical testing lab for U.S. foreign policy), the ‘cloaked’ transfer of military equipment for 
counterinsurgency purposes would be employed, most notably, in South America. Rather 
than a vehicle conducting a guerra total against drug traffickers, Condor (as well as, subse-
quently, Plan Colombia) led to the expansion of the host’s material capabilities to repress 
social actors (through military transfers) but also expanded the state’s economies supporting 
this repression by allocating control of the drug business to the security apparatus and/or its 
proxies. The authoritarian, top-to-down orientation of governance under the PRI was suited 
to conceal the rationale behind these expansive drug enforcement campaigns. The regime 
was not only able to deepen its grip over the transnational drug market but able to control the 
drug trafficking narrative that informed public perceptions of the phenomenon. This narra-
tive socialised thereafter the idea that drug trafficking was a self-contained, de-politicised 
phenomenon lacking macro-structural implications. As noted by Astorga and Zavala, a more 
folkloric representation of the bandit, closer to the ‘social’ bandit of Hobsbawm,  came to 
define the terms that framed the public’s, the journalist’s, and the scholar’s interpretations of 
the drug economy741.  
Banditry, neoliberalism and Mexico 
According to Hobsbawm, the historical prevalence of banditry is especially intense at the end 
of ‘long’ historical cycles742. Earlier I noted that a reason making ‘banditry’ particularly in-
tense at certain historical junctures is the seismic dislocation in economic and social relations 
 
741 Astorga, Luis. Mitología del “narcotraficante” en México. México: Plaza y Valdés, 1995; Zavala, Oswaldo. Los cárte-
les no existen: Narcotráfico y cultura en México. Malpaso Ediciones SL, 2018, pp. 61-64. 
742 Hobsbawm, Eric J. Primitive rebels: Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries. Man-
chester University Press, 1971. 
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that liberalisation brings about. Socio-economic dislocation inflates banditry because this ac-
tivity represents the swiftest, richest, lowest-barrier economic activity for those shaken by 
proletarianisation. And because preying and banditry, more than any other rent-seeking en-
terprise, are contingent on developing and making use of the means of violence, predators 
and bandits are called to play an important role in the protection and security dynamics of 
structural transformation. In a context of state collapse, the security apparatus becomes inte-
grated by drawing from these dislocated violent entrepreneurs whose ability to continue prey-
ing, in the long run, will obey their proximity with emerging economic interests and political 
patrons. As Blok noted, the more successful the bandit, the more likely it promotes the causes 
of the state.  
Alan Knight and John Mason Hart have noted the extent to which the triggers of social mo-
bilisation behind the Mexican Revolution were rooted in a particularly extreme, U.S.-led 
capitalisation process deployed in Mexico in the late 19th century743. A century later, a com-
parable wave in social violence, of a scale not seen since the revolution, emerged from a 
landscape framed by swift structural transformation transpiring growing social antagonisms. 
Led again by U.S. capital, the implementation of a radical neoliberal process in Mexico an-
nounced the end of a ‘long’ historical cycle –– expressed in the PRI state –– and the beginning 
of an accelerated period of capital accumulation driven by transnational interests. The ne-
oliberal programme deployed in Mexico under the presidency of Carlos Salinas embodied 
the harshest example of a neoliberal ‘shock doctrine’744 deployed (arguably) anywhere in the 
world. Its implementation was followed by a collapse of 70% in minimum wages in the two 
decades that followed745. Poverty engulfed 90% of the rural population, where the termina-
tion of state subsidies and the arrival of U.S. agribusiness collapsed small scale agriculture746. 
Life in the cities experienced a palpable decline, and millions left the country to join the 
 
743 Foran, John. "Reinventing the Mexican Revolution: The competing paradigms of Alan Knight and John Mason Hart." 
Latin American Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 4, 1996, pp. 115-131. 
744 Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Knopf Canada, 2007.  
745 Moreno-Brid, J. C., S. Garry, and A. Krozer. “Minimum Wages And Inequality In México: A Latin American Perspec-
tive.” Revista de economía mundial, vol. 43, 2016, pp. 113-129. 
746 Delgado Wise, R., R. García Zamora, and H. Márquez Covarrubias. “México en la órbita de la economía global del 
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underclass of illegal workers in America. The privatisation process, surpassed in scale only 
by that of the Soviet Union, led to a sharp decline in basic social services. By the end of the 
century, seven million young people between the ages of 16 and 29 would have neither edu-
cation nor employment747. Similarly, the deregulation of labour markets turned Mexico into 
the country where manufacturing jobs (aimed at capturing the exodus from the countryside) 
involved the longest working hours and earned the lowest real wages in the world. No other 
country in Latin America produced more poverty than Mexico during this period748. Even 
the physical appearance of the Mexican population, turned into the top destination for Amer-
ican cheap and unhealthy foods, synthesised the price of this neoliberal cataclysm. In this 
new economic landscape, hundreds of thousands shaken by the structural process crossed the 
line to tap into the swiftest, richest, lowest-barrier economic activities available to them: the 
economies of preying, crime, and most notably, drug trafficking. In his study on the effects 
of trade liberalisation on organised crime, Joel Herrera concludes that the workforce dis-
placed by free trade policies represented in many regions of the country "the social base of 
production, distribution and violence linked to drug trafficking”.749 For Salvador Maldonado, 
the effect of the structural transformation in the countryside (Michoacán) was an exponential 
increase in the number of people dedicated to the cultivation, processing and sale of drugs750. 
Largely ignored by most accounts of drug violence in Mexico, the unprecedented transfor-
mation framing this massive criminal spiral led not only to the generalisation of banditry but 
gave banditry a notable role in the security and protection dynamics of a decentralising state.  
No longer contained by the PRI’s ability to regulate drug markets, exerting control over these 
economies became contingent on developing the means of violence. Drug trafficking became 
the key economy generating the paramilitarised bodies that spread across Mexico. After fifty 
 
747 Gamlin, J. B., and S. J. Hawkes. “Masculinities on the continuum of structural violence: the case of Mexico’s homicide 
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years of a relative monopoly of violence, the means of violence became disjointed, pro-
tracted, disordered… partly because the underlying key economies contingent on the means 
of violence were no longer managed by the security systems of a single-party regime, and 
partly because the socioeconomic triggers that drive economically-displaced people into 
these activities extended greatly after Salinismo. The central state lost control of a vital econ-
omy for its security services when this economy began to fund the security apparatuses of 
adversarial, non-state actors. Following the policies deployed by Salinismo, the surge of ban-
ditry in Mexico triggered two notable responses by the post-PRI neoliberal state. The first 
was a comprehensive expansion of the state’s internal security apparatus, predicated on the 
narrative of the guerra total on drug cartels embodied by actors like Genaro Garcia Luna. 
This expansion in security capabilities was supported by a massive reorientation of public 
spending invested in militarised policing capabilities and supported by the U.S. through di-
rect transfers under what was labelled ‘Mexico’s version of Plan Colombia’, the Merida Ini-
tiative. Eventually, the political and economic empowerment of the armed forces, vested in 
policing the antagonisms of Mexican society, was the corollary of this process. The second 
response of the neoliberal state to address the generalisation of banditry, much less visible, 
was the co-optation of banditry itself. Compelled by the force of circumstances, emergent 
economic interests had no alternative but to come to terms with some of the banditry gener-
ated by their ascent in order to secure this new economic order. Banditry contained banditry. 
The police and the bandit continued to blend. Framed by a decentralising power structure, 
unstable, contingent and problematic alliances between the state and drug trafficking organ-
isations turned Mexico into the most violent internal conflict of the 21st century.  
What had formerly constituted an economy ancillary to state security became, amidst politi-
cal decentralisation, an economy supporting non-state security actors. This swarm of de-
tached violent capabilities emerged first in the state of Tamaulipas, the most notable histori-
cal corridor for transborder criminal activity in Mexico. As noted in Chapter 5, the historical 
embeddedness of transnational organised crime and the political process in Tamaulipas re-
flects the input of criminal rackets in the consolidation of political modernity in 20th century 
Mexico more generally, originating as an economy supporting regional caudillos (1920s to 
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1930s), to a state racket in support of a centralisation process (1940s to 1980s), to a protection 
racket captured by Salinismo (1980s and 1990s), followed by the collapse of the state racket 
and the rise of non-state security apparatuses supported by the drug economy. In addition to 
the drug economy, these non-state security actors began to tap into whatever low-barrier 
economy was made available. This lead to a swarm of preying, extortion and violence that 
engulfed all of Mexico, but that Tamaulipas experienced first.   
This swarm was called Los Zetas. Immediately after the end of the Salinas administration, 
the leader of the Gulf Cartel, now lacking political patrons, was promptly arrested. His lieu-
tenants had little option but to provision themselves with their own security capabilities. They 
needed to expand their security capabilities to address the challenges posed by an increas-
ingly hostile environment and an increasingly unsympathetic if weaker state. To procure it-
self with security, the organisation recruited poorly-paid elite members of the Mexican 
Armed Forces, demobilised Guatemalan kaibiles formerly used as U.S. proxies in Guate-
mala’s civil war, and effervescent gangs spreading out from the collapsed world of the border 
maquilas, to form the country’s first ‘autonomous’ security apparatus after half a century. 
This paramilitary organisation was Los Zetas, which in 2010 broke from its employers to 
form an autonomous organisation. Like any other state-making ‘process’, Los Zetas faced 
the challenge of constantly having to expand revenues in order to meet their security require-
ments. This led Los Zetas to ‘tax’ a wide spectrum of economic activity in Tamaulipas. The 
successful deployment of these extortion rackets, implemented with soldierly and brutal 
methods, allowed Los Zetas to interact in a much more horizontal fashion with local author-
ities – authorities that, after the collapse of the PRI regime, gained greater room in political 
autonomy. Like its predecessors, Los Zetas continued to provide Tamaulipecan authorities 
with payments, campaign contributions, gifts, services, but unlike all of its predecessors, they 
were now in a position to be able to gear their own membership in state and local police 
bodies. As noted in court records, by the early 2000s, the leaders of Los Zetas were ticking 
candidates for local office shoulder-to-shoulder with the leading politicians of the state. The 
challenge that Los Zetas posed to the Mexican state became fully evident when, in 2008, the 
state-making process drove the bandit to secure additional sources of revenue, hence expand 
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its tributary reach into new regions in Mexico, most notably the state of Michoacán. It was 
at this hour when the federal government, no longer under the PRI party, grasped the size 
and nature of a monster that, created by the state, was now in a position to turn against it. The 
drug war in Mexico officially began with mass deployments of troops and national police 
contingents in Tamaulipas and Michoacán around this time to neutralise the threat posed by 
Los Zetas. Less visibly manifested, however, was that the nature of the threat posed by Los 
Zetas encouraged alliances between the neoliberal state and other ‘bandits’. This led to a 
protracted new phase in the instrumentalisation of drug markets in Mexico, characterised by 
shifting, constantly dividing and very problematic alliances between the federal state, local 
politics and the drug business.   
Despite their violence and cruelty, bandits and criminals like Los Zetas ought to be seen as 
objective manifestations of the economic systems which they inhabit. As Hobsbawm noted, 
the bandit represents a form of social protest reacting against a world invested in its destitu-
tion. The criminal embodies the yearning of a class struggling to survive a death sentence 
imposed by processes far beyond its reach. The input of banditry in the capitalist world that 
paradoxically has alienated him has been a key process in the making of our capitalist mo-
dernity. This thesis is a contribution to note not only the paradoxical input of the criminal in 
policing and in generating this modernity but also a reminder of the modern antagonisms 




Books and articles 
Aboites, Luis. Excepciones y privilegios: modernización tributaria y centralización en 
México, 1922-1972. Colegio De Mexico AC, 2003. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Giuseppe De Feo, and Giacomo De Luca. “Weak States: Causes and Con-
sequences of the Sicilian Mafia.” NBER Working Paper, no. 24115, 2017. 
Adams, Julia. The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Mod-
ern Europe. Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Agamben, Giorgio. "What is an apparatus?" and other essays. Stanford University Press, 
2009. 
Aguayo, Sergio, ed. En el desamparo: Los Zetas, el Estado, la sociedad y las víctimas de San 
Fernando, Tamaulipas (2010), y Allende, Coahuila (2011). El Colegio de México AC, 2017. 
Alden Wily, Liz. "Looking back to see forward: the legal niceties of land theft in land rushes." 
The Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 39, no. 3-4, 2012, pp. 751-775. 
Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (Notes towards an investiga-
tion).” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, translated by Ben Brewster, New York and 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1971. 
Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investiga-
tion)." The anthropology of the state: A reader, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, pp. 86-98. 
Alvarado, Arturo et al. “Respuestas vecinales a la inseguridad pública en la ciudad de 
México.” Diálogo Internacional para la Reforma Policial en México, El Colegio de México, 
July 22-23, 2004. 
241 
 
Anderson, William L. “Power and Prosperity. By Mancur Olson. New York: Basic Books, 
2000.” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2002, pp. 85-87. 
Andreas, Peter. “The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico.” Current History, 
vol. 97, no. 618, pp. 160-165. 
Andreas, Peter. “Illicit globalization: myths, misconceptions, and historical lessons.” Politi-
cal Science Quarterly, vol. 126, no. 3, 2011, pp. 403-425. 
Andreas, Peter. Smuggler nation: how illicit trade made America. Oxford University Press, 
2013. 
Ankerson, Dudley. Saturnino Cedillo and the Mexican Revolution in San Luis Potosí. North-
ern Illinois University, 1984.  
Anter, Andreas. "The Modern State and its Monopoly on Violence." In The Oxford Hand-
book of Max Weber, Oxford University Press, 2019. 
Antony, Robert J. "Peasants, heroes, and brigands: The problems of social banditry in early 
nineteenth-century South China." Modern China, vol. 15, no. 2, 1989, pp. 123-148. 
Arbeláez, María S., et al. On the border: society and culture between the United States and 
Mexico. Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 
Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. Penguin Books, 1990. 
Arzt, Sigrid. “La militarización de la Procuraduría General de la República: Riesgos para la 
democracia mexicana.“ USMEX 2003-04 Working Paper Series. Originally prepared at the 
conference on “Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico” at the Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies, May 15-17, 2003. 
Astorga, Luis. Mitología del “narcotraficante” en México. Plaza y Valdés, 1995. 
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